lost all recollection; he has even lost the sensation of his indifference, and henceforth, without sorrow and without joy, whatever may be its object, either externally or internally, he has reached impassibility, that is a condition as near Nirvana as is possible in this life. Moreover, this absolute impassibility does not prevent the ascetic acquiring at this same moment omniscience and magic power; but this is a flagrant contradiction, which does not, however, disturb the Buddhists any more than many others.

Such are the four stages of Dhyana, as gathered from all Buddhist authorities. They will not astonish any one who has studied mysticism, as it is well known how, by successive eliminations, the mind reduces itself to that transitory vacancy which is called ecstasy. The mystics of Alexandria, those of the Middle Ages, and of the Renaissance, have known, like the Buddhists and the Brahmans, these workings of the mind, struggling against self in order to temporarily destroy all its mental power. Plotinus, Gerson, Saint Teresa, all think that they thereby unite themselves to God, and become one with him. The Buddhists do not claim this, as they do not know of a God, and in the whole of Sakya-muni's system the idea of an infinite being never presents itself; but they seek and practise ecstasy, which for them is an image of the annihilation which they take for eternal salvation.

We have now seen that for the Buddhists, Dhyana is the road and preliminary conquest of Nirvāna ; but, as though the idea were not sufficiently clear, Buddhism has added to the four stages of Dhyāna four other stages, superior, or rather corresponding; these are the four regions of the world devoid of form.' The ascetic who has courageously passed through the first four stages is rewarded by entering into the region of infinite space. Thence he goes up another degree to the region of infinite wisdom. Having reached this height he attains a third region, where nothing exists. However,

as in this void and this darkness it might be supposed that an idea could subsist and represent to the ascetic the void in which he is plunged, a last and supreme effort must be made, and he then enters into the fourth region of the world devoid of form, where there are neither ideas nor even an idea of their absence. The doctrine of Dhyana may therefore be considered a decisive commentary on that of Nirvana; for as by this transitory ecstatic state a transitory annihilation is already sought for, then an eternal and definite annihilation may be sought for in Nirvana.

Buddhism has no God, it has not even the vague and confused notion of a Universal Spirit, in which, according to orthodox Brahmanism and the Sankhya, the human soul is absorbed. Neither does it admit nature properly so called, and it does not make that great distinction between the spirit and the material world which is the system and glory of Kapila; lastly, it confuses man with his earthly surroundings, even while it preaches virtue to him. It cannot, therefore, unite the human soul, which it never even mentions, either to a God whom it does not know, or to nature which it ignores. One course therefore remains for Buddhism, that is to annihilate the soul, and in order to be certain that it will not reappear under any form in this world, which it considers accursed as the abode of illusion and pain, all the elements are destroyed. This is repeated over and over again. What, then, is Nirvana if not total annihilation ?

No doubt this is a most serious statement, especially when we reflect that Buddhism at the present day counts so many followers all over the surface of the globe, that it is the belief of one-third of humanity, and that such an explanation of Nirvana implies that a third of our fellow-creatures worship annihilation, and place in it all their hopes of the future.

Doubtless it is a hideous faith, but it is no calumny to impute it to Buddhism, and history would be faithless to

itself, if it shrunk from this deplorable truth, which, moreover, sheds such light on the destinies of the Asiatic world.

It has therefore been shown, that Ṣākya-muni's ethics and metaphysics are summed up in a few simple but erroneous theories: The Four Noble Truths, Transmigration, the Mutual Connecting Links of Causes, and Nirvana, explained by Dhyana which precedes it and prepares man for it. We have only now to judge the value of these theories; rendering justice to the partial truth they contain, and pitilessly condemning the monstrous errors hidden under an apparent sublimity.

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CHAPTER V.

Critical study of Buddhism. Its merits: practical tendency, contempt of wealth, charity, sentiment of equality, meekness, austerity, resignation, horror of falsehood, respect for family ties. Its faults: social impotence, egotism, no idea of duty, ignorance of justice and liberty, scepticism, incurable despair, error as regards life and human personality, atheism. General condemnation of Buddhism. Opinions of Bayle and Voltaire on the atheism of China.

THERE is so much to be said against Buddhism, that it may be as well to begin by the good that can be justly attributed to it, for, limited as our praise must be, it will at least mitigate in some degree the severity of the judgment that must follow.

We will now, therefore, state the good points, without either exaggerating or unjustly curtailing them.

The most striking feature of Buddhism, that is as founded by the Buddha, is its practical tendency. The Buddha sets himself a great problem, which is no less than that of the salvation of mankind and even of the whole universe; and he seeks its solution by the most direct and practical method. It is true that, considering himself a philosopher, he might have indulged in speculative analysis, but the Brahmans had made such an abuse of this process that the Reformer deemed it better to abstain from it. For in seeking to penetrate into the origin of things, it is necessary to avoid sinking into needless obscurity, and speak only to a school instead of addressing the masses. Philosophy, even when it does not aim at founding a religion, should never lose sight of its first duty, which is to serve humanity; and the

philosopher who is satisfied to understand and to save himself alone, by the truth he has discovered, is little worthy of his name. If these truths were to be solely for the advantage of one individual, they would lose their value; and as for the mass of humanity, the practice of morality is of more importance than the principle on which it is grounded; it is a credit to philosophers that they induce men to live according to what is right, rather than to think according to the principles of philosophy. All reforms must be preceded and strengthened by the long study which science demands; but when the Reformer at last appears upon the scene, his teaching should be as clear and simple as possible. He speaks to the people and not to the learned. He must lead minds rather than enlighten them; promulgate precepts rather than expound theories.

Moreover, although his aim was to convert and guide the masses, Ṣākya-muni does not endeavour to attract them by gross allurements, he does not flatter their passions; and the joys he promises them are neither earthly nor material. Contrary to most religious legislators, he does not predict to his followers either conquests, power, or riches; he calls them to eternal salvation or rather annihilation, which he confounds with salvation, by the narrow path of virtue, knowledge, and austerity1. It is a great deal to expect of man, but evidently not too much; and it is well for us to hear such a noble appeal to the human heart, in times so remote and in countries which our civilization has been accustomed to dis

1 We do not mention magic power and supernatural gifts, which, according to Buddhist doctrine, science and virtue confer on those who have attained the highest degree of sanctity. The legends are full of these superstitions, which the Brahmans indulged in long before Buddhism adopted them. See Memoire sur le Sänkhya in the Memoirs de l'Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, tome viii. pp. 198, 389. The Buddha himself never made any such fallacious promises, but left such tricks of charlatanry to the adversaries he despised.