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natural ally, the English government warmly | between Austria and France; with both espoused the cause of Austria in the empire; which powers, consequently, England was and actually subsidized many of the German soon at war. The approaches of France to princes, in order to secure to the son of Maria Austria, and of England to Prussia, were Theresa the reversion of the imperial digni- mutual cause and effect: at least, we cannot ty. With the Bavarian, the Palatine, the here determine the question of precedence Saxon, and the Cologne Electors, either between them. It is enough for us, that all treaties were actually concluded, or subsi- the speculations of English ministers, on the dies promised, for the purpose of gaining result of their German arrangements, were their votes. "Whether England had any scattered to the winds. "The union of the reason at all for embroiling herself so deeply two powers," says Heeren, "mocked all cal. in the affairs of Germany, is a question culation:" and yet what could be more natwhich," Heeren says, "we need not here ural-what indeed was more certain to hapdetermine;" but which we decide, without pen, than that the union of any two of four hesitation, in the negative. These things great powers should bring the other two would not have been thought of under an nearer together? English king. The subsidies, as might have been expected, failed in their object, and had only the effect of aggravating the discon tents of the Prussian monarch, with whom England, or rather the King of England, had already some differences.

But there were also differences with Austria, especially concerning the execution of the Barrier Treaty ;* and all the subsidies which we had paid in support of her family interests failed to retain the friendship of the haughty, and perhaps wayward, Maria The

resa.

Austria did not at once joir. France in her war with England, but her neutrality did not last long. Prussia anticipated the expected attack from Austria, and England brought native as well as subsidized forces to the support of her ally.

In this war, as in that which preceded it, the separate and naval war of England (now with France, then with Spain), was merged in the continental war; and the energetic minister, who raised the spirit of England, and conducted the war while its operations were glorious, avowed it as his plan to com. pel France to acquiesce in the separate de. mands of England, by pressing her on the continent,-"America shall be conquered in Germany."

Colonial disputes placed England in a state of war with France. This war began, like the last, in America; but it was now a territorial, not a commercial question. The breach arising out of the disputed limits of Our author does not miss the opportunity Nova Scotia, and other questions raised in which this German war gives him, of boastthe western hemisphere, fully supports Hee. ing of the identity of interests between Hanren's remarks on the inconvenience attend- over and England. But for Hanover, we ing the propinquity of continental territo- should not have obtained the co-operation of ries. George II., apprehending that France the king of Prussia. Yet Pitt, in a speech would attack his paternal dominions, sought quoted by Heeren, declared that he would the alliance of Elizabeth of Russia, with whom not have entered into the German war, if he concluded a subsidiary treaty; and called the faith of England had not been pledged upon the Empress Queen for succors stipu- by treaty to support the King of Prussia. lated in the treaty of alliance and guaranty. It thus appears doubtful whether, in the As is usual in such cases, Maria Theresa opinion of this great war minister, our Engdeclined, and was moreover much offended lish objects in the war were furthered by our at the demand, made at a time when she connection with the continent; but Prussia, herself, as she pretended, was threatened by no doubt, would have been ready and willing Prussia. In fact, France had by this time to accept our co-operation, if we chose to made great progress in her endeavors to offer it, and even if the Elector of Hanover separate Austria from England, which were had not joined that alliance, (which he proaided by the present approximation towards bably would,) it is at least a question, whether a union between England and Prussia. The we should not have gained more by the abKing of Prussia now undertook to defend sence of concern for Hanover, than we Hanover, receiving from George II. a recip- should have lost by the want of Hanoverian rocal promise of support, if Germany should be attacked. Then, and as some think, therefore, was published the famous alliance

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troops. If his master had been only King of England, the Duke of Cumberland might have been a more efficient auxiliary to Fred. erick II. in the days of his distress, and would not have been driven to the convention of Closter-Seven.

At all events, be it remembered, that the

Prussian alliance was not the result of systematic diplomacy; it was rather a departure from the political sysem which had been supposed to be determinate and lasting!

