show that "all phenomena can be truly reduced to changes of position among atoms and masses," and that the phenomena of consciousness are not simply accompanied by, but consist in, such changes? This representation of Mr. Spencer's position is diametrically opposed to his own statement of it in the last chapter of "First Principles," where he argues that, by virtue of the relations of subject and object, those external manifestations of force which we call Matter and Motion must stand in eternal antithesis with that internal manifestation which we know as Consciousness; and that, though these antithetical modes are probably but different manifestations of the same unknowable Cause, yet they must for ever appear to us to be antithetically opposed to one another, as belonging to self and not-self respectively. By generalizing all phenomena as processes of Evolution and Dissolution (not Evolution only, as the reviewer carelessly states), Mr. Spencer generalizes only the changes of the non ego as they are phenomenally manifested to the ego; and he does not profess to say what these changes are in themselves, or what are in themselves the changes they produce in consciousness.

Again, the reviewer says, "Every mechanical philosophy, like Mr. Spencer's, touches only the surface of things; since mechanism is inexplicable, except through dynamism" (p. 243). Here Mr. Spencer's philosophy is represented as mechanical, as distinguished from dynamical; yet, if one term more completely than any other describes it, dynamical is the word. Does not Mr. Spencer, in his chapter on "Matter, Motion, and Force," resolve our experiences of matter and motion into experiences of Force conditioned in certain ways? Does he not, in his chapters upon the "Indestructibility of Matter and the Continuity of Motion," point out that all which we can prove to be indestructible in Matter is the Force it manifests, and that all which we can prove to be continuous in Motion is the Force it implies? And does he not, in his chapter on the "Persistence of Force," repeatedly and most emphatically dwell on the truth, that all other forms of being are resolvable into this form? Yet his system is actually de

as

scribed as one from which the idea of power is left out, mechanical, and not dynamical! The reviewer goes on to say," Although Mr. Spencer has much to say about Force, he identifies Force with Unknowable, and thus empties his philosophy of all dynamism that is intelligible:" from which sentence, if it has any meaning at all, it is to be inferred that the reviewer does not identify Force with the Unknowable, but that to him it is knowable. Why, then, has he delayed so long explaining to us what Force is? Probably, by an "intelligible dynamism," he will say that he means the action of a personal God; but if this action is intelligible to him, as solving the problem of Force for the human intellect, he evidently has a new revelation to make, one for which the thinking world has been seeking these thousands of years.

In the next sentence, he goes on to say that Mr. Spencer "borrows largely from a source that is shut from every consistent empiricist, in taking from transcendentalism the idea of strict universality." Here is another instance of applying a wrong title, and then pointing out an inconsistency, on the assumption that that title is the right one. On what authority does he call Mr. Spencer "a consistent empiricist," meaning, of course, an empiricist in the sense commonly given to the word? Does he not know, that, ever since he commenced publishing, Mr. Spencer has been an antagonist of pure empiricism? The antagonism was displayed in his first work, "Social Statics." It was still more definitely displayed in his "Principles of Psychology," where, in his doctrine of "the Universal Postulate," he contended, in opposition to Mr. Mill, that certain truths must be accepted as necessary. The controversy between the two, pending since that time, has been recently revived. In the "Fortnightly Review" for July 15, 1865, Mr. Spencer re-asserted and re-inforced the position he had before taken, that, even supposing all knowledge to be interpretable as having originated in experience, there are nevertheless certain truths which must be accepted as a priori before the interpretation becomes possible.

Again the reviewer says, "Force must be either a personal God, an impersonal entity, or a property of matter. Mr.

Spencer denies that it is a personal God." Where does Mr. Spencer deny that Force, or the unknown cause of things, is a personal God? So far from doing so, he distinctly says ("First Principles," chap. v.) that a personal God can neither be affirmed nor denied. Having asserted that Mr. Spencer denies that which he distinctly says cannot be denied, — that is, that Force, or the unknown cause of things, is a personal God, he goes on to say, that "he ought to treat it as a property of matter, whereas he seems to regard it as an impersonal entity." This is diametrically opposed to a previous representation made by the reviewer himself, only two pages back, where he recognizes Mr. Spencer's doctrine as being, that Force is the universal Cause of which Matter and Motion are manifestations. If, as Mr. Spencer everywhere asserts or implies, Force is the ultimate unknowable Cause, manifested to us in the forms of Matter and Motion, under certain conditions of time and space, how is it possible for him to regard Force as "a property of Matter?" According to him, Matter cannot be known to us, except as the resistance of co-existent positions in space; it cannot be conceived, save as a statical embodiment of forces occupying space. If, then, when matter is conceived to be deprived of its forces, nothing remains, how can Force be conceived as a property of Matter? Again, the reviewer says,

"But Mr. Spencer has here fallen helplessly into a vicious circle. On the one hand, all phenomena can be formulated under a single law, because the materialist and spiritualist controversy is absurd: on the other hand, the materialist and spiritualist controversy is absurd, because all phenomena can be formulated under a single law."

