thinking it not so proper to affix a name to a sect from a doctrine which they combat, will have it come from Kadr, or Kodrat, i. e. power, because they assert man's power to act freely. Those, however, who give the name of Kadarians to the Mótazalites are their enemies, for they disclaim it, and give it to their antagonists the Jabarians, who likewise refuse it as an infamous appellation, because Mohammed is said to have declared the Kadarians to be the Magians of his followers. But what the opinion of the Kadarians in Mohammed's time was is very uncertain: the Mótazalites say the name belongs to those who assert predestination, and make God the author of good and evil, viz. the Jabarians; but all the other Mohammedan sects agree to fix it on the Mótazalites, who they say are like the Magians in establishing two principles, light, or God, the author of good, and darkness, or the devil, the author of evil: but this cannot absolutely be said of the Mótazalites, for they (at least the generality of them) ascribe men's good deeds to God, but their evil deeds to themselves; meaning thereby that man has a free liberty and power to do either good or evil, and is master of his actions; and for this reason it is said that the other Mohammedans call them Magians, because they assert another author of actions besides God. And, indeed, it is a difficult matter to say what Mohammed's own opinion was in this matter; for on the one side the Korân itself is pretty plain for absolute predestination, and many sayings of Mohammed are recorded to that purpose, and one in particular, wherein he introduces Adam and Moses disputing before God in this manner: Thou, says Moses, art Adam; whom God created, and animated with the breath of life, and caused to be worshipped by the angels, and placed in paradise, from whence mankind have been expelled for thy fault: whereto Adam answered, Thou art Moses; whom God chose for his apostle, and entrusted him with his word, by giving thee the tables of the law, and whom he vouchsafed to admit to discourse with himself: how many years dost thou find the law was written before I was created? Says Moses, Forty: And dost thou not find, replied Adam, these words therein; And Adam rebelled against his Lord and transgressed? which Moses confessing, Dost thou therefore blame me, continued he, for doing that which God wrote of me that I should do, forty years before I was created; nay, for what was decreed concerning me fifty thousand years before the creation of heaven and earth? In the conclusion of which dispute Mohammed declared that Adam had the better of Moses. On the other side, it is urged in the behalf of the Mótazalites, that Mohammed declaring that the Kadarians and Magians had been cursed by the tongues of seventy prophets, and being asked who the Kadarians were, answered, Those who assert that God predestinated them to be guilty of rebellion, and yet punishes them for it : al Hasan is also said to have declared, that God sent Mohammed to the Arabs while they were Kadarians, or Jabarians, and laid their sins upon God and to confirm the matter this sentence of the Korân is quoted;" When they commit a filthy action, they say, We found our fathers practising the same, and God hath commanded us so to do: Say, Verily God commandeth not filthy actions." II. The Sefatians held the opposite opinion to the Mótazalites in respect to the eternal attributes of God, which they affirmed; making no distinction between the essential attributes and those of operation: and hence Vide Poc. Spec. p. 238. Al Motarrezi, al Shahrest. Vide ibid. p. 232. • lidem, &c. ibid. Iidem, ibid. Vide Poc. Spec. p. 233, &c. 2 Vide ibid. p. 237. Ebn al Athîr, al Bokhari, apud Poc. p. 236. Chap. 7. Al Motarrezi, apud eund. p. 237, 238 they were named Sefàtians, or Attributists. Their doctrine was that of the first Mohammedans, who were not yet acquainted with these nice distinctions: but this sect afterwards introduced another species of declarative attributes, or such as were necessarily used in historical narration, as hands, face, eyes, &c., which they did not offer to explain, but contented themselves with saying they were in the law, and that they called them declarative attributes. However, at length, by giving various explications and interpretations of these attributes, they divided into many different opinions: some, by taking the words in the literal sense, fell into the notion of a likeness or similitude between God and created beings; to which it is said the Karaites among the Jews, who are for the literal interpretation of Moses's law, had shown them the way: others explained them in another manner, saying that no creature was like God, but that they neither understood, nor thought it necessary to explain the precise signification of the words which seem to affirm the same of both; it being sufficient to believe that God hath no companion or similitude. Of this opinion was Malec Ebn Ans, who declared as to the expression of God's sitting on his throne, in particular, that though the meaning is known, yet the manner is unknown; and that it is necessary to believe it, but heresy to make any question about it. The sects of the Sefàtians are, 1. The Asharians, the followers of Abu'l Hasan al Ashári, who was first a Mótazalite, and the scholar of