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and has some recollection of having himself seen the letter announcing the death. Thus, even apart from my knowledge of Miss J.'s thorough good sense, and of her rational and unemotional way of regarding the facts, the case remains a strong one. For even were it a probable hypothesis that the news of the death of a person to whom she was not deeply attached produced the belief that she had distinctly seen her in her cabin, and had next day informed several persons of this impression, it would be impossible to account in a similar way for her relative's recollection of her so informing him.

I have referred to as many of Mr. Innes's instances as my space permits. But even if I were more in agreement than I am with his special points, I should still feel his general conclusion-that no case at all is made out for spontaneous telepathy-to be a rash one, in view of the vast mass of evidence outside the groups which he considers; and especially of the numerous cases where we have corroborative testimony to the fact that the percipient immediately mentioned his experience. I suppose that he regards the accumulation as a mere summation of noughts. We, on the other hand, cannot regard as a nought any case in which the alternative to the telepathic explanation is the assumption of such a degree of forgetfulness and misrepresentation as ordinary experience shows to be improbable. The want of contemporary documentary evidence would apparently at once relegate any case, in Mr. Innes's eyes, to the mass of delusion which solicits the wearied eyes of men.' He thus practically assumes not the likelihood, but the certainty, that human recollection of remarkable and often recent experiences (even when several memories agree) will be substantially false. Yet some limit to the scope of unconscious invention I suppose that even he would admit; or he would not have opened his paper with a story of which he does not profess to have taken notes. I, like him, have drawn the line of human fallibility tolerably high, and I have pointed out flaws and gaps in the evidence ad nauseam throughout the book. But many cases which would not have been presented on their own account may be used as supplementary to stronger examples of the same type; and there is no need that evidence should approximate to demonstration for it to have a legitimate place in the inductive faggot.

I cannot here repeat the argument derived from the extreme and multiform improbabilities which will have to be assumed if the telepathic hypothesis be universally rejected. Mr. Innes will have done harm if he prevents his readers from forming their judgment on this question from the original work-a point to be the more insisted on because the subject is one where damaging representations and comments are welcomed and applauded by many whose sole knowledge of the matters in debate is derived from the hostile criticism. But he will have done good if his paper serves to reinforce our oftrepeated plea for more energy and greater care in the recording and

preserving of cases. I may recall the fact that our collection was not put forward as a demonstration bound to be convincing to all candid students, but only as likely to be convincing to some. It has broken ground. Our further advance depends largely on the amount of assistance that we receive from persons so far resembling Mr. Innes as to approach the subject with the rationally sceptical view-that Telepathy represents a scheme of things which may be included in the natural order, and, if so included, should admit of proof, but that it takes a very great deal of proving.



THE time has come when those who have at heart the cause of the Union should speak plainly. I am not one of those who see any reason to despair of the ultimate triumph of the Unionist cause. Recent events have not in any way impaired my confidence in the shrewd common sense and sturdy patriotism of the English people; and so long as I can so count I know that I stand upon the winning side. But faith in the ultimate result is perfectly consistent with a recognition of immediate danger. A physician may be justly confident in the power of his patient to pull through a malady, and yet may be fully alive to the fact that unless the course of the disease is checked death must ensue. Now according to my view the Unionists as a party are pursuing a course of action which, if persevered in, must lead to the injury, if not defeat, of their cause. Their policy from the outset ought by rights to have been based on the old adage, 'United we stand, divided we fall.' Instead of this they have based their policy on disunion. The Unionists, instead of forming one common and powerful organisation, have attempted to fight the battle of the Union with two divided and independent armies. I may claim the credit that from the outset I predicted in these pages the certain failure of this attempt. Now that the event has confirmed the justice of my forebodings I am entitled to make yet one more appeal to those who have the conduct of the campaign to abandon a system of tactics which has endangered our cause already, and which, if persisted in, must ruin it in the end.

The facts speak for themselves. The election of 1886 was not, strictly speaking, a party victory. Its purport was that the British public refused to entertain the idea of any repeal of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland. No doubt the Unionist sentiments of the constituencies told very powerfully in favour of the Conservatives. The Liberal party was discredited, and justly discredited, in popular opinion by the sudden adhesion of its leader to the cause of Home Rule: and the Conservatives naturally reaped the chief benefit from the consequent reaction against Liberalism. But in the main the elections turned on the issue of Home Rule. The great majority of the electorate, especially in England, would not

hear of any project of the kind, and therefore they returned candidates opposed to the repeal of the Union without much caring whether these candidates called themselves Conservatives or Liberals. In other words, the vote by which Mr. Gladstone was driven out of office was a Unionist not a Conservative vote; and the logical outcome of this vote would have been the formation of a Unionist Ministry.

