deployed; but before the 57th and 48th regiments had completed the formation, a body of Spaniards in advance of our left flank gave way, and in making off ran in our front, and then came rushing back upon We called out to them, urging them to rally and maintain their ground, and that we would shortly relieve them.

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On these assurances, with the exertions of some of their officers and of our Adjutant, who rode amongst them, they did rally and moved up the hill again, but, very shortly afterwards, down they came again in the utmost confusion,--mixed, pell-mell, with a body of the enemy's Lancers, who were thrusting and cutting without mercy. Many of the Spaniards threw themselves on the ground, others attempted to get through our line, but this could not be permitted, because, we being in line on the slope of a bare green hill, and such a rush of friends and foes coming down upon us, any opening made to let the former pass would have admitted the enemy also. We had no alternative left but to stand firm, and in self-defence to fire on both; this shortly decided the business; the Lancers brought up and made the best of their way back to their own lines, and the Spaniards were permitted to pass to the rear. (This is the moment adverted to by Sir William Inglis in his communication of the 20th May, 1832.)

The formation of our brigade being now completed, and Lumley's brigade having taken post on the left, and all being now ready for the attack, Sir William Stewart rode up to our brigade, and after a few energetic words, said, "Now is the time-let us give three cheers!" This was instantly done with heart and soul, every cap waving in the air. We immediately advanced up the hill, under a sharp fire from the enemy's light troops, which we did not condescend to return, and they retreated as we moved on. On arriving at the crest of the height we discovered the enemy a little in rear of it, apparently formed in masses or columns of grand divisions, with light troops and artillery in the intervals between them: from the waving and rising of the ground on which some of these stood, the three or four front-rank, in some cases, could fire over the heads of one another, and some guns posted on a bank fired over one of the columns. Notwithstanding this formidable array, our line went close up to the enemy, without even a piece of artillery to support us (at least near us there were none): we understood that the nine-pounder brigade had been withdrawn in consequence of the disaster above related; while Soult has since stated that he had forty pieces of cannon vomiting death at this point. The 29th regiment being on the right of this line, its flank was en l'air and completely exposed, without any strong point to rest upon, while the Fusileer and Portuguese brigades of the fourth division, which had also been brought up to the new front, were a considerable way to our right in the plain below.

This was the moment at which the murderous and desperate battle really begun. A most overwhelming fire of artillery and small arms was opened upon us, which was vigorously returned; there we unflinchingly stood and there we fell; our ranks were at some places swept away by sections. This dreadful contest had continued for some time, when an officer of artillery (I believe German) came up and said he had brought two or three guns, but that he could find no one to give him orders (our superior officers being all wounded or killed). It was

suggested that he could not do wrong in opening directly on the enemy, which was accordingly done. Our line at length became so reduced that it resembled a chain of skirmishers in extended order, while from the necessity of closing in towards the colours, and our numbers fast diminishing, our right flank became still further exposed. The enemy, however, did not avail himself of the advantage which this circumstance might have afforded him.

We continued to maintain this unprecedented conflict with unabated energy. The enemy, notwithstanding his superiority of numbers, had not obtained one inch of ground, but, on the contrary, we were gaining on him, when the gallant Fusileer brigade was moved up from the plain, bringing their right shoulders forward; they thus took the enemy obliquely in flank, who, although already much shattered, still continued to make a brave resistance, but nothing could withstand the invincible and undaunted bravery of the British soldiers. The enemy's masses, after a desperate struggle for victory, gave way at all points, and were driven in disorder beyond the rivulet, leaving us triumphant masters of the field.

To the credit of the troops engaged it ought to be recollected, that in all other battles, fought either before or afterwards, in the Peninsula, our gallant army, under a skilful commander, had only either to march up to the enemy or to await his attack, and that after a conflict of more or less duration, the victory was won; but in this terrible contest, error, confusion, and misfortune attended our first disposition. Victory had to be retrieved from a brave and experienced foe, under many untoward and disheartening circumstances, and it seems universally agreed that the annals of war scarcely afford an instance of so bloody a battle, in proportion to the numbers engaged, having ever been fought.

Mustering the living and recording the dead became afterwards our melancholy duty. On reckoning our numbers, the 29th regiment had only 96 men, two captains, and a few subalterns remaining out of the whole regiment; the 57th regiment had but a few more, and were commanded out of action by the Adjutant; the first battalion of the 48th regiment suffered in like manner; not a man of the brigade was prisoner; not a colour was lost, although an eloquent historian, most unwarrantably, stated, that the 57th had lost their's-the 57th lose their colours!-never! Major-General Houghton, commanding the brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel Duckworth of the 48th regiment were killed; Lieutenant-Colonel White of the 29th regiment mortally wounded; Colonel Inglis of the 57th, and Major Way of the 29th regiments, very severely. In fact, every field-officer of the whole brigade was either killed or wounded, so that at the close of the action the brigade remained in command of a Captain of the 48th regiment, and, singular enough, that Captain was a Frenchman (Cemetiere).