Abu Ali al Jobbâï, but disagreeing from his master in opinion as to God's being bound (as the Mótazalites assert) to do always that which is best or most expedient, left him, and set up a new sect of himself. The occasion of this difference was the putting a case concerning three brothers, the first of whom lived in obedience to God, the second in rebellion against him, and the third died an infant. Al Jobbâï being asked what he thought would become of them, answered, that the first would be rewarded in paradise, the second punished in hell, and the third neither rewarded nor punished: but what, objected al Ashári, if the third say, O Lord, if thou hadst given me longer life, that I might have entered paradise with my believing brother, it would have been better for me; to which al Jobbâï replied, that God would answer, I knew that if thou hadst lived longer, thou wouldst have been a wicked person, and therefore cast into hell. Then, retorted al Ashári, the second will say, Lord, why didst thou not take me away while I was an infant, as thou didst my brother, that I might not have deserved to be punished for my sins, nor be cast into hell? To which al Jobbâï could return no other answer, than that God prolonged his life to give him an opportunity of obtaining the highest degree of perfection, which was best for him: but al Ashári demanding farther, why he did not for the same reason grant the other a longer life, to whom it would have been equally advantageous; al Johba was so put to it, that he asked whether the devil possessed him? No, says al Ashári, but the master's ass will not pass the bridge;' i. e., he is posed. 2 The opinions of the Ashárians were, 1. That they allowed the attributes of God to be distinct from his essence, yet so as to forbid any comparison to be made between God and his creatures. This was also the opinion of Ahmed Ebn Hanbal, and David al Ispahâni, and others, who herein followed Malec Ebn Ans, and were so cautious of any assimilation of God to created beings, that they declared whoever moved his hand while he read "Vide Poc. ibid. p. 224. Al Shahrest. apud Poc. Spec. p. 223. ibid. 1 Auctor al Mawâkef, et al Safadi. apud Poc. ubi sup. p. 230, &c. in Vita al Jobbâï. Al Shahrest. apud Poc. Spec. p. 230. " Vide eund. Ebn Khalec. these words: I have created with my hand; or stretched forth his finger in repeating this saying of Mohammed: The heart of the believer is between two fingers of the Merciful; ought to have his finger cut off:3 and the reasons they gave for not explaining any such words were, that it is forbidden in the Korân, and that such explications were necessarily founded on conjecture and opinion, from which no man ought to speak of the attributes of God, because the words of the Korân might by that means come to be understood differently from the author's meaning: nay some have been so superstitiously scrupulous in this matter as not to allow the words hand, face, and the like, when they occur in the Korân, to be rendered into Persian or any other language, but require them to be read in the very original words, and this they call the safe way. 2. As to predestination, they held that God hath one eternal will, which is applied to whatsoever he willeth, both of his own actions and those of men, so far as they are created by him, but not as they are acquired or gained by them: that he willeth both their good and their evil, their profit and their hurt, and as he willeth and knoweth, he willeth concerning men that which he knoweth, and hath commanded the pen to write the same in the preserved table: and this is his decree, and eternal immutable counsel and purpose. They also went so far as to say, that it may be agreeable to the way of God that man should be commanded what he is not able to perform. But while they allow man some power, they seem to restrain it to such a power as cannot produce any thing new; only God, say they, so orders his providence, that he creates, after, or under, and together with every created or new power, an action which is ready whenever a man wills it, and sets about it: and this action is called Casb, i. e., Acquisition, being in respect to its creation, from God, but in respect to its being produced, employed, and acquired, from man." And this being generally esteemed the orthodox opinion, it may not be improper farther to explain the same in the words of some other writers. The elective actions of men, says one, fall under the power of God alone; nor is their own power effectual thereto : but God causeth to exist in man power and choice; and if there be no impediment, he causeth his action to exist also, subject to his power, and joined with that and his choice; which action, as created, is to be ascribed to God, but as produced, employed, or acquired, to man. So that by the acquisition of an action is properly meant a man's joining or connecting the same with his power and will, yet allowing herein no impression or influence on the existence thereof, save only that it is subject to his power. Others, however, who are also on the side of al Ashári, and reputed orthodox, explain the matter in a different manner, and grant the impression or influence of the created power of man on his action, and that this power is what is called Acquisition. But the point will be stiil