to stop the contagion, and never to cease their utmost endeavours to accomplish this object, till it was completely effected. To the foregoing remarks, it was added by Mr. Pitt, at the close of a speech, wherein he went over much the same ground with Lord Mornington, that whatever might be the future constitution of France, whether monarchical or republican provided it were divested of the principles on which the present government was founded, Great Britain might accede to a pacification. A monarchy was, doubtless, the most eligible of the two, as being the most acceptable to the judicious and moderate in that country, and less tending to involve it in quarrels with its neighbours: but while France remained in its present state, war was preferable to peace. A long speech was made on this occasion by Mr. Sheridan, in answer to that of Lord Mornington. Undue advantage, he said, was taken of the passions attached to human nature, in order to excite the indignation of the British public against the French, on account of the enormities they had committed in the course of the revolution. The guilt and infamy of their conduct no person could deny; but it only affected them, and no people had any other right than to lament the misfortunes of that country, without assuming, however, the least interference in its domestic affairs, unless by amicable mediation between the parties. But had Europe acted this friendly part? Had it not, on the contrary, since the commencement of the revolution, expressed a decided aversion to one of the parties, and a manifest partiality to the other? Had it not proceeded from words to deeds, and espoused the cause of the court in such a manner, as could not fail to exasperate the people of France? Doubtless, the popular fury and its consequences were deserving of execration; still, however, it did not follow that the whole nation ought to be punished for the crimes committed by the multitude during the rage of tumult and insurrec tion. The French were bursting, as it were, out of the prison of a long slavery: they had recovered their liberty, but knew not how to use it: they were hurried by resentment to retaliate on their oppressors the ill usage they had suffered, and had carried this retaliation to the most unjustifiable and criminal excess. But was it either equitable or wise in the European powers to coalesce for their punishment? They had an unalienable right to freedom, in common with all the human race; and allowing the vengeance they had wreaked on their former masters to have been ungenerous, base, and cruel in the extreme, it had been confined to France: and foreign potentates ought to have reflected, that by leaving the French to act towards each other without interposing between them, though that country would probably have been deluged with blood, it would have been the blood of Frenchmen alone, and humanity would not have to regret the additional destruction of the many thousands, whose lives had been thrown away in this fatal quarrel. But it was not from sentiments of compassion to the French, or to mankind, that this interference had arisen; it established. Whether it was a Though disunited among themselves, they still had displayed sufficient union to resist their foreign foes; and it was well known that a plurality of those who were dissatisfied with the present state of things among them, still were much more adverse to a foreign yoke, and readier to bear with internal oppression, than to see their country in the possession of strangers. Was it surprising that, after the resolution taken by the European powers to treat the French as their common enemy, they should feel a resentment ade originated in ambition. France appeared in so similar a situation to Poland; the parties that distracted it seemed so irreconcileably intent on their mutual destruction, that the grasping disposition, found experimentally to be inherent in arbitrary monarchs, had led them to form the most sanguine hopes of profiting by those scenes of discord: they could not resist the temptation, seemingly held out, to partition France among them, as they had done the other unhappy kingdom: this motive alone put arms into their hands. But after failing in their iniquitous attempt, and instead of reducing the French to subjection, being themselves nearly compelled to act on the defensive, with what face could they complain of retaliation on the part of the French nation? These had been driven by despair to exertion of which they were thought incapable. Infuriated by the aggression of unprovoked enemies on every frontier of France, and mag-quate to such treatment, and nanimously resolved to perish sooner than receive the law from nations which they had always held in a light of inferiority, they had summoned all the courage, all the abilities, all the resources of which they were masters. Armed with these, they had entered the field of contest, and bad taught the coalesced powers the difference between a state long broken asunder by an ill-constructed government, and constitutionally, as it were, involved in perpetual jars,-and a nation firmly united by a sense of its indignity, and of which an incomparable