passion that is also disagreeable *, raises by its external figns a repulfive emotion, repelling the spectator from the object. Thus the emotions raised by external figns of envy and rage, are repulsive. But this is not the cafe of painful paffions that are agreeable. Their external signs, it is true, are difagreeable, and raise in the spectator a painful emotion. But this painful emotion is not repulsive. On the contrary, it is attractive; and produceth in the spectator good-will to the man who is moved by the passion, and a defire to relieve or comfort him. This cannot be better exemplified than by distress painted on the countenance, which instantaneously inspires the spectator with pity, and impels him to afford relief. The cause of this difference among the painful emotions raised by external signs of paffion, may be readily gathered from what is laid down chapter Emotions and passions, part 7. It is now time to look back to the question proposed in the beginning, How we come to understand external figns, so as readily to ascribe each fign to its proper paffion? We have feen that this branch of knowledge, cannot be derived originally from fight, nor from experience. Is it then implanted in us by nature? The following confiderations will help us to answer this question in the affirmative. In the first place, the external signs of paffion must be natural; for they are invariably the same in every country, and among the different tribes of men. Pride, for example, is always expressed by an erect posture, reverence by prostration, and forrow by a dejected look. Secondly, we are not even indebted to experience for the knowledge that these expreffions are natural and universal. We are so framed as to have an innate conviction of the fact. Let a man change his habitation to the other fide of the globe; he will, from the accustomed signs, infer the passion of fear among his new neighbours, with as little hefitation as he did at home. And upon second thoughts, the question may be answered without any preliminaries. If the branch of knowledge we have been inquiring about be * See paffions explained as agreeable or disagreeable, chap. 2. part 2. readily not derived from fight nor from experience, there is no remaining source from whence it can be derived but from nature. ..: We may then venture to pronounce, with fome degree of confidence, that man is provided by nature with a sense or faculty which lays open to him every paffion by means of its external expressions. And I imagine that we cannot entertain any reasonable doubt of this fact, when we reflect, that even infants are not ignorant of the meaning of external figns. An infant is remarkably affected with the passions of its nurse expressed on her countenance: a smile chears it, and a frown makes it afraid. Fear thus generated in the infant, must, like every other passion, have an object. What is the object of this paffion? Surely not the frown confidered abstractly, for a child never abstracts. The nurse who frowns is evidently the object. Fear, at the same time, cannot arise but from apprehending danger. But what danger can a child apprehend, if it be not sensible that the person who frowns is angry? We must therefore admit, that a child can read anger in its nurse's face; and it must be sensible of this intuitively, for it has no other means of knowledge. I have no occafion to affirm, that these particulars are clearly ap To produce clear reflection and ex prehended by the child. and distinct perceptions, perience are requifite. But that even an infant, when afraid, must have fome notion of its being in danger, is extremely evident. That we should be conscious intuitively of a paffion from its external expressions, is conformable to the analogy of nature. The knowledge of this language is of too great importance to be left upon experience. To rest it upon a foundation so uncertain and precarious, would prove a great obstacle to the formation of societies. Wisely therefore is it ordered, and agreeably to the system of Providence, that we should have Nature for our instructor. : Manifold and admirable are the purposes to which the external figns of passion are made subservient by the author of our nature. What are occasionally mentioned VOL. II. S above, above, make but a part. Several final causes remain to be unfolded; and to this task I apply myself with alacrity. In the first place, the figns of internal agitation that are displayed externally to every spectator, tend to fix the fignification of many terms. The only effectual means to ascertain the meaning of any doubtful word, is an appeal to the thing it represents. Hence the ambiguity of words expressive of things that are not objects of external sense; for in that case an appeal is denied. Paffion, strictly speaking, is not an object of external sense: but its external figns are; and by means of these signs, passions may be appealed to, with tolerable accuracy. Thus the words that denote our paffions, next to those that denote external objects, have the most distinct meaning. Words signifying internal action and the more delicate feelings, are less distinct. This defect with respect to internal action, is what chiefly occafions the intricacy of logic. The terms of that science are far from being sufficiently afcertained, even after the care and labour |