France, in order to compel her to take such terms of peace as they might dictate; to do nothing without mutual consultation; and not to make any private and separate ac. Heeren's remarks upon Pitt, and the con- commodation with France.* But was each duct of the seven years' war, would lead us power bound by this stipulation to continue too far into domestic history. But a remark at war for an indefinite period, putting the upon subsidies deserves notice. "He af- question of peace or war altogether into the forded them to those who, under the exist- hands of his ally? Had one party the uning relations, were the most natural allies of qualified right of obliging the other to conGreat Britain, and with whom she had in gen- tinue at war? These engagements, coneral a community of interests, not to every one strued with entire strictness, would lead to who asked for them." Heeren is right. In manifest impossibilities. One question in the our time, we have heard ministers censured present case is, in what degree the advanfor "paying our allies for fighting their own tages obtained by England were owing to the batties." Now, if the battle is not his own, co-operation of Prussia ?-a question more an ally will not fight it well. Subsidies easily stated than resolved. There is on ought to be given to those only, who, of all the motives and means of war, want none but money.

such occasions a real difficulty in reconciling good faith and policy; and even if your own conscience is clear, you will seldom satisfy The alliance between France and Austria, your ally. Frederick II. never forgave in delivering the Low Countries from the England what he deemed a base desertion. fear of French invasion, had an important The seven years' war was on the part of influence upon the condition of England's England glorious and successful; but, like old ally, the United Provinces. They kept the glorious war of Queen Anne, it was terout of the war and of danger. To our other minated by a treaty which disappointed the western ally, Portugal, we had an opportu- hopes of those whose counsels had contributed nity of rendering useful assistance. When most to its success. Yet the terms, by which threatened by the combined force of France Minorca was recovered, and Canada and and Spain, now united by the family com- Grenada acquired, were really quite sufficient pact, the King of Portugal replied, that "he for the honor and interest of England. would rather see the last tile of his palace fall," than depart from his neutrality. England rewarded his fidelity with effectual support.

This war left England without powerful allies, and Heeren observes that, after what he calls, in language somewhat exaggerated, the prostration of France, she had no imme diate cause for seeking new connections. In truth, the decline of the Hanoverian influence upon British counsels was the principal cause of the cessation of that propensity to treaty. making, which had distinguished the reigns of George I. and II. The United Provinces and Portugal remained the only allies of Eng. land; they were rather to be deemed (especially Portugal) protected states.

The American war is a topic foreign to our inquiry. The participation of France and Spain in it was an instance of wanton aggression for the gratification of rivalry and

After Pitt resigned, on not being permitted to anticipate the hostility of Spain, the ministry discontinued the Prussian subsidy, and took less interest in the continental war. Before the subsidy was withdrawn, the peace with Russia and Sweden had rendered it less necessary to Frederick, and there were charges of unfriendly reserve and clandestine negotiation, which palliated, if they did not justify, the desertion of our ally. The occurrence affords a striking instance of the inconvenience produced by these alliances, even though made, as this with Prussia was, at the time when it was wanted, and not in contemplation of future dangers. Though It is to be observed of this American war, it is true that England and Prussia had a that we had at the time no continental ally, common enemy, their respective objects in nor was there any war in Europe. Will it the war were totally different. And the in- be said that any different state of our contisular power was in a condition to obtain nental relations would have turned the fate of reasonable and even advantageous terms of the war between England and her colonies? peace, at a time when it was the interest, or Certainly he must be a more sanguine adat least the desire, of continental Prussia to mirer of alliances than we are, who imagines carry on the war. The two kings were that the most stringent treaty that we could bound to each other, to make war upon have previously made, would have induced

* Ann. Reg. 1762, p. 212.

revenge.

* Koch, vol. iii. p. 32.