majority, after casting off the yoke of domestic tyranny, had determined to persevere to the last in maintaining the system they had threaten, in their turn, the severest revenge? The junction of Great Britain with the coalition, was the heaviest blow, in the opinion of the French, that they could have received. The English were the only people, since the revolution, for whom the French had avowed any esteem. It was of notoriety that they held all others in contempt It was, therefore, much against their will that they found themselves involved in a quarrel with this country. True it was, that, after compelling the Prussians to retire from France, and defeating the Austrians in Flanders, their rancour at the unprovoked invasion of their country by both those powers, and at the menaces con : tained in their manifestoes, had impelled the French to threaten on their side, to espouse the cause of those nations that rose against their oppressors; but at whom was this declaration levelled? Was it not manifestly against the Emperor and the King of Prussia? On the first signification that Great Britain disapproved of this declaration, was it not explained in such a manner as to remove all cause of offence? Was nothing to be allowed to the momentary rage of a people loaded from all parts with the most unqualified obloquy, and held out to the world as the outcasts of mankind? It was nugatory to assert that this was no more than truth it was not a language to be borne by individuals, much less by nations. We ought to have reflected, that public insults could not fail to provoke public indignation, and create national quarrels. Were the French ever so guilty, who constituted us their judges? Private opinions, doubtless, were free, and individuals had a right to deliver their sentiments in conversation, upon all public occurrences, both in their own and in foreign countries; but no nation was entitled to sit publicly in judgment on the concerns of another, unless manifestly affected by them. But in what manner did the altera tion of government in France affect Great Britain, unless by meeting with its disapprobation? This, however, was no just ground for dispute. England had, in the last century, set the precedent of many a deed highly disapproved of by its neighbours, without being called to account by any of them. It was a law held sacred by nations, that the disavowal of any act or pre tensions injurious to another, was a sufficient atonement. The French having disavowed all right to interpose in the affairs of other nations, had therefore just reason to expect that Great Britain would abstain from interposition in theirs. It ill became us, however, to reprobate the French for their conduct in this respect. We had carried our interference as far as we durst. If the French had acted with insolence in the Netherlands, by introducing forcibly their principles and forms of governments, had not Britain used compulsive measures towards the Swiss Cantons, and those Italian states she thought herself able to intimidate! Did she not, as soon as she had thrown off the mask of neutrality, insist, in the most arrogant manner, that others should cease to be neuter? Was not this acting precisely upon the principle she so bitterly reprobated? The French had been justly reproached for their perfidy towards those whom, under the pretence of emancipation from slavery, they had reduced to the meanest subjection. But had England acted otherwise, in threatening the severest treatment to those who had expressed an unwillingness to adopt her views and measures, and to join the coalition, whatever danger they might incur by their compliance? The hostile intentions of France to this country had been repeatedly urged, as fully sufficient motives to treat the French as avowed enemies. But had not the British ministry, from the very commencement of the revolution, expressed the most decided enmity to all revolutionary proceedings? What occasioned the recall of the British minister from Paris, the expulsion expuision of Frenchmen from Bri- for commencing hostilities. The tain, the confiscation of their mer-, motive ostensibly held out to the chandize in neutral bottoms, the British nation, was the preservation violation of the commercial treaty of laws, religion, property, of all, between Great Britain and France, in short, that is dear to civilized -and, to complete these inimical society. This was a cause in which measures, the contemptuous dis our ministers insisted that it was mission of its minister at our incumbent on all Europe to partiSuch being Gourt? Were not these deeds of cipate in common. open and undeniable enmity? As the case, and allowing ministers to the verbal declaration of war on to be earnest in this declaration, the part of France, would any why should they palliate the reman of candour say, that the va- solution they had most certainly rious steps taken by the British go- taken, to engage in a war which, vernment against France, ante- on such grounds, was neither unjust cedently to that declaration, were nor unnecessary; and for which, not, without declaring them such, instead of blame, they were entitled manifest acts of hostility? Did