Using Carrots to Bring Peace?: Negotiation and Third Party InvolvementHow can peace be brokered between warring sides in conflicts over self-determination and what roles do external third parties play? This book is the first of its kind to thoroughly explore the effectiveness of aid conditionality and other external tools that third parties -- from states and regional organizations to NGOs -- bring to the table in peace negotiations. Surveying the existing academic debate on incentives and peace conditionality, the author first identifies the gaps between theory and the needs of third party mediators and facilitators. Analysing in depth the negotiation processes in Sri Lanka (Eelam), Indonesia (Aceh), and the Philippines (Mindanao) as case studies, policy tools likely to be most effective are then identified and policy recommendations developed. This book is an invaluable resource for students, scholars, and practitioners alike. |
Contents
How to Make Peace Effectively? | 1 |
Overview | 11 |
3 Negotiation Ripeness and Third Party Incentives | 27 |
Eelam Peace Process The GoSLLTTE Peace Negotiations 20022003 2006 | 59 |
Aceh Peace Process The GoIGAM Peace Negotiations 20022003 2006 | 135 |
Mindanao Peace Process The GRPMILF Peace Negotiations 20012008 | 189 |
Do Carrots Bring Peace? | 249 |
Effective Tools for Forging Peace | 281 |
| 291 | |
| 313 | |
Other editions - View all
Using Carrots to Bring Peace?: Negotiation and Third Party Involvement Martina Klimesova Limited preview - 2015 |
Common terms and phrases
According Aceh administration adversaries agreement areas argued armed assistance Bangsamoro building capacity claims concessions conditionality confidence conflict resolution context continue contributed cooperation core countries decision dialogue direct discussed donor economic effective efforts employed equal especially established external actors facilitator fact final forces foreign funds further Furthermore GoSL groups hand Helsinki humanitarian impact implementation important incentives increased independence indicated initiatives insurgent interest interview involvement issues Japan lack later leadership leverage limited LTTE material meeting MILF military Mindanao monitoring Muslim mutual namely negotiation process negotiation strategies nevertheless Norway official organization peace process period Philippines political position possible President projects reaching reason reconstruction regard regional relations representatives result ripeness role signed situation solution Sri Lanka strong studied talks Tamil terrorist third party Tigers