On

this occasion Pitt adverted to "the too frequently advanced doctrine, that France was, and must be, the unalterable enemy of Great Britain; his mind revolted from this position,

any one power in Europe to come to our as-younger Pitt now took towards placing the sistance, either in suppressing the revolt, or two countries upon a more friendly footing. in attacking France when she took part with This was the commercial treaty of 1786, inthe rebels. It is even very doubtful, whether, tended to produce an interchange of com if we could by diplomatic management have modities upon fair and equal terms. excited a war in Europe by way of diversion, so as to prevent France from sending troops to America (in which it might have failed), we should have been altogether better off. We might possibly have prolonged as monstrous and impossible." And he set the struggle, but we must ultimately have forth, by just and statesmanlike arguments, given way, and should have come out of the the tendency of the treaty to preserve peace, war with finances even in a worse condition. without rendering us less prepared for war. Heeren himself takes no notice of the Fox, on the other hand, argued that " France American war, as connected with continental was the natural political enemy of Great politics, but we may observe, that we did not Britain." This enmity he traced to "her on this occasion owe much to that rivalry invariable and ardent desire to hold the sway with France which he deems necessary for of Europe," and contended, that "she wished the greatness of England. In the American by entering into a commercial treaty with war, the United Province:, instead of com- us to tie our hands, and prevent us from ening to our assistance in virtue of former trea- gaging in alliances with other powers." We ties,* when a most unquestionable casus can scarcely imagine a Foxite now so bigoted, fœderis occurred in the French aggression, as to deny to Mr. Pitt the superiority in this gave such assistance to our enemies as led to debate; which we earnestly recommend to a rupture and to their junction with France perusal. No term is more mistaken than and the American States against us. This that of natural enemy, and the mistake as to conduct, on the part of Holland, may perhaps the origin of the expression produces an erserve as a justification of Great Britain against roneous deduction from the fact which it exthe remark of Heeren's upon our retention of presses. France, from her locality, perhaps Negapatnam at the peace of 1783, when also from her disposition, is among the con. England, he says, instead of attaching the tinental powers the most likely to become the Republic to her by forbearance, "showed a enemy of England. It is not that she ought disposition to a colonial aggrandizement at to be our enemy, or that it is desirable that the expense of her ancient ally, and lost his she should be so, but that she probably will confidence for ever.' Certainly, the policy be so. There are clashing interests and which compensates one great belligerent for habitual jealousies, from which hostilities natucessions made to another, or for the want of rally, that is, according to the ordinary course acquisition from another, by territory exacted of events, will arise. Now these are undeniafrom one of the weaker parties to the war, ble reasons for not augmenting, by any meais not magnanimous or creditable. But it sure of our own, the power of France to anmay be questioned, whether the want of gen- noy us; but they are none for encouraging erosity is not rather in the powerful ally, who the tendency to a quarrel. Quite the consuffers the indemnification to be thus made. trary. They should induce us to seek all England might fairly treat those who were means of counteracting it, and if possible to allied against her as one party; and leave convert France into a friend. Reason and them to settle their cessions among themselves. experience concur in proving, that no politi Probably, if France had not required Tobago cal friendship tends more to the peace of from England, England would not have de. England, and of Europe generally, than the manded Negapatnam from the Dutch. But friendship between England and France. it is not probable that Negapatnam would Mr. Fox's apprehension, that our comhave altered the state of parties in Hol-mercial treaty would stand in the way of our land, nor could any state of parties make political allowances was speedily dissipated. Holland an efficient ally. Whatever trea. Circumstances soon occurred (to which ties may exist, it is really in vain to expect that a small commercial state, like Holland, will provoke, for the sake of England, the hostility of such a neighbor as France.

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It is strange that Heeren, who dwells so much upon the rivalry between England and France, takes no notice of a step which the

See p. 82, ante.

Heeren only adverts as the well-known events of 1787) which revived the connec. tion of England with the House of Orange and the Dutch Republic. This is the first case which we have had to notice of interference in the internal affairs of another state. The object was to exclude the influence of

* Parl. Hist. vol. xxvi. p. 392. † Ib. p. 397.

