man does verify it. But Martial, as to his instance, was no good casuist.

9. For if it be inquired, whether I am obliged in conscience to keep my promise to a thief or a bandit, which I made to save my life; I answer that I am. Because, he being an outlaw and rebel against all civil laws, and in a state of war, whatever you promise to him, you are to understand according to that law under which then you are, which is the law of nature and force together. So that you cannot be guarded by the defensative of the civil laws, nor is your contract under its guard and conditions. In contracts under the protection of civil laws, we are to go by its measures, and the contract is good or bad accordingly. But when we have no measures but what we can get of ourselves, our contracts are to begin and end between ourselves, and by our own proportions. But in law, no man is supposed to have consented, but he in whose power it is to dissent. "Si vis scire ut velim, effice ut possim nolle:" and every contract must have ὄρεξιν κατεξούσιον, as Damascen calls it, 'a desire free from all bond.' Αὐτεξούσιον δὲ, ὅτι μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. - If there be force and a sad necessity in it, it is a calamity rather than a contract; and therefore the laws intend to defend and rescue us from the oppression.

10. I am to add one caution, that no reverential fear, let it be ever so great, and the person ever so timorous, so that the use and ministries of reason be left, can excuse a sin, or nullify a contract. The reason is given by Aristotle: Ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, “The father's empire hath in it no violence and no coaction." And Heliodorus Prusæus, in his paraphrase, saith the same thing, that "the commands of parents," or such whom we reverence and fear, τὴν ἰσχὺν οὐχ οὕτω μεγάλην ἔχειν ὥστε βιάζεσθαι, “ have not such force as to compel :" not but that we are to obey; but that what we do out of reverential fear to them, is not compelled, but voluntary and chosen.

11. What is said of fear, is not true of other passions, lust and anger, or whatever else is productive of those effects which use to make men ashamed, and disorder all their interests. 1. Because these passions are seldom of that nature

and degree of violence as to take away all powers of deliberation; and therefore they are but seldom fit to be pretended in excuse of any action. 2. They are commonly the true mothers, the univocal parents, of their productions, otherwise than it is in fear, and drunkenness, and ignorance; for these produce things of a nature different from their immediate principles, as drunkenness produces effects of anger, of lust, &c. that is, it is the occasion of them, not the proper mother. But lust produces lust, and anger sends forth angry words, and spiteful actions, and resolutions of revenge. 3. The products which come from these passions, are so very far from being rendered involuntary, that by these passions they are made most delightful, and without them they could not please at all. 4. Whenever they prevail to any violence or extremity of degree, it is by an increasing will; not by weakness and natural infirmity, but by a moral state of infirmity, that is, a state of sinfulness. 5. It is not in these as it is in fear, or vincible ignorance, that what is voluntary in the cause, may be involuntary in the effect: but in these passions and temptations, the mother and the daughter are chosen; not the one directly and the other by interpretation, but both of them properly, directly, and immediately. For these reasons the case of these passions is curiously to be distinguished from the precedent. But when these passions do come to extremity, although their proper acts are not the less sins, but the greater, as an act of anger is the more devilish, by how much the passion is the more extreme; yet if any equivocal and contingent effects be produced, as if in the violence of lust, a child be run over and hurt, or any thing that is not natural to that passion, nor intended by the man, then according to the degree of the ecstasy and transport by the passion, the contingent effect may be lessened in its malignity. And in this sense is that of Libanius s to be understood; or else it is not true, that injuries are very often to be remitted, if the man hath drunkenness for his excuse, ἢ θυμὸν, ἢ προπέτειαν, ἢ λήθην, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, " or anger, or forgetfulness, or arrogance, or any such-like thing."-Like to this is that of Arrius Menander; "Capital punishments are not to be inflicted 'per vinum aut lasciviam lapsis,' 'to them that offend by the follies of drunkenness, or the violence of lust.' "

- Et vino tortus, et ira:

Wine and rage are like two racks, and compel men to open secrets. Now when the case is so that the effect is equivocal, as it is in drunkenness in many instances, and in other passions sometimes, there only there is some diminution or excusing of the crime. But the ancients gave too much liberty, and an indifferent sentence in these cases, because, wanting the Christian measures, they understood no better.

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CHAP. II.

OF THE FINAL CAUSE OF HUMAN ACTIONS; AND ITS INFLUENCE OR CAUSALITY OF GOOD AND EVIL.

RULE I.

In every good Action the Means and the End must be symbolical: so that, 1. a good Action done for an evil End, and, 2. an evil Action done for a good, are alike criminal.

