Reflecting coolly and carefully upon the subject under confideration, the constitution of man, admirable in all its parts, appears here in a fine light. The final cause now unfolded of the sense of propriety, must, to every difcerning eye, appear delightful; and yet hitherto we have given but a partial view of it. The sense of propriety reaches _another illustrious end; which is, to co-operate with the sense of justice in inforcing the performance of social duties. In fact, the sanctions visibly contrived to compel a man to be just to himself, are equally ferviceable to compel him to be just to others. This will be evident from a single reflection, That an action, by being unjust, ceases not to be improper. An action never appears more eminently improper, than when it is unjust. It is obviously becoming and suitable to human nature, that each man do his duty to others; and accordingly every tranfgreffion of duty with respect to others, is at the same time a transgression of duty with respect to self. This is an undisguised truth without exaggeration; and it opens a new and delightful view in the moral landscape. scape. The prospect is greatly enriched, by the multiplication of agreeable objects. It appears now, that nothing is overlooked, nothing left undone, that can poffibly contribute to the enforcing social duty. For to all the sanctions that belong to it fingly, are superadded the fanctions of self-duty. A familiar example shall suffice for illustration. An act of ingratitude confidered in itself, is to the author disagreeable as well as to every spectator: considered by the author with relation to himself, it raises self-contempt: confidered by him with relation to the world, it makes him ashamed. Again, confidered by others, it raises their contempt and indignation against the author. These feelings are all of them occafioned by the impropriety of the action. When the action is confidered as unjust, it occafions another set of feelings. In the author it produces remorse, and a dread of merited punishment; and in others, the benefactor chiefly, indignation and hatred directed upon the ungrateful person. Thus shame and remorse united in the ungrateful

VOL. II.

D

perfon, person, and indignation united with hatred in the hearts of others, are the punishments provided by nature for injustice. Stupid and insensible must he be in extreme, who, in a contrivance so exquifite, perceives not the hand of the Sovereign Architect.

CHAP.

27

CHAP. ΧΙ.

Of Dignity and Meanness.

T

HESE terms are applied to man in point of character, sentiment, and behaviour. We say, for example, of one man, that he hath a natural dignity in his air and manner; of another, that he makes a mean figure. There is a dignity in every action and sentiment of some perfons: the actions and sentiments of others are mean and vulgar. With refpect to the fine arts, some performances are said to be manly and fuitable to the dignity of human nature : others are termed low, mean, trivial. Such expreffions are common, though they have not always a precise meaning. With respect to the art of criticism, it must be a real acquisition to afcertain what these terms truly import; which poffibly may enable us to rank every performance in the fine arts according to its dignity.

Inquiring first to what subjects the terms dignity and meanness are appropriated, we foon discover, that they are not applicable to any thing inanimate. The most magnificent palace ever built, may be lofty, may be grand, but it has no relation to dignity. The most diminutive shrub may be little, but it is not mean. These terms must belong to fenfitive beings, probably to man only; which will be evident when we advance in the inquiry.

Of all objects, human actions produce in a spectator the greatest variety of feelings. They are in themselves grand or little: with respect to the author, they are proper or improper: with respect to those affected by them, just or unjust. And I must now add, that they are also distinguished by dignity and meanness. It may poffibly be thought, that with respect to human actions, dignity coincides with grandeur, and meanness with littleness. But the difference will be evident upon reflecting, that we never attribute dignity to any action but what is virtuous, nor meanness to any but what in some degree is faulty. But an ac