fleet he was preparing at Brest, in order to make a trial of his naval prowess with the strength of Great Britain, on what is not improperly called her own ele ment. To prepare for a contest, the issue of which would be very serious to the losing party, was equally the study of the British government. On the 27th of January 1794, Lord Arden moved, that the number of seamen for the service of the navy, during the approaching season, should be augmented to 85,000. The motion was chearfully complied with; all parties, even those who disap proved of the war as unnecessary, were alike convinced of the propriety of carrying it on with vigour after it had been undertaken, and of supporting the honour of the British arms, both by sea and land, against an enemy who, flushed with his late successes, was become more dangerous than ever, and menaced Britain particularly, as the chief agent in the coalition against him. Mr. Fox, though he acquiesced in the motion, was very severe in his examination of the conduct of the war. Ministers, he observed, had boasted of the good condition and great services of the navy during the preceding year, particuJarly of the attention shewn to the commercial fleet; and yet it appeared that several branches of our trade had greatly suffered; severteen of the traders to the Baltic had been taken, and they had all narrowly escaped: the shipping from Quebec had been left to the protection of only one ship in a bad condition; and their safe arrival was owing to the circumstance of the absence of an enemy. In the Channel, six French frigates bad been suffered to take twenty-six sail of rich merchantmen. These particulars made him doubtful of the care and vigilance professed by the ministry. Nor was it cer tain that we had not lost as many vessels in the foregoing year as in 1771, when we contended alone with Holland, France, and Spain. It was an undeniable fact, that, since the commencement of the war, in February last year, the French had seized near one hundred vessels more than they had lost. Mr. Pitt, in reply, stated, that no ships had fallen into the enemy's hands tbrough want of convoy. Six French frigates had remained uninterrupted in the Channel the space of six days, while our flect just returned from a cruize, was lying in port to refit; but they were soon driven into their own harbours. Our successes at sea had, on the whole, been great; our East and West India fleets had safely arrived at their destinations abroad, and sailed securely home: our trade was immense, and prospered in every quarter of the globe. These were truths that could not be controverted. The British navy had, in the mean time, ruled irresistibly in every sea. Many years would elapse before the French could recover from the blow they had received at Toulon. Our fleets were out everywhere in search of the enemy, who con stantly avoided coming to action. As to the intelligence brought from France, relating to the advantages of which the French were continually boasting, but little reliance could be placed upon it; and the speakers speakers in the Convention were so careful to magnify their successes and diminish their losses, and to represent their situation as completely prosperous, though it was well known that France was full of discontent, confusion, and wretchedness. When it was moved by Mr. Pitt that the treaty with the King of Sardinia should be referred to the committee of supply, Mr. Fox represented that treaty as one by which this country engaged to do much for an ally who was to make no return. The port of Nice night have been a compensation for our aid; but of that the French were masters, as well as of his hereditary Dukedom of Savoy. He was to receive a subsidy of two hundred thousand pounds to enable him to defend his own dominions; and Great Britain stipulated at the sime time to procure the recovery of the territories he had lost. But the fulfilling of these terms, considering the many chances against us, arising from this appropitious war, might prove a burden of tuinous weight to this country. With out entangling this expen ive ally in a dangerous quarrel, it would have been wiser in us, and more advantageous to him, whenever a pacification took place, to have made the restoration of his dominions a condition of the treaty. It was observed by Mr. Powis, in reply, that the ancestor of the King of Sardinia, who acceded to the grand alliance against France, at the beginning of the present century, was treated with on similar terme. The French were at that time, as they are now, grasp iag at undue power; and Europe was, in like manner, compelled to unite for its preservation. To protect the King of Sardinia was one of the means of our own defence. He was subsidized to fight our battles as well as his own; and the successes he might obtain, were uo less advantageous to us than to him, by weakening the common enemy, and by diverting a considerable part of that force which he might otherwise employ against this country and its allies. Mr. Ryder added, that, in his opi nion, the situation of the King of Sardinia's dominions in Italy sendered him an ally of considerable weight, by enabling him to prevent the French