fided to experts officially called 'garrison instructors.' At once there arose the idea that the instruction of officers was not necessarily part of the ordinary duty of the seniors, and that it could be delegated to others. Had tactics been made originally the basis of the new instruction, and the garrison instructors been employed simply as experts for the technical details, the work of instruction must necessarily have been undertaken by the senior officers, and they would have been responsible for it. The error was, however, fatal in its consequences. It was not till 1874 that tactics became a part of the course; but even then, although much damage had been already done, it was not too late to remedy it, if only the authorities had themselves accepted the fact that tactics are as vital a part of soldiering as is drill, and therefore that instruction off the drill ground is as much a part of a commanding officer's duty as is instruction on it. Tactics seem to have been regarded by them as a special subject, quite apart from soldiering; and therefore instruction in it was intrusted, like that in fortification, sketching, and law to the official expert, the garrison instructor. But as a matter of fact this officer in teaching tactics had to do so with his hands tied. Tactics can never be thoroughly mastered unless officers and men are available as instruments and apparatus in the hands of the teacher, to be used by him on the ground itself. Here the teacher takes command, and manipulates the instruments used in the lesson. But from the nature of the case the garrison instructor could teach tactics in the hall of study only. Here he might lecture on the attack formation, on the details of outpost duty, on the occupation and defence of a small position, the conduct of a rearguard or the movement of a convoy, till he was breathless; but had he been furnished with the necessary human apparatus and had he proceeded to teach practically in the field, he would have been placed publicly and in the eyes of the men in that position of command which should have been occupied by the regimental commanders of the officers under instruction. Such a course, if adopted, would have been subversive of all discipline, and would have resulted in commanding officers forfeiting the confidence of all under them. The men would naturally have regarded their natural leaders as men competent to train them on parade, but not for the field. The result of the mistake committed has been, therefore, not merely the non-acceptance by commanding officers of their proper position as teachers of the officers under them, but the instruction itself has been divorced from ordinary regimental life, and has been of a kind more or less bookish, unpractical, and of an abstract character.

Had this responsibility on the part of the seniors been universally recognised already, the issue of the announcement referred to at the commencement of this article would have been speedily followed by a notification in the Gazette that certain superior officers had been

permitted' to retire from the service. In the face of social and parliamentary influence the military authorities alone are not strong enough to adopt such severe but just measures, unless they feel sure that public opinion will support them. If the army is to be what it ought to be, public opinion must come to their aid and express itself loudly and forcibly.

But whilst it may be pleaded on behalf of the military authorities of that time that the error committed was one of judgment only, this plea cannot be alleged in defence of another mistake which lies at their door, and which was farther reaching and equally, if not more, serious in its consequences. The mistake referred to can only be ascribed either to their own disbelief in the need of the instruction or else to want of courage to enforce it on the officers. In Austria, after the crushing defeats of 1866, the captains were sent to school to learn their profession, and grey-headed veterans might have been seen at work on the ground. But in England the instruction was made compulsory on the last-joined subalterns only, and every facility was afforded to all other officers to escape it. For the last-joined officers, the test fixed for promotion was the passing an examination in the newly devised course of instruction; for the rest, passing the existing nominal examination prior to a specified date was to be accepted as a qualification, and in consequence, through this portal of ignorance, deliberately kept open by the authorities, the subalterns of the army streamed in crowds. Some of these escaped all further tests and all instruction whilst in the service, but the majority, it is believed, were entrapped later on, when, under pressure of the times, the authorities were compelled to insist on all subalterns and all captains alike passing an examination in the four military subjects as a qualification for further promotion. It is difficult to say how high in the service these qualified officers have risen at the present time; but in all probability few of the senior majors, and none of the colonels and the generals, have ever had to undergo the instruction and examination ordeal. I will leave the reader to draw his own inferences as to some of the results of this remarkable scission of the officers into two classes, one of seniors uninstructed, or at best self-instructed, in modern war, the other of juniors instructed in its theory.

But the point which it is absolutely necessary should be impressed on the British taxpayer interested in the efficiency of the army is that the further training of the qualified junior officers cannot be carried a step further unless the work of instruction is taken up and carried on by the superior officers, viz. the regimental commanders and the generals. The garrison instructors have done their own share of the work and have, as a rule, done it well. They have taught the officers of the lower ranks the theory of tactics and the technical details of fortification and sketching. The completion

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of the training is practical tactics. Of this the superior officers alone can be teachers, and by them it must undertaken.

It is not for one moment to be supposed that there is no instruction given by officers of the higher ranks; here and there are colonels and generals who accept, and who have accepted all along, this instruction as part of their ordinary duty; and the results obtained, even when the work has been carried on in the freezing atmosphere of official indifference, have been so excellent that it is almost impossible to exaggerate the value of the work when it shall be performed in the sunshine of official favour. What is asserted here is that there is no systematic instruction, no security that the teachers are competent instructors, no guarantee that the instruction is properly carried out, and no thorough inspection of the work done.

