wards other men (or relative duties ;) as justice, charity, fidelity, &c. Towards ourselves; as chastity, sobriety, tem perance, preservation of life, care of health, &c. 2 I shall proceed to state a few observations, which relate to the general regulation of human conduct; unconnected indeed, with each other, but very worthy of attention;--Mankind act more from habit than reflection. 3 It is on few, only, and great occasions, that men deliberate at all; on fewer still, that they institute any thing like a regular inquiry into the moral rectitude or depravity of what they are about to do; or wait for the result of it. We are for the most part determined at once; and by an impulse, which is the effect and energy of pre-established habits. And this constitution seems well adapted to the exigencies of human life, and to the imbecility of our moral principle. 4 If we are in so great a degree passive under our habits, where, it is asked, is the exercise of virtue, the guilt of vice, or any use of moral and religious knowledge? I answer, in the forming and contracting of these habits. There are habits, not only of drinking, swearing, and lying, and of some other things, which are commonly acknowledged to be habits, and called so; but of every modification of action, speech, and thought. Man is a bundle of habits. 5 Without entering into a detail of scripture morality, which would anticipate our subject, the following general positions may be advanced, I think, with safety: 1. That a state of happiness is not to be expected by those who are conscious of no moral or religious rule. 2. That a state of happiness is not to be expected by those who reserve to themselves the habitual practice of any me sin, or neglect of one known duty. SECTION IV. The Divine Benevolence. 1 When God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both. 2 If he had wished our misery, he might have made sure of his purpose, by forming our senses to be as many sores and pains to us, as they are now instruments of gratification and enjoyment; or by placing us amidst objects so ill suited to our perceptions, as to have continually offended us, instead of ministering to our refreshment and delight. He might have made, for example, every thing we tasted bitter; every thing we saw loathsome; every thing we touched a sting; every smell a stench; and every sound a discord. 3 If he had been indifferent about our happiness or misery, we must impute to our good fortune (as all design by this supposition is excluded,) both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, and the supply of external objects fitted to produce it. 4 But either of these, and still more both of them, being too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains but the first supposition, that God, when he created the human species, wished their happiness, and made for them the provision which he has made, with that view, and for that purpose. 5 The same argument may be proposed in different terms, thus: Contrivance proves design; and the predominant tendency of the contrivance indicates the disposition of the designer. The world abounds with contrivances; and all the contrivances which we are acquainted with, are directed to beneficial purposes. 6 Evil no doubt exists; but is never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching now and then is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps, inseparable from it; or even, if you will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but it is not the object of it. This is a distinction which well deserves to be attended to. 7 In describing implements of husbandry, you would hardly say of a sickle, that it is made to cut the reaper's fingers, though from the construction of the instrument, and the manner of using it, this mischief often happens. 8 But if you had occasion to describe instruments of torture or execution, this engine, you would say, is to extend the sinews; this to dislocate the joints; this to break the bones; this to scorch the soles of the feet. Here pain and misery are the very objects of the contrivance. Now nothing of this sort is to be found in the works of nature. We never discover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose. 9 Since, then, God hath called forth his consummate wisdom to contrive and provide for our happiness, and the world appears to have been constituted with this design at first, s long as this constitution is upholden by him, we must in reason suppose the same design to continue. 10 The contemplation of universal nature rather bewilders the mind than affects it. There is always a bright spot in the prospect upon which the eye rests; a single example, perhaps, by which each man finds himself more convinced than by all others put together. I seem, for my own part, to see the benevolence of the Deity more clearly in the pleasures of very young children than in any thing in the world. 11 The pleasure of grown persons may be reckoned partly of their own procuring; especially if there has been any industry, or contrivance, or pursuit, to come at them; or if they are founded, like music, painting, &c. upon any qualification of their own acquiring. 12 But the pleasures of a healthy infant are so manifestly provided for it by another, and the benevolence of the provision is so unquestionable, that every child I see at its sport affords to my mind a kind of sensible evidence of the finger of God, and of the disposition which directs it. 13 But the example which strikes each man most strongly is, the true example for him; and hardly two minds hit upon the same; which shows the abundance of such examples about us. 14 We conclude, therefore, that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures. And this conclusion being once established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, "that the method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness." SECTION V. Promises; contracts of sale; concerning the lending of money; of labor. 