clearer, if we hear a third author, who rehearses the various opinions, or ex plications of the opinion of this sect, in the following words, viz. Abu'l Hasan al Ashári asserts all the actions of men to be subject to the power of God, being created by him, and that the power of man hath no influence at all on that which he is empowered to do; but that both the power, and what is subject thereto, fall under the power of God: al Kâdi Abu Beer says that the essence or substance of the action is the effect of the power of God, but its being either an action of obedience, as prayer, or an action of disobe dience, as fornication, are qualities of the action, which proceed from the power of man; Abd'almalec, known by the title of Imâm, al Haramein, Al Shahrest. apud Al Shahırest, apud Poc. p. 245, &c. Al Shahrest. ibid. p. 248. Al Shahrest. apud Poc. Spec. p. 228, &c. 4 • Vide Poc. ibid. Abu'l Hosein of Basra, and other learned men, held that the actions of men are effected by the power which God hath created in man, and that God causeth to exist in man both power and will, and that this power ano will do necessarily produce that which man is empowered to do: and Abu ishâk al Isfarâyeni taught, that that which maketh impression, or hath influence on an action, is a compound of the power of God and the power of man.' The same author observes, that their ancestors, perceiving a manifest difference between those things which are the effects of the election of man, and those things which are the necessary effects of inanimate agents, destitute both of knowledge and choice, and being at the same time pressed by the arguments which prove that God is the Creator of all things, and consequently of those things which are done by men, to conciliate the matter, chose the middle way, asserting actions to proceed from the power of God, and the acquisition of man ; God's way of dealing with his servants being, that when man intendeth obedience, God createth in him an action of obedience, and when he intendeth disobedience, he createth in him an action of disobedience; so that man seemeth to be the effective producer of his action, though he really be not. But this, proceeds the same writer, is again pressed with its difficulties, because the very intention of the mind is the work of God, so that no man hath any share in the production of his own actions; for which reason the ancients disapproved of too nice an inquiry into this point, the end of the dispute concerning the same being, for the most part, either the taking away of all precepts positive as well as negative, or else the associating of a companion with God, by introducing some other independent agent besides him. Those, therefore, who would speak more accurately, use this form: There is neither compulsion nor free liberty, but the way lies between the two; the power and will in man being both created by God, though the merit or guilt be imputed unto man. Yet, after all, it is judged the safest way to follow the steps of the primitive Moslems, and, avoiding subtle disputations and too curious inquiries, to leave the knowledge of this matter wholly unto God. 3. As to mortal sin 1 Auctor Sharh al Tawâlea, apud eund. ibid. p. 248, &c. Idem, ibid. p. 219. 250. Idem, ibid. p. 250, 251. I trust the reader will not be offended if, as a farther illustration of what has been said on this subject, (in producing of which I have purposely kept to the original Mohammedan expressions) I transcribe a passage or two from a postscript sub. joined to the epistle I have quoted above, (sect. iv. p. 77,) in which the point of free-will is treated ex professo. Therein the Moorish author, having mentioned the two opposite opinions of the Kadarians, who allow free-will, and the Jabarians, who make man a necessary agent, (the former of which opinions, he says, seems to approach nearest to that of the greater part of Christians, and of the Jews) declares the true opinion to be that of the Sonnites, who assert that man hath power and will to choose good and evil, and can moreover know he shall be rewarded if he do well, and shall be punished if he do ill; but that he depends notwithstanding on God's power, and willeth, if God willeth, but not otherwise. Then he proceeds briefly to refute the two extreme opinions, and first to prove that of the Kadarians, though it be agreeable to God's justice, inconsistent with his attributes of wisdom and power: Sapientia enim Dei," says he, "comprehendit quicquid fuit et futurum est ab æternitate in finem usque mundi et postea. Et ita novit ab æterno omnia opera creaturarum, sive bona, sive mala, quæ fuerint creata cum potentia Dei, et ejus libera et determinata voluntate, sicut ipsi visum fuit. Denique novit eum qui futurus erat malus, et tamen creavit eum, et similiter bonum, quem etiam creavit : neque negari potest quin, si ipsi libuisset, potuisset omnes creare bonos: placuit tamen Deo creare bonos et malos, cum Deo so sit absoluta et libera voluntas, et perfecta electio, et non homini. Ita enim Salomon in suis proverbiis dixit, Vitam et mortem, bonum et malum, divitias et paupertatem. esse et venire à Deo. Christiani etiam dicunt S. Paulum dixisse in suis epis tolis Dicet etiam lutum figulo, quare facis unum vas ad honorem, et aliud vas ad contumeliam? Cum igitur miser homo fuerit