Whilst, however, the existence of some thorough and conscientious teachers in the senior ranks is freely admitted, it must be remembered that there are in these ranks men of other types-men who exercise on all around and below them a pernicious influence. Of these, some openly declare that they do not admit either the need or the desirableness of any instruction beyond what they themselves received in the days of their youth. Such men are simply worse than an incumbrance to the service; when they take the field, lives will be sacrificed to their ignorance of modern war. And others there are who with their lips accept the new order of things, and who, professing their perfect willingness to carry out the new duties which fall on their shoulders, have a marvellous facility for finding excuses 'how not to do it.' These excuses they retail to their friends and relatives in civil life, who receive them with unquestioning credulity; and the result is that civilians generally believe that the deficiency in our training, if it exists, is not in the slightest degree due to any dereliction of duty on the part of individuals, but to the existence of insuperable obstacles in the 'system.' I purpose now to deal with some of these excuses, and to show their utter flimsiness, and, in endeavouring to do so, I may be permitted to say that in writing on this question I am drawing on an experience of practical instruction given to officers of all arms of the service, and extending over some fifteen years.

Now, I venture to predict that if any of our civilian readers asks the next superior officer whom he meets the reason why he does not teach tactics to the officers under his command, the answer will come under one of three heads:

1. That he has no men either to teach or to teach with.

2. That in our closely cultivated country there is no ground available.

3. That there is neither opportunity nor time for the instruction.

With respect to the first class of objections, viz. that of want of

men, there is no regiment, no batta ion, which once a week at all events cannot furnish its commander with a score of private soldiers and half-a-dozen officers.

Put a skeleton force like this in the hands of a competent instructor, and with them not only will he be able to work out on the ground nearly every situation which may occur in tactics, but owing to the small size of his class every individual in it will be thoroughly trained. Later on, when a full battalion is under his command for tactical instruction, the aid his already well-trained pupils will be able to give him in carrying out the operations will be great indeed. When an instructor is called on to give instruction to a large class, the difficulty of doing this satisfactorily is very great, and the teaching is never thorough; details are slurred over, and tactics is a science of details. Let us suppose a battalion taken out for instruction in outpost duty. What a large proportion of both officers and men are necessarily mere idlers whilst the instruction is being given! More than half of each picket. The whole of the supports and reserve are simply resting, or asleep at their proper posts. What need for them to be there at all? For some tactical work large bodies may be necessary, but for the foundation of this and for the vast majority of tactical problems, only a small number of men and officers are required or eyen desirable. With a force such as I have named-six officers and twenty men-complete instruction in every detail of outpost duty could be given in four-and-twenty hours. Similarly could the tactics employed in defence of a village, retreat of a rearguard, occupation of a piece of ground, and movements depending for their proper posture on considerations of time and space be mastered.

It may be objected that work such as has just been indicated does not teach the leading of troops in action and under fire. Nobody pretends that it does this, but it does teach so much of the preparatory work, that when officers are in the presence of an enemy, leading troops under fire will be the only new problem to be solved, all others-ground, placing outposts, &c.—having been already mastered in peace time.

As regards the second class of objections-those relating to want of ground-the difficulties which our troops meet with in this respect are similar to those encountered abroad. It is in towns that troops are usually quartered: towns do not stand in bare deserts but are usually surrounded by cultivation. In the country there is a lambing season and a season for crops, and if troops are to remain passive, and never to try and make the best they can of the circumstances in which they are placed, the greater part of armies never could be trained at all. But even in the heart of a city, the defence of buildings, occupation of the outskirts, street fighting, &c., can be explained and illustrated. Rarely does the country lie at any great distance from the barracks,

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and from my own experience I can say that if to the occupiers of land it is explained that access to it is asked for in order that the soldiers for whom the occupiers pay may learn their work, if the request for entry is made at the right season, and care be taken to avoid injuring property, leave will rarely be refused, at all events to small parties.

As regards the objections that there is neither time nor opportunity for tactical training, such objections are in the mouths of the officers of our army absolutely suicidal. The officers of the army must and can find the required time, otherwise they will be made to suffer by the loss of the time they are at present allowed to devote to sport, and to spend on leave; and therefore it will be well for them to find it, as indeed it can be somehow or other. It is idle to say that there are no opportunities. Opportunities crop up in shoals to him who is on the look-out for them. One of the weaknesses of our regimental life is that in carrying out work it fails in intensity. Every moment that an officer is not on leave, be it leave of hours or months, it is duty alone which should be the subject of his thoughts. To show how, for instance, a change of quarters might be utilised as an opportunity for a cavalry regiment, let us suppose a regiment marching in two columns from Shorncliffe to York. Whilst on the march it should act as if it were the leading cavalry of an invader advancing from the south; and to resist its progress and delay its march every available soldier, volunteer, militia or regulars, in the towns through which it passes should be utilised; not merely for the purpose of giving the cavalry an opportunity of learning its work, but to practise themselves in preparation for the reception of the historical Uhlan.

What has been put forward above, and which might, had space permitted, have been given in greater detail, is, it is hoped, a sufficient reply to the excuses of the idlers. There is absolutely no reason why the superior officers should not at once undertake systematically the tactical training of the army. The work will entail upon them a great amount of labour, for the work must be their own, and not that of their staff officers and adjutants. Inexperienced as many of them are in this kind of teaching, doubtless they will, in drawing up and in arranging the exercises, require some assistance; but in carrying on the exercise they must personally lead and command. The execution of the exercise must be most carefully watched and unsparingly criticised by them; for work had better be left undone than not criticised; and if the criticisms are known to be those of the staff officers, the superiors lay themselves open to the imputation of not being able to criticise.

And one of the benefits accruing from the adoption of this system of training is, that by teaching others the superior officers will be teaching themselves; and no one, be it remembered, is too old to learn. The superior officers have before them a hard task; it is quite new to most of them, nevertheless let them go boldly at it.