The field afterwards presented a sad spectacle, our men lying generally in rows and the French in large heaps, from their having fought principally in masses, they not having dared to deploy (as they afterwards told us), from a dread of our cavalry; having supposed that we would not have ventured to act in such an open country without a great superiority in that description of force.

The French were driven in such confusion from the field, that their brigades and regiments lost all order and were completely mixed, so

that numbers of our men, and several of the officers who had been taken prisoners, made their escape out of the enemy's bivouac during the night, and many deserters came over. But notwithstanding their great disorder, which must have been known to our chief, we remained all the next day looking at one another; while the enemy was actively employed in reorganizing their shattered forces. It struck many people that if only a demonstration of advancing had been made, even on the following morning, their total route would have been complete, because General Hamilton's division of Portuguese were almost still entire, nor had Hacket's fine corps, or even Lumley's brigade, or our cavalry, been rendered unserviceable, and the remaining part of the 4th division, which had been detained at Badajos, were momentarily expected to arrive. On the third day, even after the enemy had recovered their order, they, as soon as they observed that we were about to advance, immediately commenced their retreat without offering the smallest resistance.

Some affecting incidents, which occurred on this memorable occasion, may not prove uninteresting.

When in our first position Major-General Houghton was on horseback in front of the line, in a green frock-coat, which he had put on in the hurry of turning out: some time afterwards his servant rode up to him with his red uniform-coat, he immediately, without dismounting, stripped off the green and put on the red one; and it may be said, that this public display of our national colour and of British coolness, actually was done under a salute of French artillery, as they were cannonading us at the time.

There had been a general court-martial held some time previous to the action. The prisoner, Lieutenant Ansaldo, was found guilty and sentenced to be suspended for six months; he, however, instead of quitting his corps during that period remained with the army, and gallantly went into action by the side of his prosecutor,-they both fell! And what is still more extraordinary, the President (General Houghton), the Judge-Advocate (Captain Binning, 66th regiment), and many of the members and witnesses were also killed, and were almost all of them entombed near the same spot.

A few days after the battle five regiments, who suffered most, were embodied into one! forming a provisional battalion,-viz. the 3rd regiment, one company; the 66th, one company; the 29th, two companies; the 57th, three, and the 31st, three companies, placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel L'Estrange of the 31st regiment.

The Duke of Wellington, on hearing of Soult's advance, used the utmost possible exertions to come up, and to have commanded in person: he only arrived the second day after the action, unfortunately too late. Some days afterwards, I have been told, his Grace, while inspecting the hospitals at Elvas, said to some of our men,-" Oh, old 29th, I am sorry to see so many of you here!" They instantly replied, Oh, my Lord, if you had only been with us, there would not have been so many of us here!"-so implicit was the confidence of even the humblest individuals in this great man.

REMARKS ON STREET-FIGHTING.

Ir is now nearly forty years since, that in an evil hour the celebrated Bulow broached the opinion, that modern infantry cannot with success contend in the streets against the armed inhabitants of a large town in a state of insurrection. This assertion, although its fallacy has often been proved by deeds, has hitherto remained unanswered in words, except by a few brief remarks from the pen of a writer signing himself H. J., which appeared in a former number of this Journal. Since, however, the revolutionary party continue to reiterate this most unfounded assertion, it merits a more thorough refutation, which may best be accomplished by a brief examination of the principal street-fights, between regulars and insurgents, which have occurred within the last forty years.

Of these conflicts, that of Buenos Ayres in 1807 was the most fertile in military delusions, and not the least important in its political results. No resemblance can be traced between that city and any metropolis in occidental Europe. The houses of which it is composed, all fire-proof, are built round courtyards, after the Oriental manner, with but one entrance, which is guarded by a door of amazing thickness and solidity, while the few windows which look towards the street are protected by iron bars, too massive to be broken, and too firmly fixed for an assailant to tear them away. For more than three months previous to the attack, Liniers, the governor, a stern and resolute chief, had incessantly trained the inhabitants to the use of arms; had caused several wide and deep cuts to be excavated across every street, and had so arranged the magnificent train of artillery at his disposal, as to enfilade all the approaches, and to overwhelm every spot, where an enemy might form, with a tempest of grape and shells. Arms and ammunition were abundant, trained artillerymen were numerous, and there were present no small number of skilful and scientific engineers.

