one section in every company of fire-arms altogether, and furnishing them for the occasion with cutlasses and tomahawks borrowed from the fleet, the possession of which would have enabled his followers at once to burst into the houses and to overcome with the cold iron all resistance. The most cursory reader, too, can scarcely fail to observe the great assistance which a few grenades would have rendered to the attacking force. Thrown into a room, or upon a roof, one of those missiles would at once have dispersed the ambushed sharpshooters in its vicinity, none of whom would have dared to wait the explosion.

We have examined an attack made with incomplete success by regular soldiers on an entrenched city. Let us now contemplate the storm, by irregular combatants, of a barricaded town defended by a handful of disciplined troops. Already has the battle of New Ross been referred to in a former Number by H. J., and it were therefore needless at present minutely to scrutinize its details; let it suffice then to observe, that the yeomanry and militia, although posted behind barricades, covered by artillery, and powerfully aided by the loyal inhabitants, who from their windows kept up an incessant discharge of muskets, pistols, and blunderbusses, were unable by their fire to repel the fierce onset of the insurgent pikemen, were forced from the town with the exception of a few regulars, who held the market-house, and were saved from destruction only by a headlong and overwhelming charge, made by the 5th and 9th Dragoons, supported by a considerable body of mounted yeomanry. Some idea of the desperate fury with which during more than three hours the contest was maintained, may be drawn from the facts, that some of the regulars fired one hundred and twenty rounds per man! and that the principal street was swept by twenty-three successive discharges of grape-shot, and that one of the insurgent leaders, confident in a charm which he wore, was actually blown away from the mouth of a twelve-pounder which he attempted to seize. Had the dragoons and yeomanry engaged been armed with the light Indian twelve-and-a-half-foot bamboo lance, recommended by Hasta, and H. J., the result of the day would never for a moment have appeared doubtful, for they would thereby have been enabled to reach over the pikes of their opponents, few of which exceeded ten feet in length, and to trample them down at the first onset, instead of having to sustain three repulses, and at length only retrieving the victory when the insurgents had fallen into that state of disorder which with irregular combatants generally follows partial success.

The truth of the opinions we have herein laboured to inculcate will be made still more evident by a reference to the attack of Newtownbarry. Considering the small force at his disposal inadequate to meet the numbers and impetuosity of the rebels, Colonel L'Estrange, who commanded on that occasion, ordered a retreat, which was so precipitately executed, that the whole of the loyal inhabitants were left at the mercy of the insurgents. Scarcely had the Royalists retired two miles, when flames were seen to burst out from every quarter of the town. The fury of the yeomanry now became too great to be repressed, and the regulars vying with them in ardour, their commander resolved to recover the place or perish. Imagining the troops far distant, the insurgents had dispersed and entered the houses in search of plunder. Numbers were cut down by the sabres of the yeomanry, the rest escaped into the dwellings occupied by their comrades, and opened from the windows a heavy fire. Their respite was short: the regular infantry rushed into the houses, and speedily and sternly did their dreadful work. In a few minutes not a single insurgent remained alive in the town. And what was the loss sustained by the troops in this dangerous and neck-breaking business, for such it would be considered by many modern tacticians?— not one killed, and but few hurt!

A more chivalrous affair is not recorded in the annals of war than the defence of Clonard by Lieut. Tyrrell, with twenty-five volunteer cavalry, twelve of whom only were furnished with carbines, against upwards of three U. S. JOURN. No. 83, Oct. 1835.

