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GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

TO THE Editor of THE UNITED SERVICE JOURNAL.

Promotion in the Artillery.

MR. EDITOR,-I observe that Major Mitchell, in his able arguments against promotion by purchase in your last Number, remarks that the slow "promotion in the artillery cannot be taken as a criterion of what promotion without purchase would be in the line, because the artillery is a very limited service, which admits of neither change nor transfer, and into which officers enter after a long course of professional study, and with the general intention of making it their service for life; whereas officers are constantly retiring from the line after a few years' service." Major Mitchell's argument appears to me to be this,-that the slow promotion of the artillery service in which officers do not purchase their commissions, is not to be fairly urged as a reason why similar slowness of promotion should occur in the line, if the system of promotion by purchase were in it abandoned.

His argument is just, but I do not think that he attributes the slowness of the artillery promotion to its true source; it is not to the limited nature of its service that it is owing; if a more general and even particular acquaintance with, and applicability to, the duties of the two other services, cavalry and infantry, than either of these services require or obtain as regards the artillery be not considered as limitations, it is not of a limited nature; not only is the application of the artillery arm so subordinate to the manœuvres of the other troops as to require in its officers a quick and thorough perception of them, but also the corps is constantly employed as infantry and sometimes even (as, for instance, in Ireland, and during the last war in America) as cavalry, though, of course, of a very irregular and imperfect description.

If the artillery service be limited, it is in the very confined sphere of its rewards and prospects, rather than of its duties or its requirements; and in the usual and, as it appears to me, inexpedient opposition to the change and transfer of those of its officers who desire it to the other services. But it is not the limited nature of the artillery service which occasions its slow promotion, it is the invariable rule, the fatal necessity of advancing every officer in his turn, and in his turn alone, to rank and command, whether fitted for it or not. Such a rule as this will make any promotion slow, and leaves, to all human appearance, the great responsibility, so forcibly set forth by Major Mitchell, to the distribution of blind fate. I think promotion by purchase better than this, because it only limits, it does not exclude choice: but this system will not bear the scrutiny of reason; one might as well apply a steam-engine to the crushing of a moth.

To remedy this-aye, that is the difficulty-promotion by merit would, of course, be in part by merit, but more by patronage; still there would be to the country the inestimable advantage of choice. To check patronage, I would recommend what (if I am not mistaken) obtains in the Prussian service, making seniority the general, although not the invariable rule, especially not in the highest ranks. I would have every officer, previous to promotion, not in the artillery only, but in all the services, undergo examination in the theory and practice of his profession, so as to establish, as far as possible, his fitness for it. This might, at any rate, be done with every rank under that of lieutenant-colonel. An officer thus having won his way to the rank next to that might be selected for employment according to his established character. I throw out this idea, not as a new one, for it is not, but, as I think, a not overstrained corollary to the proposition laid down so ably by Major Mitchell, that promotion should be by merit only.

One word more, the promotion of every branch of the service should be

conducted on the same principles, whatever they may be, to prevent that mortification and jealousy, which its inequalities and anomalies must otherwise produce.

I am, Mr. Editor, your most obedient servant,
J. A. GILBERT, Lt. Royal Art.

November 10, 1835.

Temporary Rudders.

MR. EDITOR, Observing in your last Number how much the safety of his Majesty's ship Pique was endangered, in consequence of the hawsers of the substitute rudders being cut by the jagged state of the ship's bottom, I am forcibly reminded of the invention of a temporary, perhaps I should say a very temporary rudder, but of remarkable easy application, in which the very occurrence complained of was effectually obviated. It is now more than five-and-twenty years since the above invention was sent to the Admiralty, and at the same time for the inspection of his present Majesty, then Duke of Clarence, to whom I had the honour to submit some other naval inventions, and always with a result very gratifying to myself.

The part of the invention here alluded to is, in the first instance, a permanent preparation, to remedy so great a misfortune as the loss of a rudder at sea, by fixing an eye-bolt on each side of the stern-post, or parts adjacent, cpposite to where the substitute for a lower gudgeon should be placed; through which eye-bolts the hawsers, or chains, attached to the cap, are to be reeved, and the ends brought up above the water-line, either through the rudder-hole or round the quarters, instead of being led under the ship's bottom from the stern-post to the hawse-holes as is now done-which I think no one will dispute would, if practicable, be a very great improvement, both as respects the facility of shipping the substitute rudder, and securing it steadily in its place.

With respect to the practicability of reeving the hawsers, or chains, through the eye-bolt so low under water, it is to be accomplished in the following manner :-When the eye-bolts are fixed in dock, a groove is to be made from each of them, extending upwards along the stern-post to a convenient point above the water-line; up each of these grooves (after having been reeved through the eye-bolts) the two ends of a small chain are to be led and secured in a similar manner to the present rudder-chains, the grooves being afterwards closed up or concealed by small strips of copper, in which state they are to remain till the ship is again in dock, or until the necessity occurs for having recourse to the substitute rudder; and when that misfortune does occur, the small chain on each side is to be forced round through the eye-bolt in any manner best calculated to rip off the strips of copper, and then it is obvious that, by fastening the ends of the hawsers to the links of the small chains, they may be easily reeved through the eye-bolts, and brought up above the water-line. November 17, 1835.

