made up of centres of force, - he would have assumed for science a liberty which he denied theology. But, while he rejects as unthinkable every proposition respecting the nature of the universe in general, he equally rejects as unthinkable every proposition respecting the nature of matter. While he admits that we are obliged to use, for the purpose of investigation, the conception of matter as formed of units, yet he expressly points out that such conceptions, being merely the product of our own forms of thought, must not be understood as corresponding to the reality; and he takes just as much care to show that such a conception, if supposed to represent the reality, brings us to contradictory absurdities, as he takes to show that the conception named Atheism or Pantheism, if supposed to represent the reality, brings us to the same result.

Perhaps it will still be said, that, as Mr. Spencer admits an hypothesis respecting the constitution of Matter to be used by science, and holds as valid the conclusions thereby reached, he ought to admit the legitimacy of the hypothesis of Theism as a means of reaching possibly valid theological conclusions. The reply is, that the conclusions proposed to be reached in the two cases are of totally different orders, and claim to be truths in totally different senses. The only truths proposed to be reached by this hypothesis respecting the constitution of matter are constant relations of co-existence and sequence among phenomena; whereas the truths proposed to be reached by one of these theological hypotheses are truths concerning noumenal existence underlying phenomena. The propositions which science aims by such means to establish, pretend only to express the order among the manifestations of the Unknowable; whereas the propositions which theology aims by such means to establish, pretend to express the nature of the Unknowable itself Relative truth is the assigned end in the one case; absolute truth in the other. Yet Mr. Spencer is called inconsistent, because the method of inquiry which he admits as legitimate in the one case, he considers illegitimate in the other.

The reviewer goes on to say in the next sentence,

"And further, when we find him identifying the Unknowable with the scientific idea of Force, and predicating of it Unity, Omnipresence, and Causation, at the very same time that he denies our right to predicate of it any attributes at all, what shall we say of such surreptitious and ostensibly disallowed predications?" (p. 254.)

Let us take by itself the first clause of this sentence. In it Mr. Spencer is represented as identifying the Unknowable with the scientific idea of Force. Now, inasmuch as the scientific idea of Force, as understood commonly, and as understood even by men of science, is supposed to be something of which we have a conception, Mr. Spencer is here made to appear as identifying the unknowable with something that is conceivable. But the identification which he makes is exactly the reverse of this. Already, in his chapter on "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," he has shown that the scientific idea of Force, when pushed to the last result, is not an idea at all, but the sign of something unknown; and, in his chapter on the "Persistence of Force," he takes especial care to insist upon the truth there arrived at, that the Force which science postulates in all its inquiries and conclusions is no one of the forces for which science has a name; but that what is tacitly postulated by the doctrine of the persistence of force, is really that Unknowable Cause of which the forces dealt with by science are manifestations. The reviewer's proposition should thus be inverted. He should have said that Mr. Spencer merges the scientific idea of Force into the Unknowable ; and, had he said this, the sentence would have had a quite contrary implication. The difference is as great as that between saying of any one that he identifies morality with good manners, and that he identifies good manners with morality.

Turning to the criticism on Mr. Spencer's treatment of the question of Religion and Science, we again find the reviewer making his points by misrepresentations. He sets out by distinguishing between two meanings of the word "religion;" saying, truly enough, that "while religious knowledge, supposing it to exist, is what we more properly call theology, religion is a term more properly confined to the emotional and moral phenomena which reciprocally cause, and are caused by, the consciousness of our relations to God." If for the word "God" we read "Unknowable Cause," this is the meaning given to the word "religion" all through the first part of Mr. Spencer's work. The reviewer, however, makes it appear that Mr. Spencer means by religion what is more properly called theology; and thereupon proceeds to evolve inconsistencies from his argument. He does this by the help of a certain quotation which seems to bear the alleged construction, but which a moment's thought shows does not bear it. The sentence is, "Every religion is an a priori theory of the universe." Now, it might have been thought sufficiently clear, that any one who speaks of an individual religion, either singly or as one of a number, means a system of theology. Current usage has established a wide distinction between "religion" spoken of without reference to any creed, and "a religion," as Catholicism or Mahometanism, which becomes individualized by virtue of its creed. But the reviewer has overlooked this very plain distinction. He has dealt with the sentence as though it ran, "Religion is an a priori theory of the universe." This is a proposition of an entirely different meaning, - one which probably nobody would make, and totally at variance with the whole tenor of Mr. Spencer's argument. Yet it is on the strength of this reading that the reviewer goes on to manufacture a page full of incongruities. He might have been excused for this misconstruction, had there been no passage showing that it could not be the right one; but he ignores the repeated proofs that by "religion" Mr. Spencer means the emotional state produced by the contemplation of the Unknowable, and deliberately asserts in the teeth of them that by religion Mr. Spencer means theology, or the intellectual theory of religion.*

