1. They are worth seeking.

2. Are not easy.

3. But yet necessary to phi-

losophy.

4. Misuse of words, the cause

of great errours.

5. Obstinacy.

6. And wrangling.

7. Instance, bat and bird.

8. First remedy, to use no

word without an idea.

9. Secondly, to have distinct

ideas annexed to them in

modes.

10. And distinct and con-

formable in substances.

11. Thirdly, propriety.

12. Fourthly, to make known

their meaning.

13. And that three ways.

14. First,

lities of substances, are
best got by showing.

22. The ideas of their powers,
best by definition.
23. A reflection on the know-
ledge of spirits.

24. Ideas also of substances
must be conformable to
things.

25. Not easy to be made so.
26. Fifthly, by constancy in
their signification.
27. When the variation is to
be explained.

5. Not without precedent

doubt.

6. Not so clear.

7. Each step must have in-

tuitive evidence.

8. Hence the mistake ex præ-

cognitis & præconcessis.

9. Demonstration not limit-

ed to quantity.

10-13. Whyit has been so thought

14. Sensitive knowledge of

particular existence.

15. Knowledge not always

clear, where the ideas are

SO.

CHAP. III.

Of the extent of human knowledge»

SECT.

1. First, no farther than we

have ideas.

2. Secondly, no farther than

we can perceive their
agreement or disagree-

ment.

3. Thirdly, intuitive know.

ledge extends itself not to

all the relations of all our

ideas,

4. Fourthly,

15. Of repugnancy to co-

exist, larger.

16. Of the co-existence of

powers, a very little way.

17. Of spirits yet narrower.

18. Thirdly, of other rela-

tions, it is not easy to

say how far. Morality

capable of demonstration.

19. Two things have made

moral ideas thought in-

capable of demonstration.

Their complexedness and

want of sensible represen-

tations.

20. Remedies of those diffi.

culties.

21. Fourthly, of real exist-

ence; we have an intui-

tive knowledge of our

own, demonstrative of

God's, sensitive of some

few other things.

22. Our ignorance great.

23. First, one cause of it, want

of ideas, either such as we

have no conception of, or

1. Objection, knowledge

placed in ideas, may be

all bare vision.

2, 3. Answer, not so, where

ideas agree with things.

4. As, first, all simple ideas

do.

5. Secondly, all complex ide-

as, except of substances.

6. Hence the reality of ma.

thematical knowledge.

7. And of moral.

8. Existence not required to

make it real.

9. Nor will it be less true,

or certain, because moral

ideas are of our own mak.

ing and naming.

10. Mif-naming disturbs not

the certainty of the know-
ledge.

11. Ideas of substances have

their archetypes without

us.

12. So far as they agree with

these, so far our know.

ledge concerning them is

real.

2. General truths hardly to
be understood, but in ver.
bal propositions.
3. Certainly two-fold, of
truth, and of knowledge.
4. No proposition can be
known to be true, where
the essence of each species
mentioned, is not known.
5. This more particularly
concerns substances.

6. The truth of few universal
propositions concerning
substances, is to be known.
7. Because, co-existence of
ideas in few cases is to be

known.

8, 9. Instance in gold.

10. As far as any such co-ex-
istence can be known, so

far universal propositions

may be certain. But this

will go but a little way,
because,

11, 12. The qualities, which make

our complex ideas of sub-
stances, depend mostly on

external, remote, and un-

perceived causes.

13. Judgment may reach far

ther, but that is not

knowledge.

14. What is requisite for our

knowledge of substances,

15. Whilst our ideas of sub.

stances contain not their
real constitutions, we can

make but few general,

certain propositions con-

cerning them.

16. Wherein lies the general

certainty of propositions.

SECT.

CHAP. VII.

Of maxims.

1. They are self-evident.

2. Wherein that self-evi.-

dence consists.

3. Self-evidence not peculiar

to received axioms.

4. First