WM. RICKETTS, Capt. R.N.

Suggestions on Military Punishments.

MR. EDITOR,-At the present juncture, when so great an outcry is raised against corporal punishment in the Army, and so general a wish seems to obtain for the amelioration of the condition of our troops, I venture to offer the following suggestions, in the hope of their finding a place in your very valuable miscellany, as I feel convinced, from nearly a quarter of a century's constant attendance upon, and experience in regimental duties, that they would be attended with the most beneficial results.

Confinement, as at present practised, is a merely nominal punishment, and many offenders are allowed to escape in consequence of there being no accommodation for them in either of the jails of Gosport or of Portsmouth, and the sending of military criminals to Winchester having been discouraged from motives of economy to the public.

In order to avoid delay, as well as not to take up too great a space in your useful Journal, I will put down the propositions seriatim, viz.

1st. Either Fort Cumberland, Southsea Castle, Fort Monckton, or Blockhouse Fort, (which are at present, and indeed nearly always untenanted,) to be converted into a military prison, under the superintendence of a veteran officer, or non-commissioned one, with a daily, weekly, or monthly officer's guard, at the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor.

2nd. Courts-martial to have the power of sentencing to diet upon bread and water, when eightpence per diem might revert to the public.

3rd. Deserters, thieves, men convicted of unnatural practices, &c., to be branded, the words of their respective crimes being stated in full; as at present, not only has the letter D been very frequently obliterated, but also others, such as avid, aniel, been added to it.

N. B.-Branded men to be invariably drummed out.

4th. Punishment-drills to be confined to three, viz. to peel, with and without arms. Each to last for six hours during the day, and those undergoing any of them to be kept in a "dry room," and not allowed to mix with the other men until the period for which they may have been ordered to attend may have expired.

5th. Men confined to barracks to be narrowly watched, and not allowed to enter the canteen, or be permitted the indulgences extended to well-conducted soldiers.

6th. Common parades to be attended but by marked men, those for divine service or field-exercise, by all.

7th. Greater powers allowed to commanding officers, by which the frequency of courts-martial might be avoided, viz., confinement to black-hole of seven days, on the ordinary diet, or of forty-eight hours on bread and water. In this latter case 8d. per day to be credited to the public.

8th. Canteens to be done away with, or if allowed to exist from motives of finance, to be invariably outside of the barracks, yet with no means of communication with the inside, as then the irregularities that so frequently occur amongst men undergoing punishment would be avoided.

9th. Stocks should be erected in all barracks; courts-martial and commanding officers having power to order delinquents to be placed in them. 10th. Six sets of round shot, with padlocks and chains, to be issued by barrack-masters to each corps, for the confinement to barracks of such men as are continually breaking out of or staying away therefrom.

11th. Contracts to be totally abolished, and the men to provide their own provisions, under the guidance and superintendence of the commanding officer.

12th. Men of good character, having been five years without being mentioned in the defaulters' books, to be denominated chosen men, wear a distinguishing badge, and be entitled to additional pay and greater pension, or discharge. This extra expense might be met by doing away with the increased rate for length of service alone.

13th and lastly, I would have colonial corps for New South Wales, the Cape, and America, to be composed entirely of married men who might be drafted from the different corps, and located in huts, on the frontiers, with a general rendezvous, or "place d'armes," in case of attack. A certain number to be always on duty in their regular turn, and the rest allowed to work for the maintenance of their families, &c. On Sundays and one other day per week, all to attend divine worship and field-exercise.

On obtaining their discharge, they might obtain grants in other parts, and their barracks be appropriated to their successors, by which, in time, the countries would be peopled by "good and leal subjects." Your assured Friend,

Portsmouth, Nov. 16, 1835.

PRIAM.

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Battle of Albuera.

MR. EDITOR,-I find, by the two last Numbers of your Journal, that the discussion of the Battle of Albuera has been again revived, with variations. I believe I may be allowed to know something of the matter, and, therefore, without further apology, beg leave to offer you the following very brief

summary.

1st. Lord Beresford never withdrew troops from his right wing to support and necessary disproper his centre. On the contrary, whenever he perceived that Soult meditated to attack that wing, he lost no time in making the positions for strengthening it. "refused to obey Lord Beresford's orders. There 2nd. Blake never was indeed some delay on the part of Blake in making the requisite disposition of his troops, arising from a false view of the movements of the enemy.

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3rd. That when the Spanish troops did take up their ground, they never "fell back from it in disorder." They held their ground gallantly "for an hour and a half," under very severe fire and heavy loss, and only quitted it when Lord Beresford thought proper to relieve them by the second division. After this they still remained in the rear of, and as forming the second line to, that division.

4th. That neither during the Spanish occupancy of the right wing, or new alignment; nor during the occupancy of it by the second division; nor during any period of the day,-did the French troops ever reach the top of the hill,* on which the allies fought, from the commencement of the It is hardly necessary, one would imagine, to 'action until its termination.

say any more than this; but let us go on.