from penetrating into the Milanese. The augmentation of the army was the next object of importance brought before the House. The secretary at war, on the 3d of February, moved, in a committee of supply, that the land-forces for the service of the current year, should consist of 60,coc men. This aug mentation was opposed by Mr. Hussey, on the ground of its inefficacy for the purposes of this war. The navy of Great Britain ought rather to have been augmented. A few stout ships were of much more utility than a land-force, in making such an impression upon the enemy as would be solid and servicealle to the interests of this country. He entertained no doubt of the courage and gallantry of our officers and soldiers; but would rather have seen our naval list carried to 100,000 men, than vote for any farther increase of the army. He was followed by Major Maitland, who entered largely into the subject. He complained that much more money was expended in raising men than heretofore, and that economy economy was little attended to in this branch of the service. But for what were we expending money in new levies? To encounter ideas and opinions, which were not of a nature to be subdued by force of arms. Nor were ministers entitled to our confidence for their application of the supplies granted to them. The injudicious conduct of ministry had been the radical cause of all the disasters that had befallen the British arms; while the advantages that had been obtained, were not the result of their wisdom. The transient successes of the allies at the opening of the last campaign, were produced by numbers: as soon as they divided their forces, they lost ground. The failure at Dunkirk was an unanswerable proof of the incapacity of our ministers. It was totally due to their mismanagement and presumption, and occasioned a long series of misfortunes. Toulon was put into our hands by the royalists, and retaken by the republicans through want of timely succours to keep it. Equal imprudence had appeared in a variety of other measures. Mr. Jenkins justified the attempts upon Dunkirk, in a variety of considerations. It was attacked at the only time when such a thing was practicable. Had the business been delayed, it must have been given over till next year. The commanders of the allied army made no objection to the enterprize, and an adequate force was provided for it. But unforeseen accidents interposed; and, in the mean time, an immense army came to its relief. In support of the augmentation of the army, Mr. Pitt argued that the power of Great Britain at sea, however irresistible on that element, could not, in the nature of things, make an adequate impres sion upon an enemy, whose whole strength was concentrated on land; and who, for that reason, could there only be asailed with efficacy. It was to prevent the invasion of the territories of their neighbours, that the war against the French had been undertaken;-it was therefore at land they were to be encountered. Great Britain was no less deeply concerned than its allies, in putting a stop to the encroachments of France. Were it to succeed in the projects it had evidently formed, its aggrandize ment would be such, that all Europe must submit to its dictates. This was far from being a mere surmise. The style of the Con vention, their continual boasts and threats, the affected superiority with which they treated other states, the plans they openly avowed of compelling all the powers of Eu rope to bow before them, these were unequivocal indications of the arrogant designs they harboured against their neighbours. The great scheme they had not only formed but executed, of converting the people of France into a nation of soldiers, manifested their real views, which were those of conquest and subjugation. A nation acting upon such principles, was necessarily at enmity with all others. Whatever the original causes were of the differences subsisting be tween the French and the neighbouring powers, the contest at present was clearly, Whether they should give laws to others, or contain themselves within their own limits? No exertion, therefore, ought ought to be omitted by Great Britain, in conjunction with its allies, to reduce so dangerous a people within bounds, and to humb'e them so completely, as to deprive them, both of the inclination and power to disturb the peace of Europe. It had been insinuated that the whole strength of the confederacy was unequal to such a task; but that was the language of despondency. France might make a long and desperate resistance; but the resources of the coalition would, if employed with vigour and unanimity, enable it to hold out longer than France, and oblige that haughty people to listen to reasonable terins. Mr. Fox, in reply to the arguments adduced by ministry, asserted that the preceding campaign did by no means deserve the epithet of successful. Our failure at Dunkirk and expulsion from Toulon, were sufficient to silence all pretences to success. The relinquish ing of Toulon was inexcusable. After pledging the honour of the nation to exert every endeavour to retain it, ministry ought to have provided a sufficient force to repel the attacks of the besiegers; where. as