The army, under Lieut.-General Whitelocke, did not muster more than 7000 bayonets; his heavy artillery was not disembarked; of hand grenades, and Congreve rockets, the only missiles of any avail in an assault or streetfight, he was left by the Government at home wholly destitute. Under these circumstances, the General, who notwithstanding all that has been said against him in England, lacked neither talent nor courage, resolved to imitate the example of Sir Samuel Auchmuty,-who had a short time before stormed the equally-defensible town of Monte Video,-and to carry Buenos Ayres by a coup-de-main. With that view he divided his infantry into eight columns, each column consisting of one battalion; his reserve was composed of the 6th Dragoon Guards and 9th Light Dragoons (both dismounted), with two light six-pounders and the same number of mountain guns, pieces far too light to make the slightest impression on the stronglybuilt houses of Buenos Ayres, some of which would have long resisted the battering of a twelve-pounder. No loading was on any account to be permitted till the attacking columns had effected a junction in the heart of the town. At the head of each battalion marched two men provided with axes, for the purpose of breaking open the doors of such buildings as might be found occupied by detachments of Spanish infantry. It is somewhat remarkable that neither the Lieut.-General, nor any individual engaged, appears to have been aware, that the strongest door may be blown open by simply discharging a musket through the lock. A knowledge of this fact would, in the subsequent opinion of almost every officer present who survived the contest, have enabled the British troops to obtain success with but comparatively trifling loss. Proudly and confidently advanced the British to the assault; the Spaniards reserving their fire till the whole of the assailants had entered the city, and involved themselves in the narrow streets, which they did in close columns of sections without breaking into the

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houses as they advanced. Then began a fearful struggle: from every window and loophole flashed a blunderbuss; the head of every attacking battalion was swept away by a storm of grape, while the hand-grenades which fell in showers from every roof did even faster and more fearfully the work of death. Yet, although thus fiercely assailed, the gallant 38th, led by the brave and skilful Sir Samuel Auchmuty, bore right onwards, without heeding the fire from the roofs and windows, or halting to load, and scrambling over the cuts, overturned the cannon, bayonetted the gunners, captured 600 Spanish veterans, who were immediately sent to the rear, and finally reached the allotted point of union in the centre of the city with but trifling loss. The two-and-thirty well-served guns, stormed and taken by the 38th, at once attested the fearful obstacles which had opposed the progress of that corps, and the stern resolution with which they had been overcome. Equally daring and equally successful was the attack of the 36th, under Colonel Lumley; but the other battalions, not less brave, but less skilled in this description of warfare, halted and attempted to return the fire of their invisible foes. From that moment their advance was at an end. Some minutes were idly wasted in firing at the windows, and when the officers by almost superhuman exertions had restored order, the axemen had been killed, and their weapons broken by the grape-shot of the Spaniards, and no means presented themselves of forcing the houses, except by battering in the doors with the butt-ends of their muskets, an operation tedious from their extreme thickness, and one in which not a few muskets were broken, and which generally allowed the defenders time to escape along the flat roofs. At the close of the day, the assailants, an eighth of whom had suffered wounds or contusions, more or less severe, held possession of one, and by far the strongest third of the assaulted town.

Terror reigned in that part of Buenos Ayres over which the Spanish flag still waved. Against a reiterated assault no hopes of successful resistance remained, while even the most sanguine felt that a few hours' bombardment would render their situation hopeless, and compel an unconditional surrender. One resource, and one alone remained to Liniers, and of it he availed himself with the characteristic dexterity-to call it by no worse a term-of a French Imperialist. A flag of truce was despatched to Whitelocke's headquarters, with directions to threaten, that unless an armistice were immediately granted, and the British forces withdrawn from the city, the English prisoners, who on a former occasion had fallen into Linier's hands, should be abandoned to the mercy of the populace. By the wily Spaniards, Whitelocke was found meditating over his loss, which, although in itself not wonderful, appeared enormous in the eyes of one accustomed only to West Indian skirmishes, and outpost affairs. He listened, granted all the demands of the enemy, lost time which could not be retrieved, and finally quitted a province which a sterner leader-a Cromwell, or a Suvaroff-would have rendered not the least valuable appanage of the British throne.

We have been more diffuse upon this affair, than would have been necessary, had not an opinion been very prevalent that the repulse of the British at Buenos Ayres arose from their attack having been made with unflinted muskets, after the fashion introduced by the late Sir Charles Grey, and which has never been known to fail. If such were the intention of General Whitelocke, it most certainly was never executed, and therefore could in no degree have occasioned the ill success of the day; for we have already shown that those columns which were repulsed, did fire, and fire most furiously, although without any effect, and that from the moment they opened a fire their advance was at an end and their failure inevitable. Had the attack really been made after Sir Charles Grey's method, the men would of course been stripped to the shirt, and disencumbered of their cartouch boxes and cross belts, in that case worse than useless, as tending to retard their movements and prevent their overtaking the fugitive Spaniards with the cold steel. The real error of Whitelocke appears to have been his not disencumbering