NARRATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN.

HIRTY years have elapsed since the sounds of war were heard in Europe. Peace succeeded to a long tumult of hostilities in 1815, since which time there has been enjoyed a tranquillity favourable to the advancement of arts and sciences, the increase of national wealth, and the melioration of social institutions. In the course of thirty years, many changes occur in society. A vast number of the aged disappear from the scene, and a new generation is chiefly concerned in the direction of affairs. At the present moment (1846), none of the youthful part of the community know anything of war but by traditionary report. Fighting was over before they were born. On this account, a large section of our community have but an imperfect idea of the disasters and the horrors of war, and are so apt to undervalue a state of peace, that they would, without much reluctance, see a revival of discord. Lamenting the possible results of this ignorance, or indifference, we propose in the present sheet to narrate one of the most instructive chapters in the history of the last European war -a narrative which, though familiar to those in middle life, must possess all the charm of novelty to the young. The account we are to present refers to Napoleon Bonaparte, a native of Corsica, who, by great activity of mind, perseverance, and personal daring, rose, through the inferior grades of a soldier's profession, to be military dictator or emperor of France. On attaining this exalted station (1804), Napoleon showed himself to be possessed of some mean, as well as some great qualities. Instead of directing his energies to the improvement and happiness of the nation

of which he had become the head, his whole thoughts were bent on giving a factitious glory to France by means of military achievements, as well as securing his own personal aggrandisement. He aimed at making all Europe one nation, or at least cluster of nations, subservient to his wishes. He was to be the earthly deity before whom all should bow. The principal obstacle to this monstrous presumption was the power and independence of Britain. At a vast sacrifice, Great Britain resisted all the aggressions of the French emperor; and this she chiefly effected by means of the great revenues and profits derived from her trade and commerce. To ruin these resources was a settled purpose

of Napoleon.

In 1806, by what is usually called the Berlin decree, he declared the British islands to be in a state of blockade; all commerce, intercourse, and correspondence with them were prohibited. By subsequent decrees, the exclusion of British goods, and the produce of British colonies, from all continental ports, was peremptorily insisted on. These cruel injunctions were generally complied with-at least ostensibly-by every nation except Russia. That extensive and populous country, governed at the time by the Emperor Alexander, carried on a valuable trade with the United Kingdom-the raw produce of Russia, such as tallow, hides, and hemp, being advantageously exchanged for the cotton and woollen cloths, cutlery, and other manufactures of England and Scotland. The Emperor Alexander would gladly have made any reasonable compromise with Napoleon for the sake of peace, but he could not consent to ruin his country merely to satisfy vengeful and ambitious feelings in a foreign despot. In 1807, when Russia, along with Prussia, had suffered a severe defeat at Friedland, Napoleon had forcibly procured the consent of Alexander to the system which excluded dealings with England: but Russia never entered cordially into this tyrannical arrangement; and in 1810 Alexander issued an ukase, which, though nominally appearing to respect Napoleon's continental system, virtually renounced it.

The immediate cause of this ukase was not alone the injury sustained by the suspension or limitation of commerce with Britain. Russia was not a conquered nation. It had lost a battle when in the Prussian alliance; still, it was an independent empire, and entitled to be treated as such. The Russians, in short, without coming to an actual rupture, would no longer consent to be dictated to in the arrogant manner assumed by Bonaparte. There were some subordinate subjects of difference; but the principal source of irritation was Napoleon's continental system, which nothing could induce him to relax. He seemed determined to treat Alexander more as a vassal or inferior, than as an equal in sovereign power. Things were at this crisis in the early part of the year 1812.

Infatuated by an excess of prosperity, and consumed with

ambition, Napoleon did not hesitate to prepare for a military attack on Russia, and bring her to terms. Accustomed as Europe was to the extraordinary movements of Bonaparte, the announcement of this new war, which he was about to undertake, filled every one with surprise: his own friends were filled with consternation. Fouché, one of his prime adherents, in an able and eloquent address, reminded him that he was already the absolute master of the finest empire the world had ever seen, and that all the lessons of history went to demonstrate the impossibility of attaining universal monarchy. The French empire had arrived at that point when its ruler should rather think of securing and consolidating his present acquisitions, than of achieving farther conquests, since, whatever his empire might acquire in extent, it was sure to lose in solidity. Fouché stated the extent of the country which Napoleon was about to invade, and the distance which each fresh victory must remove him from his resources, annoyed as his communications were sure to be by hosts of Cossacks and Tartars. These and other admonitions were listened to with impatience. Napoleon, obstinate and imperative, despised counsel; and on this, as on many other occasions, carried his point, or silenced his advisers, by bombast and charlatanry. "Don't disquiet yourself," said he in reply to Fouché; "but consider the Russian war as a wise measure, demanded by the true interests of France and the general security. Am I to blame because the great degree of power I have already attained forces me to assume the dictatorship of the world? My destiny is not yet accomplished-my present situation is but a sketch of a picture which I must finish. There must be one universal European code-one court of appeal. The same money, the same weights and measures, the same laws, must have currency through Europe. I must make one nation out of all the European states, and Paris must be the capital of the world-it is I who assure you of it."

