9. This also holds in cases of punishments 'ipso facto' incurred, that is, which a man is fallen into, as soon as ever the crime is committed. And of this there is a double reason; the one is, because the punishment is actually incurred before he is actually mad, for the very crime itself is to him as a judge and sentence, and the sanction of the law is all the solemnity: and that is the other reason, consequent to the former; in this case there needs no process, and therefore the sinner's indisposition cannot make him incapable of passing into punishment.

. 10. In punishments emendatory, that is, such which, besides the exemplar justice, intend to reform the criminal, he that is fallen into madness, ought not to suffer them, whether the sentence be to be passed by the law or by the judge, whether it be solemn or summary, whether it be passed before his calamity or after. The reason of this is plain, because such punishments being in order to an end which cannot be acquired, are wholly to no purpose, and therefore are tyrannical and unreasonable; the man is not capable of amendment, and therefore not of such punishments, which are emendatory.

11. But after all this, the moderation of charity in Christian judicatories is such as that they refuse to inflict corporal penalties on distracted people, it being enough that they are already but too miserable.

He that knows not what he does, or what he hath done, is next to him that is innocent. And when the man is civilly dead, it is to little purpose to make him sink further under the civil sword. That is a dreadful justice and security, that would kill a man twice over. Only when any thing of example, or public interest, or detestation of the fact, is concerned, it may be done according to the former measures, and for the present considerations; just as it is in some cases lawful to punish a man after he is dead, by denying him an honourable and Christian sepulture: where although there be something particular in this case, the nature of this punishment being such, that because we do not bury them beP Senec. Herc. Fur. act. iv. 1096. Schröder, pag. 83,

fore they be dead, this evil must be inflicted upon him that feels it not, or not at all be inflicted; yet indeed it is true, that it ought not at all to be inflicted upon any direct account of justice, but upon collateral considerations, as for terror and exemplarity; and so it may be in the case of the present question.

Sect. 2. Of the Diminutions of voluntary Actions: and first of Ignorance and its Influence into the Morality of human Actions.

RULE V.

Nothing is good or bad, but what we know, or concerning which we can deliberate.

1. THE great measures of morality are, 'Choose the good, and eschew the evil: before these can be chosen or avoided, they must be considered and discerned. And therefore those things concerning which there can be no deliberation, are neither morally good nor bad, and those persons who cannot deliberate, can neither be virtuous nor vicious; but the things may be lawful, and the persons be innocent, but both of them negatively, that is, the things are not evil, and the persons are not criminal. And therefore St. Paul celebrating the immense love of God to mankind, says, that "God would have all men to be saved;" and in order to this, he adds, he would have all men "come to the knowledge of the truth," as knowing this to be the only way: no man can be saved unless he knows saving truth, but every man may be saved unless it be his own fault; and therefore there is to every man revealed so much truth as is sufficient to his salvation. It may be, this saving truth is revealed by degrees; and so that he who hath the first general propositions of nature and reason, and uses them well, shall have more, even so much as is necessary until he comes to all-sufficient knowledge. "He that comes to God (saith St. Paul) must believe that God is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him." This is the gentiles' creed, but such as at first will be sufficient to bring them unto God; whither when they are

come, he will give them his Holy Spirit, and teach them whatsoever is yet necessary. I am not here to dispute what is likely to be the condition of heathens in the other world: it concerns not us, it is not a case of conscience: but we are sure that all men have the law of God written in their hearts; that God is so manifested in the creatures, and so communicates himself to mankind in benefits and blessings, that no man hath just cause to say he knows not God. We see also that the heathens are not fools, that they understand arts and sciences, that they discourse rarely well of the works of God, of good and evil, of punishment and reward: and it were strange that it should be impossible for them to know what is necessary, and stranger yet that God should exact that of them, which is not possible for them to know. But yet on the other side, we see infinite numbers of Christians that know very little of God, and very many for whom there is no course taken that they should know him; and what shall be the event of these things, is hard to tell. But it is very certain that without a man's own fault, no man shall eternally perish : and therefore it is also certain that every man that will use what diligence he can and ought in his circumstances, he shall know all that in his circumstances is necessary; and therefore Justin Martyr said well, "Voluntate ignorare illos, qui res ad cognitionem ducentes habent, nec de scientia laborant." Every man hath enough of knowledge to make him good if he please: and it is infinitely culpable and criminal, that men, by their industry, shall become so wise in the affairs of the world, and so ignorant in that which is their eternal interest; it is because they love it not.

