his Majefty's confidence would blunt the fhafts which malevolence was pointing against me; and he concluded with faying, that, in his opinion, I might ferve the nation eflentially by going to Eng

land.

"To please the King, would alone have been to me an important confideration; but to contribute to the return of publick order, appeared to me the greatest favour I could confer on the people, who gave me fo many affecting proofs of their attachment: it alfo feemed to me, that publick tranquillity was the more defirable in the capital, at a time when the King refided in it, and that it was fo foon to poffefs the National Affembly in its bofom; above all, I imagined I faw the Revolution fixed on the most firm bafis, having only infignificant difficulties to furmount. In short, the propofed miffion feemed to me pregnant with importance to France: 1 acquiefced, on condition however that my abfence fhould be fanctioned by the National Affembly-the reprefentatives of the nation confented, and I fet off immediately."

It may not be improper here to add, that M. M. de Biron and de Liencourt knew the instructions and the correfpondence of that miffion; the King having given leave that they should be imparted to them; and, though the cabinet fecrets cannot yet be revealed, M. D'Orleans does not entertain a doubt, but that M. de Montmorin would, were it thought neceflary, vouch for the truth of thefe affertions.

Such are the circumftances which M. D'Orleans has thought proper to lay before his counfel; who, no doubt, will direct their proceedings by the writings thereunto annexed.

M. D'Orleans concludes with forewarning them, that he does not wish to give way to fentiments of enmity or revenge; but at the fame time, that it is his determined refolution to neglect no neceffary means of fulfilling his engagements, and of throwing a radiant light on the fmallest detail of that dark business.

He, therefore, wishes to know what are his claims against the King's Attorney at the Châtelet, against the Judges, and againft the Witneffes.

LOUIS-PHILIP-JOSEPH D'ORLEANS.'

THE COUNSEL, after infifting ftrongly on the impoffibility of the charges, after pointing out the partiality with which the proceedings against M. D'Orleans were conducted, and after fhewing the perjury of fome witneffes, and the inconfiftencies of others, recommend that he fhould prepare to prefer his complaint:

ift. Against M. M. Boucher D'Argis, (the Attorney General,) and de Flandre de Brunville.

zdly. Against M. M. La Serre, Duval Nampty, and Thierry La Ville, for perjury.

3dly. Against other witneffes-namely, M. M. Frondeville, Guillermy, Pelletier, Digoine, Morlet, Roch Galand, Boiffe, &c. whofe depofitions appear replete with material falfehood and flan derous intentions; which ought not to pass unpunished.'

It

It would, no doubt, gratify our readers to learn what, in the opinion of the counfel, were the causes of these unfortunate riots: but for thefe circumftances we must refer to the Memoir at large.

ART. XV. De P'État de la France, &c. par M. de Calonne. [Article concluded.]

IN N a former article on this fubject, we enquired into M. de Calonne's account of the FINANCES of France: we attended, as accurately as we were able, to his calculations; and we endeavoured to ascertain what degree of confidence was to be placed in the conclufions which were deduced from them. In doing this, we proceeded with caution, which might almost be termed fufpicion we felt as if we were in an enemy's country, and we knew not whether every advance might not lead into a foare. We enter more boldly on the remainder of our progress: a more intimate acquaintance with the author has added to our favourable opinion of his character; and as we have neither prejudice nor prepoffeffion to bias our fentiments, we shall fpeak openly we wifh advantage to none, but to thofe, who like ourselves, are contending for truth; and we scorn to urge the arguments on one part, and at the fame time to ftifle thofe on the other.

M. de Calonne, having infifted on the deplorable fituation of France, next proceeds to inquire into the means which may produce a favourable change in its circumftances. This change confifts in recurring to the Cahiers †, which ought to ferve as a bafis for the conftitution, and as a guide for the National Affembly. He confiders the decrees of the Affembly either as agreeing with the Cahiers, and as being confequently valid; or, as relating to questions concerning which the Cabiers have not spoken, and therefore as requiring a revifion; or, as being oppofite to the Cahiers, and, of course, radically void. With refpect to the first of thefe divifions, he is filent. On the fecond head, we learn that there have been five material decrees paffed by the Affembly, concerning which the Cabiers have not determined. We fhall notice thefe in their

order.

The 1ft is, that the Affembly has formed itself into a permanent body, and has thereby deprived the king of fome powers

See the Appendix to our laft vol. p. 564.

+ The Cahiers are the papers of inftruction given to their deputies by the three ellates; the Noblee, the Clergy, and the Tiers Etat.

which ought to be exercifed by him:-but what is this permanence? It is, if we may be allowed the expreffion, only temporary; it exifts no longer than while the conftitution remains unfettled. This then can afford no very powerful ob, jection.

2dly, The Affembly has had recourfe to the establishment of martial law. This, like the former, is an evil of temporary duration: the neceflity for it was certainly lamentable, but it was urgent.

3dly, The inftitution of juries. Of this decree, M. de Ca lonne fpeaks in high and proper terms: he doubts, however, whether the trial by jury can be extended to the army and

navy.