Advices from other counsellors were equally in vain. With the army he should be able to raise, nothing could be more easy than to bring Russia to terms. Alarmed for the consequences of plunging into so distant a war, his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, remonstrated with him on the undertaking. He conjured his kinsman to abstain from tempting Providence; he intreated him not to defy heaven and earth-the wrath of man and the fury of the elements at the same time; and expressed his apprehension that he must sink under the weight of the enmity which he daily incurred. The only answer which Bonaparte vouchsafed was in keeping with his character. He led the cardinal to a window, and opening the casement, and pointing upwards, asked him, "If he saw yonder star?" "No, sire," answered the astonished cardinal. "But I see it," answered Bonaparte; and turned from his relation, as if he had fully confuted his arguments.*

* Scott's Life of Napoleon.

Thus refusing all counsel, Napoleon may be said to have rushed on his fate. At this period he was engaged in a war with Spain; yet such was his power, that he found little difficulty in raising fresh armies; and in 1812, just before the campaign of Russia, he is understood to have had altogether-in France, Spain, Italy, and elsewhere-eight hundred thousand men in arms, independently of allies. To raise so many soldiers in France, he made forcible draughts on the whole male population between eighteen and sixty years of age. Men were everywhere torn from their families to serve in the army; leaving mothers, wives, and children in distress and destitution, and causing a large part of the common business of the country to be conducted by women. To aggravate the exhaustion of the nation, there was at this time a dearth of food, which caused a wide-spread suffering through the country. Everything tended to prove the madness of the Russian expedition, yet nothing occasioned its interruption. Accustomed to submit, and to believe in the continued good fortune of their emperor, deranged also on the subject of military "glory," the French generally entered into this new war with high hopes, or at least offered no obstacle to its commencement and progress.

Reckless as he was, Napoleon was by no means blind to the difficulties of his project. Before his armies could reach the interior of Russia, where battles were likely to be fought, they would require to march eighteen hundred miles, through different states, and across large extents of country, possessing little or no food for men or horses. As he had gained, by open force or secret intimidation, the aid of Bavaria, Saxony, Prussia, and Austria, over which his forces would necessarily advance, he had nothing to fear from any attack by the way. His chief difficulty lay in procuring and transporting supplies of provisions for his army over such a wide and almost unknown territory. Another serious obstacle to his progress was the number of rivers. Between Paris and Moscow there are various large rivers issuing into the Baltic or Mediterranean seas, and therefore flowing at right angles with the proposed line of march of the French army, The Rhine, the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, could be crossed by bridges; but the Niemen, the Berezina, the Dnieper, and some others, would require to be forded by men, horses, and wagons, and probably under the fire of an ever-vigilant and indignant enemy. Altogether, the enterprise was gigantic and hazardous. There had been nothing like it in modern history.

Napoleon's tactics as a general consisted in effecting sudden and overpowering movements; an enormous force being brought to bear on a centre of operations. On this principle he now acted. Gathering together that part of the army which France was to furnish, it was despatched in an easterly direction into Germany, where it was to unite with the levies drawn from Spain, Italy, Austria, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Poland, and the other countries over which he exerted a control. From different

directions this immense force, under able generals, drew towards a central point on the Oder, whence all were to combine in a united attack on the Russian frontier.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN.

On the 9th of May 1812 Napoleon departed from Paris, to superintend the war in person. His march through France and part of Germany to Dresden was a continued triumph. Whole nations quitted their homes to throng his path; rich and poor, nobles and plebeians, friends and enemies, all hurried to have a passing view of the great man, almost looked upon by them as a supernatural being. Kings and princes forsook their capitals to do him homage. The adulation was universal. On the 29th he departed from Dresden, taking his route through Poland; and from this time he acted as a presiding genius over the various divisions of his army, which was now hurrying on to the Vistula.

The scarcity in France, and the length of the way, caused much reliance for provisions on the countries in this quarter. But great as was Napoleon's power, he failed in his calculations in this respect. Many of his arrangements for provisioning the army fell short of what was necessary; and the subsistence of his forces-man and beast-was made to depend in a great measure on plunder. It is but justice to say that he did not sanction robbery as a principle; but he winked at it as a practice. He felt that a compromise was necessary, in order to maintain his position. "Ever since 1805," observes Segur, "there was a sort of mutual understanding-on his part, to wink at the plundering practices of his soldiers; on theirs, to suffer his ambition." In one sense, therefore, Bonaparte, in all his pomp and pride, was but the chief of a band of robbers. Like all robberies, however, this toleration of rapine recoiled on its author. The injustice and inhumanity of indiscriminate theft, accompanied as it often was by the murder of the unhappy victims, was a short-sighted policy. Aware of the merciless disposition of the French army, every one fled at its approach, with all they could carry along with them; and frequently what could not be transported to a place of security, was destroyed. It was only by making a sudden onslaught, that the marauding soldiery had any chance of securing a prey.

Between the Oder and the Vistula the army began operations, laying hold of everything useful that fell in their way: wagons, cattle, and provisions of all sorts were swept off; everything was taken-even to such of the inhabitants as were necessary to conduct these convoys. There was everywhere, however, a great want of forage. The crops of rye, yet green, were cut to feed the horses; and so insufficient was this resource, that often the thatch was stripped from the houses. Laying the country thus waste before them, the army reached the banks of the Niemen,