sent. He was therefore compelled to assume the offensive, to obviate the daily increasing difficulties of his position; but in so doing, and in compelling by strategical movements his adversary either to retire or fight an action, he nevertheless was unwilling by an ill-judged and inconsiderate attack to renew events that had so recently occurred. He was, moreover, anxious that if an action should be fought, that it should take place on ground that he had previously selected-in fact, that it should be received, and not given. On the other hand, the English General, faithful to his favourite system, was equally desirous of reducing the action to the defence of a position; hence, the remarkable movements which were executed from the Douro to the Tormes in July, 1812.

In consequence of this system followed by both parties, the British army was compelled to make a retrograde movement; and it is incontestable that its retreat into Portugal would have been the immediate result of this beginning of the campaign, if an unskilful movement executed by a division of the French army, and the severe wound which the General-in-Chief received about an hour before the commencement of the battle, had not, by the confusion in the transmission of orders which it occasioned, rendered impossible the reparation of the gross fault which had been committed, and which brought on an action which then ought to have been avoided, or fought under more favourable auspices. Nevertheless, the losses were equal on both sides.

Although I am firmly convinced that French troops, well commanded and adequately supplied, are fitted for every species of warfare, I am, moreover, of opinion that the offensive is their peculiar forte, a fact which the genius of Napoleon rendered so self-evident.

I have already advanced, that no General ever possessed in so high a degree the talent of strategical combination as Napoleon. Down to the Russian war his marches were skilfully conceived and executed. The powerful means at his disposal, their energy and moral character, his own activity and unfettered will, by the rapidity of his combinations, and the grandeur of his projects, bore down every obstacle, and elevated the spirit of his soldiery; while, on the other hand, it demoralized the enemy, and prepared their defeat. Thus, what a series of splendid operations, executed as if by magic, does his early career present. At his very debût in Italy, he turned all the enemy's positions, and beat him in detail. Forestalling all his movements, he passed the Po without opposition. Reduced for a time to the defensive, he suddenly changed the character of his operations, and impressed them with the stamp of his own peculiar genius.

In 1800, he entered Italy, and brought the Austrian army to action, under the most unfavourable circumstances, after it had lost not only its communications, but its point of retreat.

In 1805, the direction alone of his army, which he threw "en masse" on the Danube, after showing the head of his columns in the Black Forest, to occupy the enemy's attention, decided the campaign; for if Mack, by his blind confidence, had not produced the catastrophe which followed, and had merely retired, this simple movement would still have given to us the possession of all Bavaria.

At Austerlitz, a tactical movement decided in a few hours the fate of the battle. At Jena, the same prodigious resul.s were obtained by a

similar manœuvre; and as long as this system was followed, invariable success crowned all the operations of Napoleon.

In 1809, at the commencement of the campaign before Ratisbon, his operations were distinguished by the same character; but this system was soon changed. The passage of the Danube, the first attempt at which failed, was at length executed with success, and a victory gained in the plain of Wagram. In this case an attack was made on the enemy's front, circumstances admitting of no other alternative. The passage of a river like the Danube is no easy operation, and is not to be effected by surprise, when an army, posted on the opposite bank, is prepared to oppose it. As the enemy must be attacked on debouching from the river, a concentration of efforts and determined energy are the sure guarantees of victory.

In 1812, it depended on the will of Napoleon alone to impress on the great battle which he fought on the Moskova the stamp of his former victories. A simple flank movement would have given him a great advantage over the Russians, and would have produced much greater results. But he had then a decided predilection for direct attacks by the employment of mere physical force, and appeared to disdain the assistance of art and the combinations of the mind. True, he was victorious; but his losses were enormous, and the advantages he obtained of little or no importance.

In 1813, he varied the application of his principles. Surprised at Lutzen, he at first acted on the defensive; but soon assumed the offensive.