1 From whence the obligation to perform promises arises. They who argue from innate, moral principles, suppose a sense of the obligation of promises to be one of them; but, without assuming this, or any thing else, without proof, the obligation to perform promises may be deduced from the necessity of such a conduct to the well-being, or the existence indeed, of human society. 2 Men act from expectation. Expectation is, in most cases, determined by the assurances and engagements which we receive from others. If no dependence could be placed upon these assurances, it would be impossible to know what judgment to form of many future events, or how to regulate our conduct with respect to them. 3 Confidence, therefore, in promises, is essential to the intercourse of human life; because, without it, the greatest part of our conduct would proceed upon chance. But there could be no confidence in promises, if men were not obliged to perform them: the obligation, therefore, to perform promises, is essential to the same end and in the same degree. 4 The rule of justice which wants most to be inculcated in the making of bargains, is, that the seller is bound in conscience to disclose the faults of what he offers for sale. 5 To this of concealing the faults of what we want to put off, may be referred the practice of passing bad money. mo This practice we sometimes hear defended by a vulgar excuse, that we have taken the money for good, and therefore must get rid of it. Which excuse is much the same as if one, who had been robbed upon the highway, should allege he had a right to reimburse himself out of the pocket of the first traveller he met; the justice of which reasoning the traveller possibly may not comprehend. 6 Whoever borrows money is bound in conscience to repay it. This every man can see; but every man cannot see, or does not, however, reflect, that he is, in consequence, also bound to use the means necessary to enable himself to repay it, 7 "If he pay the money when he has it, or has it to spare, he does all that an honest man can do," and all he imagines that is required of him, whilst the previous measures which are necessary to furnish him with the money, he makes no part of his care, nor observes to be as much his duty as the other; 8 Such as selling a family seat, or a family estate, contracting his plan of expense, laying down his equipage, reducing the number of his servants, or any of those humiliating sacrifices, which justice requires of a man in debt, the moment he perceives that he has no reasonable prospect of paying his debts without them. 9 An expectation which depends upon the continuance of his own life, will not satisfy an honest man if a better provision be in his power: for it is a breach of faith to subject a creditor, when we can help it, to the risk of our life, be the event what it will; that not being the security to which credit was given. 10 Service in this country [England] is, as it ought to be, voluntary, and by contract; and the master's authority extends no farther than the terms or equitable construction of the contract will justify. 11 A servant is not bound to obey the unlawful commands of his master; to minister, for instance, to his unlawful pleasures, or to assist him by unlawful practices in his profession; as in smuggling or adulterating the articles in which he deals. For the servant is bound by nothing but his own promise; and the obligation of a promise, extends not to things unlawful. 12 For the same reason, the master's authority is no justification of the servant in doing wrong; for the servant's own promise, upon which that authority is founded, would be none. 13 Clerks and apprentices ought to be employed entirely in the profession or trade which they are intended to learn. Instruction is their hire, and to deprive them of the opportunities of instruction, by taking up their time with occupations foreign to their business, is to defraud them of their wages. 14 A master of a family is culpable, if he permit any vices among his domestics, which he might restrain by due discipline and a proper interference. This results from the general obligation to prevent misery when in our power; and the assurance which we have, that vice and misery, at the long run, go together. SECTION VI. Lies; revenge; duelling; slander. 1 A lie is a breach of promise; for whoever seriously addresses his discourse to another, tacitly promises to speak the truth, because he knows that the truth is expected. 2 Or the obligation of veracity may be made out from the direct ill consequences of lying to social happiness. Which consequences consist, either in some specific injury to particular individuals, or in the destruction of that confidence, which is essential to the intercourse of human life: for which latter reason, a lie may be pernicious in its general tendency, and therefore criminal, though it produce no particular or visible mischief to any one. 3 All pain occasioned to another in consequence of an offence, or injury received from him, farther than what is calculated to procure reparation, or promote the just ends of punishment, is so much revenge. It is highly probable, from the light of rature, that a passion, which seeks its gratification immediately and expressly in giving pain, is disagreeable to the benevolent will and counsels of the Creator. 4 The feuds and animosities in families and between neighbors, which disturb the intercourse of human life, and collectively compose half the misery of it, have their foundation in the want of a forgiving temper; and can never cease, but by the exercise of this virtue, on one side or both. |