Now, neither of the propositions said to constitute this vicious circle is anywhere to be found in Mr. Spencer's writings, either expressed or implied. What are the facts? Mr. Spencer carefully goes through in detail the various classes of phenomena, for the purpose of seeing whether they exemplify the law he alleges. He distinctly points out, that this law is a universal induction from the phenomena examined. And he then goes on to verify it, by showing that it is also

a necessary deduction from the persistence of Force. Yet, though the greater part of "First Principles" is occupied with these inductive and deductive proofs, Mr. Spencer is made to allege this law, "because the materialist and spiritualist controversy is absurd"! Equally baseless is the other statement, that Mr. Spencer considers the materialist and spiritualist controversy absurd, "because all phenomena can be formulated under a single law." The very passage which the reviewer has just quoted gives Mr. Spencer's reason for calling them absurd, which is a totally different reason. Mr. Spencer's own words are: "The Materialist and Spiritualist controversy is a mere war of words, in which the disputants are equally absurd, each thinking he understands that which it is impossible for any man to understand."

Again, the reviewer says,

66

Recognizing the phenomenal diversity of matter and mind, and at the same time scouting their ontological diversity, to the inquiry why their ontological diversity must be denied, he has no sound answer to make. There is as great an assumption of knowledge in saying that there is no difference at bottom between matter and mind, as in saying that a radical difference exists" (p. 245).

Here Mr. Spencer is represented as making a great assumption for which he gives no reason; and yet he has given both special and general reasons. In his chapter on the "Correlation and Equivalence of Forces," he has pointed out that the modes of Force with which matter impresses us are transformable into the mode of Force which we know as mind; showing how there is an equivalence between the amount of an external agency acting on the senses, and the amount of consciousness produced by it in the shape of feeling; and how, conversely, there is an equivalence between the amount of consciousness which we experience in making a muscular effort and the amount of physical effect produced on an external object. In the very chapter from which the reviewer quotes respecting the absurdity of the materialist and spiritualist controversy, Mr. Spencer points out, that, if the transformation of external forces into the internal forces which we

call feelings is an argument for the materialist, the transformation of these forces we call feelings into external physi cal actions is an equally good argument for the spiritualist. That the forces of the ego and the non ego are transformable into one another, is the evidence which Mr. Spencer assigns for the belief that they are but differently conditioned forms of the same ultimate Force. Yet this assimilation of them, the reviewer calls an assumption, an assumption for which there is no better warrant than the opposite one. And this, too, in spite of the further reason distinctly assigned in other parts of Mr. Spencer's work; as in the chapters on the "Relativity of Knowledge" and the "Persistence of Force," where, after showing that mind and matter are alike inscrutable in their ultimate natures, or are manifestations of something unknown, Mr. Spencer concludes that they are manifes tations of the same unknown, and are made to seem different to us by belonging, the one set to our consciousness, and the other set to existence out of our consciousness.

But, if the fact of the transformability of these inner and outer manifestations into one another goes for nothing with the reviewer, perhaps he will be able to furnish "sound answers" to the following questions suggested by the dualistic hypothesis. If mind and matter are not differently conditioned manifestations of one unknown cause, must there not be two unknown causes? Are these independent of one another? And, if so, in what manner are they made to work in harmony as they do? If they are not independent of one another, which of the two is the cause of the other? And in what relation stands the one that is caused to that which causes it? If the one which is caused is not itself a portion of that which is said to cause it, what is the nature of its being? According to the dualistic view, it must be the Creator of what are known as its manifestations. If it is a Deputy Creator, how does it derive its creative power? And must not the power by which it creates be a part of the power of that which created it? And is not this saying that it is itself but another form of the original unknown power of which it is the deputy? The reviewer must accept one of two conclu