thousand insurgents. Unable from the want of lances to charge his opponents on horseback, he dismounted his men, and posted them with his three gallant sons, the eldest of whom did not exceed sixteen years of age, in two stone dwellings separated by an unwalled garden. After a short but heavy musket fire, the rebels rushed to the storm, and in an instant forced the lower story of the smaller house, and passing their pikes through the floor, they soon rendered the upper rooms untenable by the defenders. Finding their situation no longer maintainable, the yeomen drew their swords, leaped from the windows into the midst of their opponents, who expecting nothing less than this attack from above, were wholly unprepared to receive it. In the melee which ensued, the long pike was found no match for the light dragoon sabre, the most handy of all weapons in a press, and although several yeomen were speared, the rest joined Lieut. Tyrrell in safety with their swords dyed to the hilt. Fiercely the rebels renewed their attack; but so cool and deadly was the aim taken from the windows by Tyrrell's followers, that the leaders went down at the first discharge, and scores of the insurgents were stretched dead in front of the post. Indeed it is self-evident that for the defence of a house a carbine is infinitely preferable to a great clumsy, ill-made infantry musket, as not only is its fire far more rapid, but from its shortness it does not fatigue the arm, and enables the wielder to take aim with much less waste of time and far more precision. Again and again the insurgents rallied and charged up to the door of the house, but aware that the first who entered must inevitably fall by the swords of the defenders, none would enter. Perceiving their hesitation, Tyrrell suddenly flung open the door, and sword in hand attacked them whilst retiring. At the same moment a reinforcement of thirty-six men appeared in view, and the rebels struck with terror, immediately dispersed, and never again were able to undertake anything of consequence. Their loss was severe,-far exceeding, in killed alone, the whole loyal force engaged. Thus terminated a resistance not less obstinate than that of the heroic Charles XII. at Bender, which it wonderfully resembled in most of the details.

Such exploits can never be too much celebrated, and no reward could have been too lavish for the little band engaged. Nor let it be imagined the insurgents were a despicable or timid foe. In no one instance, unless powerfully aided by artillery, had the bayonets of the militia or yeomanry been of any avail in the open field against their pikes. At Oulard three hundred militia drawn up in a line on tolerably level ground, had, after firing four volleys, been rushed upon and massacred by an inferior number of pikemen, not more than six of whom were slain by their fire, while of the militia, the Colonel and a drum-boy, who caught hold of his horse's tail, alone escaped to Wexford, and brought the news of their defeat. It has been asserted that cavalry may easily exterminate pikemen with their fire-arms: the experience of the Irish Rebellion proves the contrary. Scarcely an instance occurred, during that memorable contest, of the slightest advantage being derived by mounted troopers from either carbine or pistol, while numerous checks were received by them entirely from the want of an efficient lance. That want would have been still more felt, but for the two light curricle guns then attached to every cavalry corps, which often did good service in smashing the insurgent columns, and thus clearing the way for a charge in line. A couple of six-pounder-rocket-volley carriages, had they then been in use, each carrying three hundred rockets and three rocketeers, the full complement required to work it with effect, would have been of infinitely greater service, and would have enabled the cavalry to strangle the insurrection in its birth, without leaving anything for the infantry to do.

We do not exactly agree with the sentiments expressed by H. J., relative to the Saxon bayonet exercise now rapidly coming into use on the Continent. Under no circumstances can we conceive so heavy a weapon as that now carried by our infantry capable of contending with a sabre or cut-and-thrust sword wielded by an ordinarily skilful hand. Still, however, the knowledge

of this exercise could do our troops no harm; as it would tend to familiarise their minds with the idea of coming to close contact; and would often be of good service, especially in Ireland, where they are so often called upon to perform the duties of police. It is idle to say that Infantry lines never come into collision. Their not doing so is owing to their not being trained to contemplate its probability. Cavalry never closed, from the death of Cromwell till the rise of Frederick the Great, who first caused them to be exercised in the use of the steel. Had the party cut off at Oulard, or the larger corps afterwards overthrown under Colonel Walpole, been taught to fence with the bayonet, the probability is, that instead of firing at twenty or thirty yards, they would have charged without firing, till their bayonets clashed against the insurgent pikes, when a well-directed volley delivered from the charging position would have thrown their opponents into such disorder, as to leave the survivors almost unresisting victims to the bayonet. In the wish for shortening the musket, and compensating for its diminished length by a long and light rifle-sword, we most cordially agree.