Non aurum in viridi quæritis arbore,
Nec vite gemmas carpitis,
Non altis laqueos montibus abditis,
Ut pisce ditetis dapes r.

No man looks for emeralds in a tree, nor cuts his vines hoping that they will bleed rubies, or weep pearls. Which of all the heathens or Christians ever went to take goats in the Tyrrhene waters, or looked for crystal in a furnace ? Many know what pits have the best oysters, and where the fattest tortoise feeds :

Boeth. lib. 3. de Consol. Philos.

Sed quonam lateat quod cupiunt bonum,
Nescire cæci sustinent:

Et quod stelliferum trans abiit polum,
Tellure demersi petunt :

and yet they look for immortality in money, and dig deep into the earth, hoping there to find that blessedness, which, their reason tells them, dwells beyond the stars. Men have enough of reason and law put into their hearts, by which they read the will of God; and therefore no man can, in the universal lines and measures of salvation, pretend ignorance; I am sure we cannot, and that is all that concerns us. And therefore ignorance, in the law of God, in that which concerns our necessary duty, is so far from excusing any thing it causes, that itself is very criminal. "Non est levius omnino nescire quod liceat, quam facere aliquid quod scias non licere ";" 'To do some things that we know to be unlawful, is not so great a crime, as to be wholly ignorant of what is and what is not lawful.' So that since the great end why God hath given us liberty and election, reason and understanding, is that by these we should serve him and partake of his felicities, it follows that in all that is of necessity to our salvation God is not wanting to give us sufficient notice; and of good and evil in general, every man, that hath the use of reason, does or may understand the rules and differences.

2. But if we descend to particular rules and laws, the case is different. St. Gregory Nyssent said, “Universalium secundum electionem non esse involuntariam ignorantiam, sed particularium;" "A man cannot against his will be ignorant of the universal precepts, that concern our life eternal and election, but of particulars a man may." That a man must not oppress his brother by cruel or crafty bargains, every man ought to know: but there are many that do not know whether all usury be a cruelty or oppression, or, in any sense, criminal. But, concerning these things, we may better take an estimate by the following measures.

Of what Things a Man may, or may not, be innocently ignorant.

3. No man can be innocently ignorant of that which all the nations of the world have ever believed and publicly professed; as, that there is a God; - that God is good, and just,

and true;-that he is to be worshipped ;-that we must do no more wrong than we are willing to receive or suffer.Because these things and the like are so conveyed to us in our creation, that we know them without an external teacher; and yet they are so every where taught, that we cannot but know them, if we never consulted with our natural reason.

4. No Christian can be innocently ignorant of that, which the catholic church teaches to be necessary to salvation. The reason of this is, because every one that knows any thing of God, and of heaven and hell, as every Christian is supposed to do, -cannot but know it is necessary he learn something or other in order to it; and if any thing, then certainly that which is necessary: and of that, nothing can so well judge, nothing can teach so readily, as the whole church; for if the whole church teaches it as necessary, then it is taught every where, and at all times, and therefore to be ignorant of such things can never be supposed innocent.

5. Of that, which is by several churches and societies of wise and good men disputed, a man may be innocently ignorant; for there is supposed difficulty, and obscurity, and every degree of these is the greatest indication that there is not of them any absolute necessity. What God hath made necessary to be known, he hath given sufficient means by which it can be known. But because every man cannot dispute, and of them that can, very many do it to very little purpose, and they had better let it alone, and by disputing men often make more intrigues, but seldom more manifestations of what is obscure; it is certain that which cannot be known but with some difficulty and more uncertainty, may be unknown with very much innocence.

6. Those things which do not concern good life, and the necessities of this world and of the other, are not of necessity to be known by every one; because there is, beyond these, no common and universal necessity. But beyond these,

7. Whatsoever concerns every man's duty in special, to which he is specially obliged, of that he cannot be innocently ignorant, because he hath brought upon himself a special obligation of a new duty, to which he must take care that sufficient aids and notices be procured. Thus must a bishop understand not only the articles of faith, but the rules of manners, not only for himself, but for those which are under