Bock to have any trouble in relation to the matter at all, and that he assumed all the responsibility."

Cross-examination by Mr. Lewis:

"Q. Well, did you act upon that suggestion?

'Ă. In what way?

"Q. Did you govern

yourself accordingly, and from that time consider that Mr. Bolster was the one man responsible in this case?

A. I think so, so far as the dog was concerned.

"Q. Do you mean to say that Mr. Bolster said on that occasion that he would assume any legal responsibility of Frank Bock's, if Frank Bock should be the man that was legally responsible in this case?

"A. I mean just what I said. He said that he did not want Mr. Bock to have any trouble about it.

"Q. He did not say that he was the keeper of the dog, did he?

"A. No, sir; he said that he was the owner of the dog."

Defendant denied that he made the statements attributed to him in this interview; but, for the purpose of determination, those statements must be considered as having been made by him, as testified to by Mr. Cavanagh. Assuming, therefore, that defendant said that he did not want Mr. Bock to have any trouble in relation to the matter at all, and that he assumed all the responsibility, the question presented is: Does this statement make the defendant liable for damages for which he could not have been held had the statement not been made?

It will be noted that the only statement of fact contained in the alleged admission is that defendant was the owner of the dog which caused the injury. This fact was already known to plaintiff; for on the day of the injury defendant went to plaintiff's home, and there told plaintiff's father that the dog was his. It is obvious that this statement, which was one of a fact already known, had no legitimate tendency to fix liability upon defendant, because the statute liability does not attach to him as owner. That part of the admission, to the effect that defendant

did not want Mr. Bock to have any trouble in relation to the matter, and that he assumed all the responsibility, may be regarded in two aspects: It may be taken as an assertion by defendant that in the state of his mind at that time he intended to assume the responsibility which rightfully rested upon the shoulders of Mr. Bock; or it may be construed as an absolute undertaking on the part of defendant to answer to plaintiff for the default of Mr. Bock. If the first view be taken, it is clear that no estoppel is suggested; if the second view be taken, it is equally clear that defendant's liability, if any, would be one growing out of contract, and not out of a tort. The facts in the case, fully known to the plaintiff before suit was brought, disclosed legal liability on the part of Bock as keeper of the dog, if any person was liable under the statute.

Plaintiff in his declaration alleges that defendant was the owner and keeper of the dog, and defendant's liabil ity is predicated upon the truth of this allegation, or upon the fact that defendant is estopped to deny its truth. The language of defendant cannot be tortured into an admission that at the time of the injury he was the keeper of the dog. And herein precisely lies the distinction between this case and the case of Robb v. Shephard, 50 Mich. 189 (15 N. W. 76). The defendant in that case was held to be estopped from denying liability, because, by her false statements as to ownership, she had induced the plaintiff to believe that she was the proper party to sue. The plaintiff, a stranger in Michigan, relied upon her statements, and expended considerable sums in prosecuting his suit against her. An examination of the record in that case shows that the jury was permitted to find that the defendant was estopped from denying that she was the keeper of the dog. This decision follows that of Meister v. Birney, 24 Mich. 435. The case at bar presents no features, such as were controlling in those just considered. No false statements were made by defendant, and all the facts bearing upon liability were fully known to plaintiff before

suit was brought. A verdict should have been directed in favor of defendant.

The judgment is reversed, and there will be no new trial.

STEERE, MCALVAY, BLAIR, and STONE, JJ., concurred. MOORE, C. J., and OSTRANDER, J., concurred in the result. BIRD, J., did not sit.

STEPHENS v. CORYELL.

1. REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS LEASE-CONTRACTS.

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· VENDOR AND PURCHASER

Where complainant, in a suit to reform a land contract so as to effect a lease of the farm conveyed, with an option to purchase, offered testimony tending to show that she executed the writing without examining it, supposing that it conformed to the oral agreement of the parties for a tenancy and option to buy, that complainant was unfamiliar with business matters, the instrument ambiguous, and containing provisions inconsistent with the purchaser's claim that it expressed the true agreement, the court rightly entered a decree interpreting the agreement in accordance with com. plainant's prayer for relief, as amended.

