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THE

ANNUAL REGISTER,

For the YEAR 1794.

THE

HISTORY

OF

EURO PE.

CHAP. I.

Mens entertained of the Power and Situation of France by the Coalesced Powers ut the Commencement of the War. Their mutual Suspicion. Their Presumption on their first Successes. Close of the Campaign in 1793 unfavourable to them in the Netherlands and on the Rhine. Activity of the French in preparing for the next Campaign. Numbers and Resolution of their Armies. Abilities of their ruling Men. Prodigious Preparations of the French for the next Campaign of 1794. Willingness with which they submit to Burthens in support of their Cause. Their military List double to that of the Coalesced Powers. The Promotion and Military Talents of Jourdain, Hoche, and Pichegru. Aptitude and Patience of the common People in France in the enduring of Hardships. Violence and Impetuosity of the French in Action. Bravery and Discipline of the Austrian Armies. Enthusiasm and Perseverance of the French Soldiers in attacking their Enemies. Colonel Muck sent by the Imperial Court to concert Measures for the ensuing Compaign with the British Ministry. Project of the French relating to the Netherlands discovered and frustrated. Hopes of the Republican Administration in consequence of the Rivalship subsisting between the Houses of Austria and Brandenburgh. The Duke of Brunswick discontented at the Manner of conducting the War. His Resignation of the Command of the Prussian Armies. Pernicious Effects resulting to the Confederacy from the mutual Jea lousies of Austria and Brandenburgh. Advantages arising to the French from that Cause. French and Prussian Commissioners meet at Frankfort, on the Pretence of settling an Exchange of Prisoners. Suspicions of the Pullic on this Occasion. Policy of the Prussian Ministry in its Conduct with the Members of the Confederacy. Ideas of the l'eople of England respecting the Views of Prussia. The King of Prussia declares his Resolution to recede from the Confederacy against France, ond assigns his Reasons for taking this Step. He withdraws his Troops from the Confederates. Endeavours of the Emperor to procure the Accession of the Empire to the Designs of the Coalition against France, and to obtain Supplies from the Diet. VOL. XXXVI,

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He proposes the Raising of the People in a Mass; but is opposed by the Prussian Deputy. Prejudice to the Cause of the Confederacy from these Disagreements. Subsidiary Treaty concluded between Great Britain ana Prussia. Discontents produced thereby among great Numbers of the People in England. Their Suspicions of the good Faith both of the Austrian and Prussian Ministers. Movements of the French Armies in the Netherlands. Condition of the Austrian Forces, and those of the other Confederates. A Council of War held by the Allies. Plan of the ensuing Campaign proposed by the Austrian Ministry. Produces an Altercation, which ends in a Determination of the Emperor to command the Confederate Army in Person. He repairs to Brussels, and is inaugurated as Sovereign of the Austrian Netherlands. He assumes the Command of the Allied Army. The French attacked and defeated near Landrecy. Siege of that Town undertaken. The French attack the Troops of the Hereditary Prince of Orange, and are repulsed. They obtain some Advantages over General Alvinzy, but are forced to retire. They are attacked by the Duke of York, and obliged to retreat to Cambray The Duke attacked by the French, but compels them to retire with Loss. They are repulsed at the same Time by Prince Cobourg. General Pichegru attacks General Clairfait, defeats him, and takes Menin and Courtrai. Landrecy surrenders to the Allies. General Jourdain invades the Duchy of Luxembourg, and defeats the Austrian General Beaulieu. The Duke of York attacked by the French near Tournai. The French_repulsed. They force General Clairfait to abandon Courtrai with great Loss They are defeated by General Kaunitz near Mons. The Allies attack the French in the Neighbourhood of Lisle, and gain some Advantages. The French atta k the Allies, and obtain a complete Victory. Principal Cause of their Successes. Great Defeat of the French, who are driven back as far as Lisle. Again defeated with great Loss by General Kaunitz. Bouillon taken by the Austrians, under General Beaulieu, who defeats a large Body of French. He is compelled by General Jourdain to retire towards Namur. The French defeated with great Slaughter, by the Hereditary Prince of Orange, and forced to withdraw from Charleroy. The Siege of Charleroy resumed. Battle of Fleurus, wherein the Allies are entirely defeated, and lose great Numbers. Debilitated State of their Army. Charleroy surrenders to the French. Ypres besieged by General Moreau, who gains a great Victory over Clairfait, and takes that Town. Consequences of these two Events. Bruges submits to the French. The Duke of York moves towards Oudenard. Tournai surrenders to the French.