not to praise? But were these the real the French, notwithstanding these motives that led them to undertake infringements of peace, abstain this war? Until this were fairly from all violence, and earnestly so. proved, it still remained incontrolicit for amity and a good under- vertible, that they were the pristanding between them and this mary aggressors in a ruinous and Country: But long had our minis- unjustifiable war, since no other The agtry determined to cast them off motives could defend it. as unworthy of their friendship. gression was clearly imputed to We now were entering on a se- them, even by their allies, who cond campaign; but what was the demanded, in consequence of it, this object proposed ? Had we not immense pecuniary supply; which obtained the main point in contest, they could not have claimed with the security of our allies? It could any colour of equity, had Great But not be supposed that the French, Britain been first attacked. were they, conformably to their whatever were the real or pretenddemands, to remain unmolested in ed motives of ministry, or of their their domestic arrangements, would allies, the French still remained refuse to agree to reasonable terms. unsubdued. That peace and safety Were they to be guilty of so rash for which the confederacy was a refusal, then indeed the British fighting, did not seem obtainable ministry would stand acquitted in by their arms. The French had prosecuting the war against them resisted them so successfully, that with the utmost vigour, and hold- peace, when it came, would proba ing them out as perversely inclined bly be concluded on their own to be our enemies. But if cir- terms. What a prospect did this cumstances were duly consulted, afford to the movers of the war! this fatal war was meditated by Whatever ministers could say upon ministry. The French attack upon this subject, facts spoke decisively the Dutch, was no other than a against them. They had not pretence, and, as it were, a signal made that impression upon France which which they had at first expected. The royal party, after the most spirited efforts, was entirely crushed. The violent republican party, after overcoming all its opponents, had seized all the power of the state, and exercised it with such conduct and energy, as to have rendered the French arms victorious alunost everywhere. From their vast successes, they had acquired universal confidence in their abilities; their authority was uncontrouled both in civil and military affairs; soldiers, officers and generals paid them implicit obedience; and the nation at large was not only submissive, but zeelous in its compliance with their decrees. Hopes had been entertained by our ministry, that the finances of France must prove inadequate to the support of the stupendous mass that had risen in its defence: but those hopes had been totally frustrated. Means had been found to provide amply for all the necessary deinands of those immense multitudes that had been brought into the field; and instead of diminishing, the strength of the French, since the beginning of the war, had increased. Could the same be atserted of the coalition? Were their arms not surprisingly decreased, and, what was much worse, their spirit fallen by the numerous defcats they had suffered from an enemy whom they had been taught to despise, on account of his inexperience and ignorance in tactics? The Austrians and Prussians, long reputed the best disciplined troops in Europe, had however been repeatedly foiled by the raw French fevies, collected on the spur of the occasion, wholly unpractised in the usages of war, and led to battle merely by the necessity of defending their country, but inspired at the same time with an enthusiastic resolution to be victorious, or to lose their lives. After mentioning the Austrians and Prussians, the other branches of the confederacy were beneath notice. What had Spain effected worthy of consideration? What had been done by Sardinia? To what, in short, had amounted the efforts of a confederacy formed, with few exceptions, of all the powers in Europe? The answer was fatally too mortifying to reflect upon it with patience, when we appreciated the treasure expended and the blood that had been shed, against the paltry successes they had purchased, and which were far outweighed by the disgraces that so quickly fol owed them. But the efforts of a mighty combination against France amounted to something still more alarming: they had proved that France alone, under the influence of those maxims it had embraced, was able to encounter the united force of all Europe. This surely was a most important though mortifying discovery; yet not surprising to those who considered with a cool and philosophic eye the consequences naturally flowing from a spirit of enthusiasm in a cause, of the rectitude of which men were intimately convinced, and who examined at the same time the organization of that great force which France had raised for its protection. Contrarily to the long standing practice in the European armies, of confining rewards and promotion to men of family and interest, soldiers were raised from the ranks for their valour: they were pre ferred |