France, by throwing our weight, together vocate of continental alliances, and of eternal
with that of Russia, into the scale of that opposition to the French power, objects to
party which was opposed to France. On this alliance with one of the great military
the part of the King of Prussia, whose sister, powers of Germany, at a time when the other
the Princess of Orange, had been arrested was closely connected with France. "Chat-
by the Republicans of Holland, there was ham," he says, "with his principles, would
the actual intervention of an armed force: never have concluded the alliance which his
England interposed only by mediation and son concluded, still less would he have ap-
advice; except that when France declared proved the consequences which followed it."
her intention of taking part in the internal It is really not possible to deduce from the
dissensions, and made some addition to her speeches or counsels of Lord Chatham, in
forces by sea and land, England also armed, regard to foreign politics, any principle upon
and declared that she would not be an indif- which this proposition of M Heeren's can be
ferent spectator of the interference of France. maintained or controverted.
After the Stadtholder was restored to power,
by the aid of Prussia, France and England
disarmed by mutual agreement.

stadtholdership in the Netherlands could not
possibly become of sufficient importance to
both these powers, to form a permanent bond
of union between them."

The objection appears to consist in the narrowness of the base upon which the alliance rested. "It was not founded on so Heeren thinks that England took the wrong extended a community of interests as under side; she ought to have supported the re- Frederick II. The maintenance of the publican party, representing, as he conceives, "the nation." He is aware of her motive, the counteraction of French influence, but says that the peace would have been a more favorable period for this attempt. Surely, In our opinion, a union for a specific and it would have been difficult to establish any attainable purpose is the only union likely to English interest in Holland, under the exas- last. But it was clearly Mr. Pitt's intention peration of the recent war. But the neglect to take advantage of the accidental coinci. of a former opportunity does not alter the dence of views between England and Prussia, wisdom of the present interference; and, if for forming and preserving an alliance with we interfered at all, with the view of counter- one of the great military powers, at a time acting France, we must doubtless have sided when two others, Austria (with whom France with the party which she did not favor. Eng- was still closely allied,) and Russia, now grow. land did not interfere, until France had pre- ing into great importance, had combined with pared, or threatened, a direct and apparently views threatening the balance of power and armed intervention. The conduct of Eng- the maritime interests of England. The amland, independently of the connection with bition of the empress Catherine extended not the Orange family, may rest upon the prin- only to Sweden and Poland, but to Turkey ciple more than once avowed by Queen and the Mediterranean.* Maria Theresa, Elizabeth, of not permitting the forces of a and still more Joseph II. entered more and third power to occupy, without opposition, the more warmly into these views. The friend. territory of a neighbor. Apparently, the ship between Russia and Prussia was rapidly English government of 1787, and certainly declining. This surely was a fit opportunity its opponent, Fox, carried much further the for an alliance with Prussia, if such alliances right of interference. Pitt maintained that can be at any time defended. The infuence we were justified in restoring the government of France, it may moreover be added, in of the Prince of Orange, with the view of the United Provinces, though counteracted, securing a valuable ally, instead of seeing was not destroyed; in the opposition which Holland irrevocably attached to a rival; and we offered to it, Prussia was now our "natuFox justified our interference, as consonant ral ally." to the principles of "the balance of power" The first fruits of the alliance, the congress which he professed, although he doubted whether France had in fact threatened to interfere by force.

Out of this joint interference with Prussia in Holland arose that triple alliance between those states and England, which was the basis of Mr. Pitt's continental policy prior to the French Revolution. Nootka Sound was an isolated case of injury redressed.

of Reichenbach, where the allies mediated
the terms of peace between Austria and the
Porte, were confessedly beneficial to Europe.
The allies also prevented Denmark from as-
sisting Russia against Sweden; but failed,
according to Heeren, when they attempted to

* See in ch. 3 of the Annual Register for 1788, Heeren condemns, upon grounds ill ex-diterranean, and her attempts, defeated by the Engsome account of the projects of Russia in the Meplained, the alliance with Prussia. We are lish government, to obtain aesistance of English really at a loss to understand why he, the ad-pilots and seamen.

7

1837.