1. THE first part of this rule is in the express words of our blessed Lord", "Take heed that you give not your alms ber fore men, to be seen of them." Even 'alms,' which are our righteousness,' and so rendered both by the Arabic and the Vulgar Latin, yet if done to vain-glorious purposes, are good for nothing, but are directly acts of vain-glory. Τῆς εὐποιΐας · σαλπιζομένης ὄφελος οὐδὲν, saith St. Basil; "The noise of a trumpet spoils our alms." -For 'from the end every action is qualified; and an indifferent action is made good and bad by the end; and that which is so already, is made more so by a participation of that to which it is designed. For the end changes the nature as well as the morality of the action. So Aristotle *: Εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύοι καὶ προσλαμβάνοι, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν· οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης· ἐκεῖνος δ ̓ ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ ̓ οὔ. "He that commits adultery for

gain, is covetous, not lascivious: but he that spends his money and suffers loss for his lust's sake, he is the wanton." -And therefore God and all wise men regard not the exterior action in their accounts of virtue, but the manner and purpose of doing it. "Quoniam quidem non in facto laus est, sed in eo quemadmodum fiat. Eadem res si gulæ datur, turpis est : si honori, reprehensionem effugit. Amico ægro aliquis assidet? probamus: at hoc si hæreditatis causa facit, vultur est; cadaver exspectat": so Seneca: "The praise and virtue are not in the thing done, but in the manner of doing. If we spend great sums of money in our kitchen, it is sordid: but if upon public works, on colleges and hospitals, on the poor or upon religion, it is brave and noble. He that visits his sick friend in charity, does well; but he that sits by him and watches with him in hope to get a legacy, is a vulture, and watches for the carcass and the prey."

2. Now concerning this, the best compendium of all the cases of conscience which can relate hither, is, that with hearty simplicity we pursue that rule of St. Paul", "Whether ye eat or drink, and whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God:" the same with those other words of his", for the one illustrates and explicates the other; " Whatsoever ye shall do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God, even the Father, by him."-Concerning the obligation and full sense of these precepts, the following measures are our rule.

3. He that, in every action that is considerable, and fit to be noted and discerned, and is distinguished by counsels and consultations, by deliberation and observation, -does actually design the glory of God, does his work most perfectly. It will shame the tepidity and incuriousness of Christians, if I tell them that this advice is given to us by some wise heathens. When Marcus Brutus had given many excellent precepts to parents, and children, and brethren, he adds, " Hæc nemo faciet quemadmodum debet, nisi habuerit quo referat. Proponamus oportet finem summi boni, ad quem nitamur, ad quem omne factum nostrum dictumque respiciat, veluti navigantibus ad aliquid sidus dirigendus est cursus :" "No man can do these things as he ought, unless he direct them to some proper end. We must propose to ourselves the

chiefest good for our end, to which every word and every 'deed of ours must have regard; as mariners, in their sailing, look to a star for conduct." This is not so to be understood as if we were to make actual directions and dedications of every single word, or little minute action we do, to the glory of God: this is a snare to consciences, and a hypochondriacal devotion which some friars have invented, and attributed to St. Gertrude, of whom they report that Christ admonished her that she should consecrate every little part of action and word unto him; not only every writing, and every discourse, and every meal, and every prayer, but every bit she put into her head, and every letter she did write, every single step she did tread: just as if a man that were to receive a thousand pounds should tell it over by so many single maravedes, and not be content to tell every shilling, but reckon how many farthings are in the whole sum; this would sound great as the Spanish cobbler's portion to his daughter; but certainly a wise man will find something else to do, which may be more really for God's glory, than so to tell his little minutes and particles of actions. It is a great piety if we dedicate to God all our states of life, and all our great actions in every state, and all changes, and every day, and every night, and every meal, and every beginning of labour, and give God thanks at every end, and invocate his help in every progression; for so doing, we shall consecrate our whole life to God. And this counsel St. Macarius of Alexandria gave to Palladius bishop of Helenopolis; who when he was a young man, was much troubled in conscience concerning his unprofitable life, and supposed that he did nothing that was good, nothing that was profitable, but all he did, was vain and trifling. Macarius told him, Dic tu tuis cogitationibus, -Propter Christum custodio parietes," When such afflictive thoughts do intervene, say unto them, "For Christ's sake I keep the walls." Nothing could be a meaner employment, nothing could be less useful; for the walls were not likely to runaway. His meaning was, 'Whatsoever the employment of a man's day or a man's life be, though ever so mean, yet if it be done with a single eye, and with an intuition on Christ, it is a holy employment.

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4. Although our intentions by how much the more they a Hist. Lausiac, cap. 20.