4thly, The new divifion of the kingdom into geometrial portions, in order to form a more equal diftribution of taxes.— On this fubject, we think with M. de Calonne. We cannot fee the neceffity of the meafure: to us it appears like the wild excess of reform, where nothing that is old can be good, but where alteration is fynonymous to improvement, and where novelty means excellence. As the kingdom was before divided, could not the relative powers of the divifions, the quantity of force which each bore to the other, or to the whole kingdom, have been eftimated; and might not the quantity of taxation have been proportioned to each with equal exactness, as it can be in confequence of the proposed mode of equal divifion? If, indeed, the fame number of fquare miles, wherever fituated, were to bear the fame weight of taxation; if the city of Paris were to contribute equally with the naked inhofpitable heath of equal extent, then trouble would be faved by a geometrical divifion; but when in both cafes, the powers of each must be afcertained from the infpection and comparifon of their various fituations and conditions; from accurate investigations of their population, manufactures, cultivation, and other sources of riches, more various and uncertain, by far, than the present inequality of their limits: when thefe things are remembered, the trouble, which at firft fight appeared to be removed, is ftill remaining the difficulties are real, the advantages are imaginary.

The 5th decree in which the Affembly has gone beyond the Cahiers, is that which limits the number of Bishops to that of the departments, and which renders them, the Curés, &c. elective by the people. To render this lawful, it is argued that there fhould be held a national council, where each Bifhop fhould give his confent: that the free confent of the king fhould alfo be had; and that the whole fhould be confirmed by the

pope.

We

We next come to M. de Calonne's third divifion, wherein he confiders thofe decrees of the Affembly, which, being contrary to the Cahiers, are, in his opinion, of no validity. Thefe are arranged under four heads:

1. Such as refpect the form of government.

2. Those relating to the liberty and fafety of individuals. 3. Thofe concerning property.

4. Such as relate to the adminiftration of justice.

Refpecting the form of government: we are told, that the Cahiers of the clergy, nobility, and tiers état, all fay that the French government is monarchical, and that the king should govern according to the laws.-The Affembly, as far as we can judge, fays the fame thing: but what are the laws, and who are the law-givers? The laws must be permanent and fixed, and the king muft not be fole law-giver;-and this, it is evident, was the intention and idea of the primary aflemblies, from the restriction of the king's governing according to the laws, which is ftipulated in the Cahiers of all parties for if the laws depended on his own will, it would be nonfenfe to talk of his governing according to the laws.

It is faid, however, that the Cahiers give to the king a pofitive co-operation in the legislation, of which the Affembly has deprived him, reducing him to the mere poffeffion of a veto fufpenfif, limité,' &c. which is afterward faid to lead to a fanction forcée. It is obferved alfo, that, in England, there is no abfolute veto, nor any power which can hinder the effect of a law when it exifts; and, fecondly, that no law can exist without the consent of the king.-Now, certainly, any check on the king's power of confenting to, or rejecting, a law, feems hurtful: but we are not clearly informed what is the nature of this check in France. From what we can gather, it appears to confift in this: that the Affembly has decreed that when the king refufes his confent to a bill, his refufal fhall only be for a limited time.-Here are one or two circumftances which require to be cleared up. 1ft, Does the Aflembly confider this bill as being a law, before the king either confents to it, or objects? If it is a law before this, then before this it must have the energy of a law; and, confequently, the king's interference is merely nominal, of no fubftance nor value.Again, the king's refufal of confent, we are told, is only limited. Is it meant, that after a certain period from the time of the king's refufal of confent, the law then, without any farther act, becomes valid and active? If fo, his power is indeed only limited and fufpenfary: dangerous to the ftate in confequence of an improper reftriction on one hand; infinitely more dangerous in confequence of an unconftitutional privilege

on

on the other. In this cafe, too, all the former abfurdity of the bill being a law before the king's confent is obtained, is evident: for that cannot be fufpended which is not in existence; and if it becomes active merely in confequence of the term of fufpenfion being elapfed, it must have been active before the fufpenfion was made.

We fufpect, however, that these cafes are not juftly stated; and that the king of France is limited in no other way than the king of England. Our king's refufal only operates for a time, and he may be, and is, required, in one feffion of parliament, to accede to or reject the bill, to which, in the preceding feffion, he refufed his confent: his refufal, therefore, in this view, is not a permanent refufal: the bill is certainly done away altogether, and in order to be again prefented, muft again go through all its forms, &c. but this neither violates the king's free power of refufal, nor the undoubted right of propofing, poffeffed by the other branches of the legiflature. If, then, the king of France is limited only thus; that after a certain term, the bill which he has rejected may again folicit his confent, but without which it can never be law, there is no limitation in this, but that to which every king ought to be fubject: no reftriction, but what it would be an act of madness to

remove.

Another circumftance refpecting the form of government in which the Affembly has acted in oppofition to the Cahiers, is in abolishing diftinctions of rank. The neceflity of preferving an hereditary nobility is ftrongly maintained in all the Cahiers, particularly in thofe of the tiers état. M. de Calonne urges its utility as an engine of ftate, and ftrengthens his opinions by the fupport of MONTESQUIEU. We shall not here enter at large into this question, though we do not hesitate to avow our partiality for a conftitution, confifting, like our own, of three parts. We will just remark, however, that the abolifhing nobility in France feems to have arifen from the fear, (whether extravagant or not, we will not inquire,) of a too powerful ariftocracy: but the means do not feem equal to the production of the defired end: for, fuppofing no nobility to exift, in what light muft we confider the reprefentatives of the nation; a few men, poffeffed of power and honours derived from the people? May we not call this fmall body an aristocracy, independent of the monarch, whofe privileges are frequently in oppofition to his, and who may be tempted to preserve or enlarge their own power, by pretending that they are watching over, or extending, the rights of their conftitu ents? And is not this popular ariftocracy as bad as a monarchical one? Is it not, when thus conftituted, capable of producing

all