British Continental Connections.

dictate to Catherine the terms of peace with the Porte. This is true, but it is true also that the threatened opposition of the British parliament made it impossible for Mr. Pitt to proceed. It is well known that the question of peace between Russia and Turkey turned at last upon the apparently trifling point of Oczakow; and that England and Prussia were prepared to go to war with Russia upon that single point. By this mode of statement, almost every dispute may be made to appear trifling. We insisted upon the restoration of things to the state in which they were before the war; Russia says, "I must have a slice of Turkish territory." The allies say No; -and the question is really one of principle. If the interposition of other powers for the protection of the weaker states is justifiable at all, these powers may reasonably say, The aggression shall be in no degree successful.

"To set

In winding up his remarks upon this eventful period, which he terminates at the French Revolution, Heeren says very truly, that England never claimed to be a dominant power in the federative system of Europe,that she had to determine her conduct by the internal relations of this system, which she did not govern, and that, therefore, her continensolid prin. tal policy seldom proceeded upon ciples. He makes it a question, which, how. ever, he does not discuss, whether this want of solidity is a matter of reproach. tle permanently the reciprocal relations of the continental powers is throughout beyond the capacity of England. It would have been foolish and vain presumption to attempt it. For this very reason then, she could discern no durable and solid basis for her federative system, in respect of the choice of her allies." All this is true, and our deduction from it is, that England ought not to attempt to regulate the continental system, or in any way to mix herself up in it.

a

Heeren concludes this section with a specific censure of England for the non-perform ance of engagements. In the three great continental wars in which England took part, the Spanish,* the Austrian war of succession, and the seven years' war, she concluded every time a peace for herself, or only in connection with Holland, and deserted her principal confederates. We cannot altogeth er deny the truth of this charge. It is strik. But we ingly true of the Peace of Utrecht. do not plead guilty to it, in respect of Aix-laChapelle; and have already urged something in defence of the treaty of Paris.

* Meaning what we call the war of the Spanish succession, see p. 80, ante.

†The Silesian war, or war of the pragmatic sanction, see p. 88.

* See p. 90.

VI. French Revolution, 1788-1815.

Although this period is the most eventful, and the most interesting of all, to modern readers, it furnishes less of matter for the peculiar doctrines which we now inculcate. There is, however, one great exception, suggested by the very first remark of Heeren's.

"Never," he says, "has the truth of the observation with which we commenced this inquiry-that it is a highly advantageous circumstance for the maintenance of the liberty and independence of a states-system, that one of its principal members should be an insular state, and in possession of a naval force,— been more strikingly demonstrated than in this period. If a bridge had been thrown across the Channel, how different might have certainly do not entertain the slightest doubt been the fate of England and of Europe! We that England, even in this case, would have remained unconquered, or that the invasion of a French army would have eventually ended in its destruction; and simply because the warlike energies of the nation would in that case have been more generally roused and concentrated, and more reso!utely displayed."

He adds, that there might have been a momentary conquest, and that assuredly a even from the occupation of the metropolis. very great inconvenience would have resulted This is beyond a doubt; but there is, happihappen if there were a bridge from Calais to y, no necessity for considering what would Dover. Our great consolation is, that the events of this period have demonstrated, we will not say the impossibility, but the extreme improbability, of a successful or even attempted invasion of England, even while France has a leader of the highest military genius, an army almost innumerable and eminently successful, powerful allies, and no avowed

enemy on the continent.

An insular power, says Heeren, is a useful member of a states-system; useful, no doubt, to those continental powers to whom it lends its fleets or its money: but we say, an insular power may be independent of the states

system.

But we now proceed with the RevolutionHeeren's narrative is introduced ary war.

by a character of Mr. Pitt.

"Several of his contemporaries, his opponents and rivals, might possess more brilliant talents, but none could vie with him in clearness of intellect, in decision of purpose, and in devotion to his country..... The account of his foreign policy must be prefaced by one general observation: His conduct throughout was uniformly in accordance with his own conviction, and this is expressed in every one of his speeches, in a manner not to be mistaken."

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