the strength employed in its defence was so inconsiderable, that no doubt subsisted of its inability to oppose the force which the French government was preparing against it. The retention of Toulon was a duty of the first importance. Had it been put into an effectual posture of defence, the condition of France was such at that time, as to afford well founded hopes of a powerful insurrection of the royal party in the southern parts of that kingdom. Such was the language of the enemies to the VOL. XXXVI. Convention at that time; and it behoved ministry to make a full trial of its veracity, as they pro fessed themselves of the same opinion. But instead of this, they sacrificed Toulon, and its inhabitants, to their projected expeditions in the West Indies. He did not however place much confidence in that language: he had experienced the fallacy of similar assertions by the adherents to government in the colonies, during the American war. While we possessed Toulon, Lyons was in arms against the Convention, and Marseilles in a state bordering upon insurrection; yet none of their neighbours shewed the least disposition to join them. This proved how little we could depend on assistance from the people of France in favour of a counter-revolution. The delays of ministers in fitting out the expedition intended for the coast of France, under Lord Moira, to succour the royalists; and the feeble efforts made in their behalf at Toulon, had convinced them that we were not able to bring them effectual relief; and that they ought not, therefore, to trust in our promises. In the mean time, all these attempts tended to widen the breach between Great Britain and France, and to kindle a spirit of inveteracy productive of great evils to both countries. Peace, however, was not so difficult an object to attain as some people imagined, or affected to believe. The French and English had more than once been involved in the deadliest quarrels. France had strove, with all her might, to impose an arbitrary government on this country, to subvert its religion, and to replace a banished family on the throne. P These These were certainly most heinous attempts; yet they never induced us, in the height of our resentment, to vow eternal war with the French. Byaparity of reasoning, the French, notwithstanding our endeavours to force upon them a system of government which they had reprobated, would, on our desisting, not refuse to treat for a peace, which they could not want less than we did; and we ourselves could not be supposed so inveterately fixed in our hatred of that people, as to eternize hostilities for the purpose ⚫ of gratifying it, until they submitted -implicitly to our own terms. But this we had no reason to expect, while they continued an armed nation. The supreme power in that country was now lodged in those hands which alone could effect the changes we required; and they were determined to persevere in resisting us and our allies to the very last. After a few words from Mr. Pitt, stating, that by an armed nation he meant no more than the immense mass of people compelled by the Convention to take up arms, the several resolutions of the committee were agreed to. On the 5th of February, the minister laid before the house an account of the supplies necessary for the prosecution of the war, together with the ways and means to raise them, the particulars of the intended loan, and of other methods of procuring money, with the taxes that would be requisite to pay the interest acerning on - the sums-additionally borrowed. He observed, that the exertions required, though great, were indispensable; and that every man should bear in mind that he was now struggling for the preservation of all that was dear to him. The public had likewise the satisfaction of knowing, that both the naval and military department were on the most respectable footing ever known in this country: the exertions of government had been such, that the numbers voted by parliament were already nearly completed in both these branches of the service. The interior strength of the kingdom consisted of one hundred and forty thousand effec、 tive men; and that of the navy, of near ninety thousand: the artillery had been placed on a footing of great improvement, and amounted to near six thousand men. The foreign troops in our pay were almost forty thousand: constituting altogether a force little short of two hundred and seventy thousand men, in the best condition and discipline. He then proceeded to the statement of the sums necessary for the maintenance of this force. The navy would require five millions five hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds; the army, six millions three hundred and thirty-nine thousand; that of the ordnance, one million three hundred and forty-five thousand; and the miscellaneous services would call for two hundred and six thousand. The deficiencies of last year in grants, amounted to four hundred and seventyfour thousand pounds; in the land and malt-tax, three hundred and fifty thousand: the sum appropri ated to the discharge of the naLional debt was two hundred thousand; and the exchequer bills would amount to five millions five Lundred |