creatus à voluntate Dei et potentia, nihil aliud potest tribui ipsi quàm ipse sensus cognoscendi et sentiendi an bene vel male faciat. Quæ unica causa (id est, sensus cognoscendi) erit ejus gloriæ vel prena causa: per talem enim sensum novit quid boni vel mali adversus Dei præcepta fecerit." the Ashárians taught, that if a believer guilty of such sin die without repentance, his sentence is to be left to God, whether he pardon him out of mercy, or whether the prophet intercede for him, (according to that saying recorded of him, "My intercession shall be employed for those among my people who shall be guilty of grievous crimes,") or whether he punish him in proportion to his demerit, and afterwards, through his mercy, admit him into paradise; but that it is not to be supposed he will remain for ever in hell with the infidels, seeing it is declared that whoever shall have faith in his heart but of the weight of an ant shall be delivered from hell-fire. And this is generally received for the orthodox doctrine in this point, and is diametrically opposite to that of the Mótazalites. These were the more rational Sefàtians, but the ignorant part of them, not knowing how otherwise to explain the expressions of the Korân relating to the declarative attributes, fell into most gross and absurd opinions, making God corporeal, and like created beings.5 Such were, 2. The Moshabbehites, or assimilators; who allowed a resemblance between God and his creatures, supposing him to be a figure composed of members or parts, either spiritual or corporeal, and capable of local motion, of ascent and descent, &c. Some of this sect inclined to the opinion of the The opinion of the Jabarians, on the other hand, he rejects as contrary to man's consciousness of his own power and choice, and inconsistent with God's justice, and his having given mankind laws, to the observing or transgressing of which he has annexed rewards and punishments. After this he proceeds to explain the third opinion in the following words: "Tertia opinio Zunis (i. e. Sonnitarum), quæ vera est, affirmat homini potestatem esse, sed limitatam à sua causa, id est, dependentem à Dei potentia et voluntate, et prop. ter illam cognitionem qua deliberat benè vel malè facere, esse dignum pœna vel præmio. Manifestuni est in æternitate non fuisse aliam potentiam præter Dei nostri omnipotentis, e cujus potentia pendebant omnia possibilia, id est, qua poterant esse, cum ab ipso fuerint creata. Sapientia verò Dei novit etiam quæ non sunt futura; et potentia ejus, etsi non creaverit ea, po uit tamen, si ita Deo placuisset. Ita novit sapientia Dei quæ erant impos. sibilia, id est, quæ non poterant esse; quæ tamen nullo pacto pendent ab ejus potentia: ab ejus enim potentia nulla pendent nisi possibilia.-Dicimus enim à Dei potentia non pendere creare Deum alium ipsi similem, nec creare aliquid quod moveatur et quiescat simul eodem tempore, cùm hæc sint ex impossibilibus: comprehendit tamen suâ sapientiâ tale aliquid non pendere ab ejus potentiâ.-A potentiâ igitur Dei pendet solûm quod potest esse, et possibile est esse: quæ semper parata est dare esse possibilibus. Et si hoc penitus cognoscamus, cognoscemus pariter omne quod est, seu futurum est, sive sint opera nostra, sive quidvis aliud, pendere à sola potentia Dei. Et hoc non privatim intelligitur, sed in genere de omni eo quod est et movetur, sive in cœlis, sive in terrâ; et nec aliquâ potenliâ potest impediri Dei potentia, cùm nulla alia potentia absoluta sit, præter Dei; potentia verò nostra non est a se, nisi a Dei potentia: et cum potentia nostra dicitur esse a causa sua, ideo dicimus potentiam nostram esse straminis comparatam cum potentia Dei: eo enim modo quo stramen movetur â motu maris, ita nostra potentia et voluntas a Dei potentia. Itaque Dei potentia semper est parata etiam ad occidendum aliquem; ut si quis hominem occidat, non dicimus potentia hominis id factum, sed æterna potentia Dei: error enim est id tribuere potentiae hominis. Potentia enim Dei, cum semper sit parata, et ante ipsum hominem, ad occidendum; si solâ hominis potentiâ id factum esse diceremus, et moreretur, potentia sanè Dei (quæ antè erat) jam ibi esset frustra; quia post mortem non potest potentia Dei eum iterum occidere; ex quo sequeretur potentiam Dei impediri à po tentia hominis, et potentiam hominis anteire et antecellere potentiam Dei; quod est absurdum et impossibile. Igitur Deus est qui operatur æterna suâ potentiâ ; si verò homini injiciatur culpa, sive in tali homicidio, sive in aliis, hoc est quantunt ad præcepta et legem. Homini tribuitur solùm opus externè, et ejus electio, quæ est a voluntate ejus et potentia; non verò internè.-Hoc es punctum illud indivisibile et secretum, quod à paucissimis capitur, ut sapientissimus Sidi Abo Hamet Elgaceli (i. e. Dominus Abu Hamed al Ghazâli) affirmat (cujus spiritui Deus concedat gloriam, Amen!) sequentibus verbis: Ita abditum et profundum et abstrusum est intelligere punctum illud Liberi Arbitrii, ut neque characteres ad scribendum, neque ullæ rationes ad exprimendum sufficiant, et omnes, quotquot de hac re locuti sunt, hæserunt confusi in ripa tanti et tam spaciosi maris." Al Shabrest. apud Poc. Spec. p. 258. Vide Poc. ibid. p. 255, &c. Abultar, p. 167 &c. Al Mawakef, apud Poc. ibid. 'Al Shahrest. apud eund. ibid. p. 226. |