2. SAME ASSIGNMENT -LAND CONTRACTS.

EQUITIES OF PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH

As against an assignee of the vendee's rights transferred by an assignment and quitclaim deed, the complainant was entitled to enforce equities to which the contract was subject in the hands of the assignor.

Appeal from Saginaw; Kendrick, J. Submitted January 26, 1912. (Docket No. 128.) Decided March 12,

1912.

Bill by Mary A. Stephens against Myron E. Coryell and Guy Wickham for reformation of a written instrument. From a decree for complainant, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

James P. Devereaux, for appellants.
A. Elwood Snow, for appellee.

STONE, J. The complainant filed her bill of complaint to correct and reform a certain contract, so as to truly represent and set forth the true contract and understanding between the parties, thereby changing the same from a land contract to a lease with the option of purchase, and providing for a yearly rental of $250.

Complainant states that the contract actually made with defendant Coryell was for the lease and purchase of a certain farm, upon the following terms and conditions: That she leased said real estate to said defendant for a period of three years at an annual rental of $250, with the privilege and option to said defendant to purchase the same at any time within said term of three years upon his making payment to her in the sum of $4,500, and with the further proviso that if a purchase and sale were not effected within said period of three years, another lease and option were to be executed for a like period, and with the same rental and option, and with a further proviso that said defendant was to break up a stump lot of about 19 acres, and set out an orchard of about 100 fruit trees in the spring of 1910, and set out 6 shade trees in the driveway the same spring.

The complainant claims that the paper signed by the parties had been prepared by said defendant, and waɛ not in conformity with the mutual understanding and agreement of the parties, but is a fraud on complainant, practiced by said defendant; that at the time she signed the said paper she was attending her mother, who was sick; and that when said paper was presented to her by said de

169 MICH.-4.

fendant she supposed that the same had been prepared according to the terms of their oral agreement. The answer of defendant Coryell denies these claims of complainant, and asserts that the written contract was in exact accord with the understanding and agreement of the parties.

The contract actually signed by the parties is as follows:

"This contract, made this 30th day of April in the year one thousand nine hundred and nine, between Mrs. M. A. Van Inwagen, of the village of Chesaning, Saginaw county, Michigan, party of the first part, and Myron E. Coryell, of the same place, party of the second part, witnesseth: That the said party of the first part, in consideration of the sum of forty-five hundred dollars, to be to her duly paid as hereinafter specified, hereby agrees to sell and convey to the said party of the second part, all the following described land, situated in the township of Chesaning, county of Saginaw, State of Michigan, to wit: The east half of the east half of the northwest quarter and the west half of the west half of the northeast quarter, section seventeen (17) town nine (9) north, range three (3) east, containing 80 acres of land more or less, for the said sum of forty-five hundred dollars, which the said party of the second part hereby agrees to pay to the said party of the first part, as follows: $250 January 1, 1910; $250 January 1, 1911; and $250 January 1, 1912. At the end of three years from date hereof a new contract is to be executed between the parties hereto, or deed to be given second party on payment of purchase price. Second party to break up stump lot of about 19 acres and set out an orchard of about 100 fruit trees in the spring of 1910. No standing timber to be cut by either party. Also set out six shade trees in driveway next spring. Said party of the first part also agrees to pay in due season all taxes and assessments, extraordinary as well as ordinary, that shall be taxed or assessed on said land, including the taxes thereon for the years 1909, 1910 and 1911. It is agreed by the parties hereto, that the said party of the first part, on receiving payment in full of the said principal and interest at the times and in the manner above mentioned, and of all other sums chargeable in her favor hereon, shall and will at her own proper cost and expense, execute and deliver to the said party of the second part, a good