Economic Sciences, 1991-1995Below is a list of the prizewinners during the period 1991 ? 1995 with a description of the works which won them their prizes: (1991) R H COASE ? for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy; (1992) G S BECKER ? for having extended the domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behaviour and interaction, including nonmarket behaviour; (1993) R W FOGEL & D C NORTH ? for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change; (1994) J C HARSANYI, J F NASH & R SELTEN ? for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games; (1995) R E LUCAS ? for having developed and applied the hypothesis of rational expectations, and thereby having transformed macroeconomic analysis and deepened our understanding of economic policy. |
Contents
GARYS BECKER | 23 |
ROBERT W FOGEL and DOUGLASS C NORTH | 59 |
JOHN C HARSANYI JOHN F NASH | 125 |
ROBERT E LUCAS | 231 |
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active type Alfred Nobel American Economic analysis approach assumption b₁ bargaining Becker behavior strategy best reply bounded multistage game Cambridge changes Coase cooperative games decisions decline defined delay supergame discrimination dynamics economic growth economic history ECONOMIC SCIENCES economic theory economists empirical equilibrium points expected payoff factors firms Fogel game G game theory Harsanyi human capital I-games incomplete information increased institutional interpretation investments John Harsanyi John Nash Journal of Political labor macroeconomic malnutrition mathematical mixed strategy monetary multistage game models Nash equilibrium Nash's non-cooperative games nutrition paper parents payoff functions payoff vector percent Phillips curve play player Political Economy population preplay Princeton probability problem production Professor pure strategy rational reachable period Reinhard Selten result social solution concept strategy combination structure student subgame perfect equilibrium theoretical thesis tion transaction costs University of Chicago University Press