We close these remarks, which might easily be extended to a much greater length, with some passages in a private

* The reader may verify the foregoing by reference to pp. 17, 44, 98, 100, 107, of "First Principles."

letter of Mr. Spencer to the writer, on the ethics of reviewing, which seem so appropriate here as perhaps to justify the liberty of publication:

"I am not inclined to quarrel with the intolerance which limits itself to hard words. Denunciation of something held to be wrong commonly implies strong attachment to something held to be right; and, whether this something is right or not, the feeling enlisted on its side is a good one. Whoso is indifferent when he hears denial of what he mistakes for the truth, would be an equally indifferent defender of the truth itself, did he hold it. If absolute toleration were possible, society would dissolve. Were there no reprobation of any opinions, there would be no reprobation of the actions dictated by those opinions; vice would be as respectable as virtue, and order would become impossible. Any one who says toleration should be unlimited, commits himself to more than he intends; as he will find on taking an extreme case. Suppose there grew up among us a sect like the Thugs of India, with whom assassination is religious duty. Suppose that their doctrine was tolerated to the full, and no one spoken the worse of for becoming a convert to it. Suppose that, thus unhindered, the sect grew and ramified throughout society, assimilating to itself all who had enemies to be revenged on, or wished to get rid of men standing in their way. Would not the organization, by facilitating murders, be a gigantic evil? and would not the universal sense of insecurity be an additional source of misery? Nay, worse. To treat such a doctrine with toleration implies toleration of murder itself; for, detestation of the doctrine being merely a reflex of detestation of the act, the one cannot cease without the other ceasing. And, if there were no detestation of murder, the punishment for murder would not be enforced; since a law becomes inoperative when there is no public feeling to support and aid the agency for executing it. Clearly, then, the wellfare of mankind, necessitating intolerance of certain kinds of conduct, necessitates intolerance of the opinions which justify such conduct. Had you heard the strong words I have used to those who defend our doings in Jamaica, you would see that I can be intolerant enough myself upon occasion; and I should be ashamed were it otherwise.

"But, you will say, the doctrines which we thus cannot allow to be denied without manifesting reprobation are moral principles which directly underlie social life, and we resent any thing antagonistic to them, because it endangers human welfare; whereas the theological intolerance in question concerns certain propositions," which may be admitted or rejected, without affecting the laws of right conduct. The reply is, that those who defend these propositions so warmly, contend that belief in them also underlies human welfare, -underlies it, indeed, more deeply than any other. I have no hesitation in accepting as perfectly sincere their professed conviction, that, in the absence of a revealed will of God, there could be no moral law. And hence it seems to me quite natural, and indeed quite proper, that they should be intolerant of doctrines opposed to one which they think all-essential. That the laws of right conduct are deducible from the laws of life, as limited by social conditions, is a conception entirely alien to their way of thinking, and practically incredible to them. In the absence of such a conception, the choice is between the guidance they have, or no guidance at all; and, very rightly, they cling to that which they have. Their intolerance is but the correlative of their allegiance to the highest truth they

see.

"Beyond this justification for theological intolerance, there is a deeper justification. The attachment of a society to its creed is the mark of a certain fitness between the two, - not simply an intellectual fitness, but a moral fitness. The rewards and penalties of the existing religions, described as definite and inevitable, are far more operative on minds in a certain stage of progress than those which science discloses as arising by the necessities of things, but in ways that are difficult to trace, and contingent in detail, though inevitable on the average. Hence it is best for the old to live on as long as it can, yielding inch by inch only as fast as the new grows up to replace it; and men's attachment to the old is the measure of its remaining vitality, and of the still continued need for it.

""Are, then, you will ask, all these displays of intolerance to pass unnoticed?' I do not say that. Though the spirit which prompts them is defensible, it does not follow that the ways in which this spirit is manifested are defensible. The dishonesties and stupidities of criticism may be condemned while saying nothing against the feeling of antagonism which the criticism shows. Judging from those I have seen, your religious journals in America are less unscrupulous than those we have here; but their criticisms contain plenty of gross misrepresentations and deliberate perversities, and for these they may very properly be held to account."