:

Hastening over minor events, let us now survey the, so called, "three glorious days of Paris, in July, 1830, the unfortunate issue of which appears to have been rendered inevitable by the very first orders of Marshal Marmont. Regardless of the excessive heat, he directed the parties employed in clearing the streets to wear their great coats and to carry their knapsacks. Armed crowds were to be dispersed without firing if shots were fired from windows, they might be returned, but the houses on no account to be forced. Thus the troops were at once precluded from knocking off the sharp-shooters in the streets, who invariably dispersed at their approach, and from dislodging their more dangerous adversaries, who, ambushed in the houses, picked off the military at their leisure. One house, and one alone, was forced during the three days by the Swiss Guards. The only difficulty experienced in carrying it arose from their bear-skin caps, the height of which not only impeded their entrance, but when they had got in by stooping, rendered it impossible for them to stand upright in the lower rooms. Of the 2000 superb cavalry who waited at his disposal, Marmont attempted not to make any important use. If the barricades, few of which by-the-bye would have stopped an English dragoon or an Austrian hussar, prevented their acting on horseback with effect, they should have been dismounted and employed either to garrison those public buildings, of which it was important that possession should be retained, or to force the principal points held by the insurgents,-a service for which dismounted cavalry are better fitted than even infantry, from the nature of their equipment, as was well proved by the Life Guards in 1780; by the 19th at Vellore; by the French Mamelouks in 1807 at Madrid; and by the hussars of Thielmar at Zeiss in 1813; and by the detachment of the 14th Light Dragoons, who stormed the jail during the fearful riots at Bristol. The most remarkable fact, however, connected with the three days is the trifling loss sustained by the troops; considerably less than that sustained in a few moments at the assault of Tarifa, and not to be compared with that of the division under Lannes, which, allowed to enter the streets of Acre without opposition, was suddenly closed upon by a few gallant young Turks, under Sir Sydney Smith. So inferior is the destroying power of fire-arms to that of the cold steel.

The course adopted by Marshal Soult, to suppress the émeutes of 1832 and 1834, appears to have been diametrically opposite to that which failed under the more humane, but less resolute Duke of Ragusa. Each attacking column was accompanied by a detachment of sappers, who with their weighty axes shivered the doors and shutters of the shops where the Jacobins had taken post, and then rushing in followed by the infantry, with axe, bayonet, and sabre-poniard, speedily overcame all resistance. It is for this sort of conflict that the Roman sword now worn by the French flank companies is intended, and in this sort of fighting it is far more useful than the bayonet,

serving either as a hatchet, a crowbar, or a most formidable weapon of offence, the thrust of which it is almost impossible to parry or to elude. Why are not at least the serjeants, musicians, and six or eight privates in every company of the British army provided with this imposing and effective instrument? Hung by a waistbelt, it would not impede their motions in the least, and its weight would not much exceed that of the wretched toy-resembling, awkward, useless tool which serjeants now wear. A similar weapon would also be found highly useful to the marines in boarding, who, in individual combat, possess at present no means of defence against an adversary armed with a boarding-pike; and also the Rifle Brigade, the shortness of whose weapons renders them incapable of acting in small parties as police in Ireland, when engaged in a street or nocturnal attack.

The remarks we have made respecting the Revolution of the Barricades will apply with equal, or even greater force, to the unsuccessful and miserably-conducted attack on Brussels, which failed entirely from the exaggerated estimate entertained by the Dutch leaders,-men more remarkable for sternness in defence, than daring in attack,-of the prowess of their opponents. Resolute, like all insurgents, only where there is no danger, the Belgians kept at too great a distance from the Dutch either to inflict or suffer much harm; and according to the admission of the two Yankees who were foremost among their leaders, ducked their heads like water-fowl at every volley. The same writers express their conviction that the slightest demonstration on the part of the Dutch of an intention to storm the town and extirpate all who resisted would at once have terrified the insurgents into an unconditional submission, and have thereby terminated the revolt; and they also assert that the Duke of Wellington would have carried the place in half an hour, had he commanded the Dutch troops, and that without being compelled to make use of his artillery.

