An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Volume 2J. Johnson, W. J. and J. Richardson, W. Otridge and Son, F. C. and J. Rivington, D. Ogilvy and Son, Leigh and Sotheby, T. Payne, [and 11 others], and J. Mawman, 1805 - Knowledge, Theory of - 510 pages |
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... their agreement or disagree- ment . 3. Thirdly , intuitive know . ledge extends itself not to all the relations of all our ideas , 4. Fourthly , 4. Fourthly , not demonstra- tive knowledge . 5. Fifthly The CONTENTS .
... their agreement or disagree- ment . 3. Thirdly , intuitive know . ledge extends itself not to all the relations of all our ideas , 4. Fourthly , 4. Fourthly , not demonstra- tive knowledge . 5. Fifthly The CONTENTS .
Page 36
... ment or information ; whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions , which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas . And yet men think it strange , if in discourse , or ...
... ment or information ; whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions , which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas . And yet men think it strange , if in discourse , or ...
Page 43
... ment would perhaps take it amiss to have any thing offered to abate the length , or lessen the number , of their disputes : yet methinks those who pretend seriously to search after or maintain truth , should think themselves obliged to ...
... ment would perhaps take it amiss to have any thing offered to abate the length , or lessen the number , of their disputes : yet methinks those who pretend seriously to search after or maintain truth , should think themselves obliged to ...
Page 56
... ment in the signification of common words , within some tolerable latitude , that may serve for ordinary conver- sation : and so a man cannot be supposed wholly igno , rant of the ideas which are annexed to words by com mon mon use , in ...
... ment in the signification of common words , within some tolerable latitude , that may serve for ordinary conver- sation : and so a man cannot be supposed wholly igno , rant of the ideas which are annexed to words by com mon mon use , in ...
Page 59
... ment or disagreement of two ideas , is opposite or inconsistent with that article of faith which your lordship has endeavoured to defend ; it is plain , it is but your lordship's fear , that it may be of dangerous consequence to it ...
... ment or disagreement of two ideas , is opposite or inconsistent with that article of faith which your lordship has endeavoured to defend ; it is plain , it is but your lordship's fear , that it may be of dangerous consequence to it ...
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Common terms and phrases
abstract ideas Æneid affirmed agree agreement or disagreement annexed assent bishop of Worcester body called capable cerning certainty changeling Cicero clear and distinct co-exist colour complex idea conceive concerning connexion consider credibility demonstration discourse disputes distinct ideas dity doubt equal essence of matter eternal evidence examine faculty of thinking faith farther gism give gold hath ideas they stand ignorance immaterial substance immortality imperfection inquiry intuitive knowledge known language ledge lordship maxims men's ment mind mixed modes moral motion names of substances never nexion obscurity observe omnipotency opinions particular perceive perception perfect precise principles proofs propositions qualities rational real essence religion repug revelation Secondly sense simple ideas soever solid sort soul sounds species spirit stances supposed syllogism tain things thought tion triangle true truth understanding universal propositions unquestionable truths whereby wherein whereof whilst
Popular passages
Page 102 - Who also hath made us able ministers of the new testament ; not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.
Page 127 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Page 102 - As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child: even so thou knowest not the works of God who maketh all.
Page 273 - Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light, and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from God.
Page 339 - I have mentioned mathematics as a way to settle in the mind a habit of reasoning closely and in train ; not that I think it necessary that all men should be deep mathematicians, but that, having got the way of reasoning which that study necessarily brings the mind to, they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledge, as they shall have occasion.
Page 201 - ... deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels.
Page 163 - ... neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon ; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist ; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together.
Page 438 - Heat is a very brisk agitation of the insensible parts of the object, which produces in us that sensation, from whence we denominate the object hot ; so what in our sensation is heat, in the object is nothing b,ut motion.
Page 69 - For if we reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge.
Page 214 - For the ideas that ethics are conversant about being all real essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another ; so far as we can find their habitudes and relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general truths : and I doubt not, but, if a right method were taken, a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave, to a considering man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the truth of...