5th. If Soult had, " on the evening of the 15th, detected all the weakness of the English General's disposition for battle,"-I am very much inclined to think, with all due deference to Marshal Soult, that he changed his opinion on the evening of the 16th!

6th. If it be true that Albuera was a bad position, Lord Wellington, in his letter to Lord Beresford of the 23rd of April, 1811, had the honour (in general terms certainly) of suggesting it; and in a year afterwards, the odium (if any) of occupying it himself "foot for foot!"

7th. In the same letter Lord Wellington gave Lord Beresford the option as he should think proper." of either fighting or not,

66

8th. He did think proper to fight, and, up to the present moment, can perceive no very obvious reasons why he should regret the decision.

9th. That if, during the "crisis" of the battle, it be true that Lord Beresford really "wavered," he most assuredly took a most extraordinary method of exhibiting it; having (after examining the abortive attempts of the enemy to deploy) dispatched Colonel Arbuthnot, with the utmost promptitude and decision, to order a brigade of General Hamilton's troops to move round the hill, and take the enemy in flank,-to do, in short," that very thing" (but with greater safety) which, at an evident risk, Colonel Hardinge, in the supposed furtherance of the Marshal's views and intentions, did with the fourth division!

the 10th. The orders of Lord Beresford to Colonel Kemmis were to pass ford above Badajoz if practicable. But it was not practicable for infantry, and therefore he was obliged to go round by Jerumanha.

11th. First one officer, then another, had been sent after Madden; but the gallant General was non est inventus. He had actually retired, without reporting himself to the Quartermaster-General, to the right bank of the Guadiana, where he remained till after the battle.

It was

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66 won "

12th. The day was not "three times lost and won." once; and this, notwithstanding the assertion, that "the allies were al

Vide Sir W. Inglis's letter in answer to Colonel Napier's reply to the second "Strictures."

ways fewest in number at the decisive point!" Lord Beresford did not expose one man more to the enemy's fire than was necessary.

Colonel Napier says (no doubt playfully) that Lord Beresford's "infantry were not held in hand." I do not very well know what to say to this, seeing that the Marshal (during the "crisis," and when he is said to have "wavered ") held a Spanish Colonel in one " hand," and an Ensign with his colours in the other! If, however, any movements were made during the battle, either contrary to Lord Beresford's orders, or not executed in a proper and soldierlike manner, it would surely be too much to blame the Commander-in-Chief for this.

Albuera, &c.

AN OLD SOLDier.

MR. EDITOR,-In a communication to the pages of the United Service Journal, dated London, July 1, 1835, signed "An Old Comrade," and published in the Number of the Journal for October last, appears a very entertaining, clear, and cleverly written detail of the great action and complete victory at Albuera. The narrative is strictly professional, and affects the reader, especially if military, like the blast of the trumpet and the thunder of battle. It contains a passage, however, which I apprehend calls for particular notice. At page 221, the writer says "not a colour was lost, although an eloquent historian most unwarrantably stated that the 57th had lost theirs." Undoubtedly the glorious 57th regiment lost life profusely, but neither colours nor renown, upon the bloody day in question. My business here is with the expression employed by the writer: the phrase "an eloquent historian" is equivocal, and has, at least in this city, given rise to a misconception calculated to hurt the feelings of the party concerned. Conjecture has, to my knowledge, in several instances, pointed out Col. W. Napier as the historian referred to. Col. N. may indeed be described not only as an eloquent, but the eloquent historian of the martial genius and the triumphs of England; as the writer, whose brilliant pages will continue to instruct and to delight, till Britain and her language and her greatness shall be no more. But Col. N. is not the historian to whom the " Old Comrade" alludes; as he has not, in his noble work, one word directly or indirectly insinuating any such loss as that of their colours on the part of the 57th regiment. Let the historical writer, whoever he may be, answer for himself; and if he can, let him account and apologise for his heedless assertion. He may, meanwhile, find some consolation in learning, that he has been— even for a day-identified with the immortal historian of the Peninsular Campaigns.

Before I conclude, allow me to correct an error of the press in " An Old Comrade's" able article, as it respects the name of an officer called " Binning" in your Journal. My gallant friend, who fell at Albuera, was Capt. Benning of the 66th, and a finer fellow in spirit, talent, worth, and personal endowments, never had the honour of dying in the service of his country. Bath, Nov. 20, 1835. I am, Sir, &c.

E. M.

The involuntary error above alluded to was committed by the Marquess of Londonderry, in the first edition of his History, but was corrected in the third edition of that work on the authority of Sir William Inglis, and in the pages of this Journal.-See the U. S. J. for March, 1829, page 350, and the Number for June of the same year, page 106.-ED.

Horse and Foot.

MR. EDITOR,-Equally averse with the "Old Soldier," to continue a controversy which appears to be almost decided by the observations of J. M., I cannot but in courtesy remind my chivalrous opponent, that Charles XII., with his wearied cavalry, had not only to contend against a very superior

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