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Oudenard taken.

HEN the coalition of European potentates against France first took place, the majority of politicians were of opinion, that in the state of disunionand reciprocalmistrust wherein the French nation was so deeply involved, it would prove unable to resist the efforts that were prepared to overwhelm it, Some of the powers in the

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distress. Reflecting on these facts, they naturally inferred, that having triumphed over this powerful enemy in the days of his greatest force and union, they might reasonably presume on his inability to oppose them, while distracted by internal feuds, and seemingly rent to pieces by the rancours and animosities that characterized the parties dividing the nation, which had extinguished all sentiments of humanity, and rendered then inexorably bent on their mutual destruction. But while the coalesced powers eagerly contemplated the divisions and distractions of the French nation, they lost sight of those seeds of mistrust and suspicion that were profoundly sown among themselves. The plan to reduce France to its own limits, was attended with collateral views, that necessarily tended to promote jealousies of each other amongst its enemies; and to break the bonds of the alliance they had formed to prevent the dangers apprehended from the aggrandizement of France. This spirit of reciprocal suspicion did not however manifest itself to any extent during the first cam paign in Flanders in the year 1793. The warmth with which hostilities were at the commencement prosecuted against a people that avowed themselves the enemies to all Kings, kept alive the determination to cooperate vigorously against them. But the successes of the allies on their first entering into action, the repeated defeats of the French armies, and the reduction of some of their strongest towns, induced the coalesced powers to imagine that the completion of their designs would not meet with great difficulties. Hence they overlooked the neces

sity of acting with the firmest and mest indissoluble concord. Instead of remaining in that compactness of strength which had procured them their first advantages, they thought themselves able to divide their operations. Thus, by separating their force, they rendered it ineffectual for the great and principal purpose they primarily proposed, and lost the only opportunity of accomplishing it which they could reasonably expect.

The close of the campaign of 1793 in the low countries, left the French armies in possession of so many advantages, that the most expert in military affairs, were convinced that they would retain their superiority in the campaign that was approaching. This opinion was corroborafed by their successes on the Rhine, and on the other frontiers of France, and above all by the total suppression of the various insurrections against the republican government in so many provinces of that country. The diligence and activity with which that government pursued its measures, the vigour which aimated the officers and soldiers of its numerous armies, the abilitics of the many commanders that were continually starting up to notice, the indefatiga. ble exertions of all men employed in the public service, struck their enemies with astonishment. However inimical to the principles that actuated the French, their most determined adversaries could not forbear admiring the courage and capacity of those who were at the head of that nation. The opening of the campaign in the year 1794, plainly shewed how resolutely the French were bent, not only to prethe advantages they had gained, but to carry them to the

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utmost extent their arms would enable them. The approaching year seemed pregnant with events that would decide the fate of France, and eventually that of all Europe. Nor did the generality scruple to predict, that however adverse fortune had proved to the allied powers, they were still doomed to greater calamities. The prodigious efforts of the French government evinced how strongly they were persuaded, that on the issue of this campaign the confirmation or the destruction of the Republic would entirely depend. In order to secure a system which they considered as superior to all others, and to which their attachment increased in proportion to the endeavours of their enemies to destroy it, they loaded the nation with every species of burthen and hardship for its preservation.