To do the Conservatives only justice it is no fault of theirs if the general election of 1886 did not lead to its legitimate result. If they had been intent alone on securing a party gain, they might in all likelihood have carried many of the seats now held by Liberal Unionists, and have thus obtained an absolute working majority in Parliament. Instead of so doing, the Conservatives not only abstained from contesting seats held by Liberal Unionists, but gave them a staunch and loyal support. The returns of the election showed that the Conservatives constituted more than three-fourths of the whole Unionist party; yet their leaders postponed all personal and party considerations to the one paramount object of forming a government competent to fight the battle of the Union. With a disregard of self, rare in our political annals, Lord Salisbury and Lord Randolph Churchill offered to take office under Lord Hartington, and to accept any arrangement by which the leading Unionist Liberals might be included in the new ministry.

These overtures came to nothing owing to the reluctance of the Liberal Unionists to accept accomplished facts. Their refusal to form a coalition with the Conservatives was a bitter disappointment at the time to all who realised the true position of affairs. Still I do not question for one moment that the resolution was arrived at in accordance with honest, though erroneous views. When I come to speak of the duty incumbent on the Liberal Unionists at the present crisis, I shall have to say something as to the objections to a coalition which were raised at the time of Lord Salisbury's accession to office, and which are still raised, though with less confidence and persistency. For my immediate purpose it is enough to say that the grounds on which Lord Hartington and his colleagues declined to take office last year were partly personal, partly political. For very obvious reasons the idea of entering a coalition Cabinet was personally distasteful to the Liberal Unionist leaders. Still I feel convinced they would not have allowed their private antipathies or prepossessions to determine their course of public conduct if they had not at the same time been of opinion that this course was the one most conducive to the interests of the Unionist cause. The plain truth is that after the late election the Liberal Unionists, with very rare exceptions, laboured under a complete though very natural delusion. As a body, they were wedded to the belief that they had only to hold their own ground, and to avoid any direct fusion with the Conservatives,


in order to secure the early return to their ranks of the Liberals who had reluctantly followed Mr. Gladstone in his conversion to Home Rule. The Liberals, they fondly imagined, having found that Home Rule was not a popular cry, would be only too ready to throw it, and if necessary its author, overboard, and to cast in their fortune with the Liberal Unionists. It is very easy to be wise after the event and I admit freely that a year ago such a solution of the Libera schism did not seem out of the question. The mistake in the calcu lation arose from a failure to appreciate two facts: first, the extent to which latter-day Liberalism had become identified with Mr. Gladstone's personality; and secondly, the degree to which the Irish vote had become essential to the supremacy of the Liberal party. I shall not be suspected of any desire to overrate Mr. Gladstone's statesmanship. Indeed, one of the chief condemnations I should pass upon his career, if it ever fell to my lot to comment on the part he has played in English politics, is that he has stimulated and traded upon the natural tendency of a democracy to care more about persons than about principles. Still I could never shut my eyes, as most of the Liberal Unionists did, to the fact that Mr. Gladstone had got the ear of the people to a point unapproached by any other living public man, and that an attempt to constitute a Liberal party without Mr. Gladstone was tantamount to an attempt to play Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.


That this is so was manifest to that section of Liberals of whom Sir William Harcourt may fairly be taken as a representative. As party men they recognised that Mr. Gladstone's leadership was essential to their chance of recovering office; and therefore they were willing to accept Home Rule, or any other measure which their leader might think fit to propose. Moreover, though at first sight they considered Home Rule a bad card to play, they soon came to the conclusion that in this respect Mr. Gladstone's instinct had been sounder than their No one who looks at politics from a broader view than that of the mere partisan can have failed to observe that the Liberal party in this country, as we have hitherto known it, has wellnigh come to the end of its tether. The course of modern legislation has effected one by one all the reforms which are compatible with our political institutions. Any further marked advance in the path of democratic change must necessarily be of a revolutionary or a socialist character, and for such a change public opinion in the United Kingdom is not yet ripe. The weakness and decline of the Liberal party during the last few years has been due mainly to the absence of a programme. Such a programme was supplied by Mr. Gladstone's espousal of Home Rule. On this platform the Liberals could be assured of the Irish vote; and with this vote their return to power was possible.

Whether this explanation be sound or not, there can be no question as to the fact that the Liberals, as a party, have shown no dis

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