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URING these parliamentary transactions, the minds of all men were anxious in what manner the powers involved in the present conflict intended to regulate their movements in the ensuing campaign. It was clear to all the unprejudiced, that whatever might be the issue of this obstinate war, whoever obtained the ascendancy would use it with very little moderation. The threats of the Austrians and Prussians, at the commencement of the war, and their intentions to fulfil them, of which the French entertained no doubt, had filled these with a resentment, the effects of which had been severely felt by those two powers in the campaign of 1793, when, thro' the defection of Dumouriez, and the confused situation into which it had thrown the armies of France, the coalition was enabled, during some time, to assume a formidable appearance. It displayed so firm and systematic a determination to treat France with unbounded severity, and to eradicate, as it were, all traces of its former greatness and importance, that the French were convinced no medium remained for them but the basest state of subjection to their enemies, or to compel them by defeats to renounce the schemes of conquest, which Europe fully understood they had formed respecting France. The campaign of 1793 had nearly decided the question. After some suspense, fortune seemed to have

declared in favour of France; and that decision, to some good judges, had appeared final and conclusive. The coalition would doubtless strug gle for a recovery of the situation it was in, previously to the disasters it had incurred at the close of the campaign; but the causes of these disasters, and of the superiority which the French had gained in the field, subsisted in their full force; while the motives that had formed the coalition seemed daily to lose their influence, in proportion as its arms were unsuccessful. Of the three great pillars, as it were, of the coalition, one was beginning to give way; and of the other two, one only could be depended on for ability and resolution to persist in the contest; the means of the other being almost exhausted, to say nothing of the unwillingness with which its restoration to its primitive power was likely to be viewed by a considerable portion of its allies. The unity of France against those three powers was held by many profound politicians as the very reverse of a disadvantage : their different and almost opposite interests were looked upon as sources of discord, that would not fail to operate to the dissolution of the confederacy, or at least to the diminution of its efforts against France; which, though standing alone, yet when driven to the most desperate efforts by the terror of being subdued by a merciless foe, would from that circumstance de

rive

rive a fund of spirit and of resist ance, that, aided by its native strength and genius, would weary out the patience and expectations of the allies, more prompted by the personal views of their rulers, than by their public interests, to engage in the destruction of the French system of government. For these reasons the majority of the nation, though cordially abborrent of the atrocious conduct of the French republicans, and nowise inclined to give their principles admittance into this country, still bitterly lamented that spirit of inveteracy to their principles, which had put arms into our hands for their extirpation; as if the experience of all ages has not invariably borne witness, that persecution is the feeblest weapon wherewith to conquer the huaian mind; and that opinions always make the greater progress, from the endeavours to oppose them with any other arms than those of reasoning and argumentation.

Great was the fermentation occasioned among all ranks at the prospect of the uncertainty attending the ministerial measures, and of the fatal consequences that would probably result from their failure. Numbers considered the minister as influenced by other motives than his own, to continue a war, evidently of a more dangerous as well as of a more destructive nature than any antecedent one, and of which, from the fluctuation of fortune that had hitherto attended it, the duration threatened to be considerable, allowing even that the ultimate issue, notwithstanding some unfavourable appearances of late might prove altogether not unprosperous, with what a price must any advantages be purchased! After

the profusion of lives and of treasure they would cost, what would Great Britain finally reap? The utmost that could be expected in the hopes of reasonable people was that France, exhausted as well as her enemies, would at last consent to remain within her antient limits, and give up what she had seized. As to the conquest of that rich, populous, and extensive country, it never entered into the expectation of any rational and well-informed individual.

Such being the general opinion of those in whose knowledge and understanding men at large were disposed to confide, it was with much grief and anxiety that the enlightened part of the public, both in France and England, contemplated the pertinacity with which the war was now carried on by both parties, and threatened to become still more destructive, from the accession of fresh auxiliaries on both sides; either bribed by subsidies to lend their assistance, or stimulated by motives of fear or of jealousy to become parties in the contest. The speculations in writing or in conversation that took up the interval of hostilities in the winter of 1793 and the ensuing spring, were much of this tendency,-deploring the probable continuance of the war, but foreseeing no period of its cessation. This indeed could not appear otherwise than remote: the motives of this unfortunate war being diversities of opinion, the usual obstinacy with which men maintain these, afforded a sad presage of the fatal length of a dispute that involved, in the persuasion of multitudes, the dearest concerns of mankind, and that could not be terminated while either of

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the combatants remained undestroy ed or unsubdued.