During the recent siege of Oporto by the forces of Don Miguel, no hope was entertained by the inhabitants, if the trenches were once forced, of offering effectual resistance to the assailants in the heart of the town. That the Royalists failed to carry those works arose entirely from the wretched, pedantic, and absurd mode of attack which the Royalist generals thought fit to adopt, instead of making their soldiers rush on, one hour before day break, after the plan laid down by the great Frederick for such emergencies, in close column, stripped to the shirt, with unloaded arms; at midday beneath the scorching heat of a July sun in Portugal, they came on in line, encumbered with knapsacks, great coats, sixty rounds of ball-cartridge, and three days' provisions, and with their weapons charged. History records no instance, in which an assault made with loaded arms has proved successful against a resolute foe: it relates many in which picked veterans, entrenched up to the teeth, have been overthrown by a rush with unloaded muskets by impetuosity alone. If the power of popular resistance has been doubled by the introduction of barricades, the destroying energies of regular troops have been augmented fifty-fold by the invention of the Congreve rocket. Ninetysix artillerymen with twenty-four thirty-two pounder carriages or frames, can fire in one minute seventy-two of those terrific engines of destruction, cach ranging from a mile and a half to two miles, and carrying from five to twelve pounds, of an incendiary composition, which continues to burn for several minutes wherever it falls, over which water has no influence, and which from the mephitic vapour which it exhales cannot be approached so as to be extinguished by any other means. In twelve hours more than 3000 might be thrown by the same detachment,-a number sufficient to lay in ashes the finest city of modern Europe. For it is not the number of missiles thrown during a bombardment which avails, but the number simultaneously fired, and the rapidity with which the fire is kept up. Two hundred fires, occurring in succession, may be extinguished, but against twenty breaking out at the same moment, it were vain to contend.

In street-fighting, the six, twelve, and twenty-four pounder rockets are

most useful. A twelve-pounder rocket laid on the ground and discharged without a tube, by simply applying a match to the vent, will run along the ground four or five hundred yards, seldom rising higher than a man's head, and then alternately rising and falling, will continue its course with such effect, as, after ranging 1200 yards, to pierce through twenty feet of turf, and explode on the other side, scattering the seventy-two carbine balls with which it is loaded in all directions. No barricade could for an instant retard its force; and should it by any accident strike against a stone, or any obstacle which it cannot pierce or overturn, it will bound off and continue its terrible course. Half a dozen field-rockets would at once clear the longest and widest street in London or Paris, although filled from one end to the other with insurgents. At the first assault of Oporto, two six-pounder rockets threw the troops of Don Miguel into confusion, after musketry and artillery had alike failed in checking their advance.

It has sometimes occurred to us, that in the assault of lines, such as those of New Orleans, or of detached redoubts, smoke-balls might be used with immense advantage. One smoke-ball thrown by a 54-inch howitzer into, or even in front of a work, would so obscure the air for at least five minutes, as to render the fire of the defenders, were they even the famed riflemen of Kentucky, or the Tyrol, perfectly harmless. By a similar stratagem, the Emperor Sigismund succeeded in carrying a strong chain of redoubts, erected by the Hussites, garrisoned by their best troops, and deemed by them impregnable. Still more annoying would suffocating-balls be to the defenders of a work. No man however resolute would stand within twenty yards of the spot where one of them fell; and for a much greater distance round the mephitic vapour would so annoy the enemy, as to render it impossible for them to fire with effect, or seriously to injure the assaulting columns.

ZISCA.

MILITARY MORTALITY IN THE CANADAS.

MR. EDITOR,-I have been much pleased with an article in your June Number on the "Relative Risk of Life in the different Colonies of Great Britain," as relating to the Officers of the Army.

Life Insurance has lately occupied much public attention; and I have pleasure in handing you extracts from a paper on the "Medical Statistics of Lower Canada,' by Dr. William Kelly, Surgeon, R.N., and read at a sitting of the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec.

Dr. Kelly says, By the kindness of Dr. Skey, I have been afforded every facility in examining the medical records of the Army in Canada. As the information they contain is most accurate, and as the health of the troops in each year bears a relation to the general health of the province, these records are very valuable in assisting us to form an opinion respecting the diseases of the different seasons.

The following Table shows the hospital admissions and deaths in the Army in Lower Canada, during each quarter of the year, from 1820 to 1827. I have distinguished the diseases that usually depend on climate or season, or that have been remarkable for frequency or fatality. The remainder are included under one general head.

The first quarter extends from the 21st of December to the 20th of March; the second, from the 21st of March to the 20th of June; the third, from the 21st of June to the 20th of September; the fourth, from the 21st of September to the 20th of December.