The military list exhibited by France to the eyes of Europe for the year 1794, was such as to occasion the most serious alarm to the coalition. The whole strength they had been able to collect for a contest in which they were so deeply concerned, and the decision of which was so quickly approaching, did not exceed 360,000 men ; while the troops sent into the field by France alone, more than doubled that number. But France relied as much, if not more, on the temper of the men that composed its armies. Tutored by those who raised them, and no less by those who were employed to teach them military discipline in the maxims of republicanism, so violently predominant in France, they took up arms with far other views and ideas than those that actuated the soldiers of the combined

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powers. Obedience to the will and orders of their rulers was the sole motive that actuated these ; whereas the French soldiers went to battle, some of them, animated with the deadliest sentiments of revenge against men whom they looked upon as the base instruments of tyranny and oppression ; others, by the hope of rising in the army, and acquiring both fame and fortune; and all of them by a desire of maintaining the military reputation of Frenchmen.

Delivered from those anxieties which had arisen from the intestine commotions, which had proved so difficult to be suppressed, the republican administration was now at liberty to exert the whole strength of France in those quarters where its successes would prove most decisive. These were the low countries, and those lying towards the Rhine. The former appearing the more important scene of action, it was chiefly there that the French proposed to make the greatest efforts. The flower of the German and British armies being stationed in that country, with the double view of protecting it from the invasion of France, and converting it into the principal depôt of arms, from whence to annoy the French, it became the chief object of these to frustrate both those designs, and especially the latter. The preceding campaign in those parts had terminated by a general action that had covered the French troops with particular glory. They had defeated in the battle of Maubeuge, that lasted two entire days, the most illustrious commander in the allied armies, Prince Cobourg, who had taken so advantageous a posi

tion, that he seemed persuaded the French would find it impossible to attack him with success. The reputation they obtained by vanquishing the Prince in a pitched battle, the first he had lost during the campaign, added a lustre to their arms, and inspired a confidence in their officers which never after abandoned them.

Jourdain, the General who commanded the French on that day, had now attained a degree of celebrity, which rendered him the principal favourite of the soldiery. It was he who had first turned the tide of success in favour of France at Dunkirk. Had it not been for his conduct and courage on that occasion, the French Republic must have been reduced to the most serious distress. The abilities he had displayed, induced the government to entrust him with the command of the army on the Rhine, where the fortune of war, notwithstanding some very brilliant successes, had not proved so extensively advantageous as in the Belgic provinces. The impetuous activity that marked the progress of the war on the part of France, was the principal cause of its success. The French were continually forming and executing the boldest enterprizes; and tho' frequently foiled, still returned to the charge; and through their invincible perseverance, seldom failed to succeed. Besides General Jourdain, two other men began at this time to attract the public in a most conspicuous manner; the celebrated Pichegru, and the no less famous Hoche. Through their skill and valour, that experienced warrior, General Wurmser, had been successively defeated, and the efforts of the Austrians and Prussians

to penetrate into France, had been completely frustrated.

In addition to the military talents of their commanders, a circumstance operated to the advantage of the French, of which it seems their enemies were not sufficiently aware, Though natives of a country less exposed to the rigours of winter than either Germany or the low countries, the commonalty in France had long been used to a course of living that qualified them to endure almost every species of hardship. From the high price of fuel, they were particularly inured to the bearing of cold; and, from their general poverty, were satisfied with very moderated supplies of food. These two qualifications combining with the enthusiasm infused by the principles they had so warmly espoused, rendered them capable of enduring the greatest hardships attendant on a military life, and fitted them or the most arduous undertakings that could be proposed by the many enterprizing and daring leaders with which their armies now abounded.

In the depth of that rigorous winter which was felt throughout all Europe, from the close of 1793 to the end of the ensuing February, the French troops began to act in a variety of places in the Netherlands. Their operations were not of an important nature, and were chiefly calculated to keep them in action, and to fatigue their enemies: nor were they attended with much success. Their first onsets in the va rious skirmishes wherein they were continually engaged, were usually so violent and impetuous as to bear down all resistance: but the issue of the contest was frequently no less unfavourable to them than the beginning

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