While the public was busied in the altercations that continually arose from these gloomy appearan ces and prognostications, the British government was firmly intent on the means of bringing its plans against the French republic to a state of forwardness: the majorities it counted in both Houses were such, as to overwhelm at once all resistance. Never since the American war had its hands been so strengthened by the adherence of its friends, and the accession of those many opponents who, dreading the influx of French principles, were ready to sacrifice all considerations of persons and party-attachments, in order to join in counter-, acting them. As it were unjust to doubt the sincerity of the declared motives that actuated those in forsaking their former political connexions, it would be equally illiberal to question the repeated assertions of these latter; that their opposition to the measures of government was solely dictated by the conviction that they were erroneous, and by no means proceeding from disaffection to the constitution. They indignantly complained that a motive so heinous and unfounded should be so frequently reproached to them by the great plurality they had constantly to contend with, and which they accused, in their turn, of loading them with those vile imputations, as a revenge for their having hitherto, with amazing patience and resolution, contested inch by inch, as it were, every point that in their opinion demanded litigation. Certain it is, that without espousing the cause of either party, each has adduced remarkable in

stances of the variety of ways and methods of attacking and defending opposite opinions; and how much wit, genius, and knowledge, may be displayed by men of abilities, on whichever side they may be engaged.

A powerful attack was made upon the conduct of ministers on the 17th of February, by the Marquis of Lansdown, one of the most conspicuous members in the opposition. He had uniformly combated the idea of a war with France on account of its revolutionary principles; and recommended the maintenance of peace with that country as the safest policy that Great Britain could pursue in the present juncture. He introduced on this day, and supported with a multitude of arguments, a motion for peace with France. He had, he said, entertained some hope that ministers, at the sight of the tremendous dif ficulties they were about to en counter, might have reflected how much more they would ingratiate themselves with the nation by terminating, than by continuing this ruinous war; but, from their vast preparations and their numerous alliances, he too plainly saw their determination to persevere at all hazards in this arduous conflict :this had induced him coolly, but seriously, to investigate the motives on which it was founded. He would not on this occasion appeal to the passions of men; he would calmly ask, Whether the public would approve the voting of thirteen millions demanded by ministry to prosecute a war, the necessity of which was attempted to be proved by extracts from a French pamphlet, written by the member of a faction in that country? Both that

faction

faction and the writer had been destroyed, and others risen in their turn. But were inflammatory speeches or writings to be converted into authorities for making war? Before we undertook a third campaign, it was incumbent on us to review the former two, and to consider whether they afforded grounds to expect better success in that for which we were preparing. We were involved in a multiplicity of treaties, more expensive than profitable, while we continued to act as we had done during the preceding campaigns. France had been attacked by the ablest Generals, at the head of excellent troops: but it had been precisely where the most consummate masters of the art had pronounced France invulnerable. In defiance of an assertion confirmed by two years failure, we still persisted in the attempt, on the credit of an officer, brave and enterprizing indeed, but not to be preferred for his military merit to those who had already been unsuccessful. The advanta ges that had been obtained in Flanders were short and accidental: it was notorious that we owed them to the dissentions among the French. Since they had proceeded with unanimity in the defence of their country, we had gradually lost ground; and the necessity of being unanimous would always keep men together in the field, whatever parties might arise in the Convention among those who were struggling for power. But, whichever party was predominant, the power obtained was exerted in the most formidable manner; and the French, through the influence of the prin eiples they had adopted, and the indefatigable capacity and exertions

of their rulers, were become the terror of their enemies. It behoved us seriously to reflect on the consequences that would probably follow from compelling the French to cherish those ideas, and keep alive that desperate frame of mind which enabled them to do such extraordinary things. Were we to continue in that violent disposition towards them, which appeared the design of the coalition, they must, in their own defence, become a military republic, the more dangerous for being placed in the center of Europe, whence they might disseminate their principles among their surrounding neighbours. The French were but one people, and the coalition consisted of many: but when a great people, rouzed by indignation at ill usage, real or so deemed, called forth all its powers and faculties, it instantly assumed a new character, and every man rose above himself.

Great occasions naturally gave birth to great men, and difficult emergencies produced the most striking exertions. France was now a military school, where every youth was educated a soldier, not from interested views, but an enthusiastic passion, for the glory and independence of their country.

This being the real situation of France, was it wise to continue a war, pregnant, from the causes specified, with imminent danger to Europe, and wherein, should the coalition be unsuccessful, it had every thing to dread from the resentment of the French? It were unworthy of sound politicians to rely upon the utility of the treaties we had entered into with the various powers in the confederacy: fear and jealousy would dissolve

them