At Bautzen, his strategical movements were skilful and well conceived; but at Leipzig it may fairly be asked how Napoleon, who was unfettered in the choice of a theatre of operation, could have selected a field of battle which the simplest calculation might have taught must be followed by the most fatal results. The battle of the 18th October was fought on the defensive, and offered no chance of success, since that of the 16th had not been gained, and on the 17th the enemy had received a reinforcement of 150,000 men. He should therefore have avoided it, and have retired on France. The battles of Brienne and of Craon, those of Laon and of Arcis, could produce no possible advantage. All the operations of that period should have been confined to partial movements upon detached corps of the enemy. In this manner should have been directed whatever energy remained to the French army, the more so as such combinations more particularly distinguished the genius of Napoleon, and he applied them with brilliant success at Champ Aubert, Montmirail, Vauchamp, and Montreau. He there imparted to the obstinate defensive system that he adopted all the character of the offensive, which was in fact the fundamental basis of his talent. But reduced at last by the concentration of the enemy's whole force to fight a general action, he should have made it a defensive one, have taken up a position under the walls of Paris, fortified it, and united all the means left at his disposal to those of the capital, which he alone was capable of developing, and there for the last time have appealed to the fortune of arms*. But he did not possess this

* If 14,000 men-mere wrecks-abandoned to themselves in the open field, without a solitary work of art to support them, deprived of the assistance which the

species of resolution, and neither foresaw its necessity or prepared for its execution. He latterly placed the lever of his power on the fulcrum of public opinion*.

One word more on offensive battles. At what hour ought they to commence? This is a question of vast importance, and deserves a serious examination. When a General is unfettered in his choice of time, he ought to vary it in conformity to the circumstances under which he may be placed.

If with a superiority of force so decided there is every chance of victory, the attack should be made at an early hour in the morning, in order to profit by success. It must be in the recollection of every old soldier the chagrin which is felt when night approaches in the full tide of victory, and the importance with which its arrival is looked for in the opposite ranks. When the troops are well in hand, and on the other hand, when those of the enemy are disseminated, the attack should be made as early as possible; and although we are aware that a thousand unforeseen circumstances often sport with the combinations of a General, the question will naturally be asked why Napoleon at Waterloo, in the season of the longest days, only attacked the English at eleven in the morning, although he was perfectly aware, by an intercepted letter of Blucher to Wellington, that the former could not come up till four in the afternoon. Had Napoleon proved victorious, he might then have opposed the Prussians. If, on the other hand, the day had gone against him, he would have been but too happy that he had not a second army on his hands.

The greatest military questions are reducible to the most simple expressions; thus, there is more chance of success in fighting one to one than one against two.

But when equality of forces renders victory more uncertain, it is better to attack about the middle of the day; the consequences of defeat are then less to be apprehended. The first duty of a General is the preservation of his own army, the destruction of the enemy must be secondary to that consideration; besides, should the action have proved undecided, he has the whole night to prepare for a new 'attack. His troops also acquire rest, and thereby renewed strength and energy. The army, on the other hand, which is acting on the defensive, has not the same facility, and as the moment for action approaches, its morale is sensibly diminished.

In the midst of our victories in Italy, in 1796, two little reverses were experienced on two successive days-at Cerea and at Due Castelli-in consequence of the extreme fatigue and some little disorder which prevailed in Massena's division. As it was important to drive

capital might have rendered by the flight of all the superior authorities-I repeat that if 14,000 men, under such circumstances, were able to resist for ten hours the colossal force in their front, 54,000 of which were actually engaged, and 13,000 put hors de combat, we can easily judge what would have been the result if 30,000 men had fought under cover of well constructed field-works, supported by all the means of defence which Paris possessed, and which the presence and authority of Napoleon would have called into action.

*Although the power of public opinion is immense, in order that it be perma nent in its operation, it ought to be based on something of a real and positive character.

Wurmser into Mantua, and to guard against a second check, the troops were allowed to rest till noon. After dinner they resumed their arms, and the victory of St. George was never for an instant doubtful.

To conclude, defensive battles require more particularly the exercise of great professional knowledge and experience; while offensive ones, skilfully conducted, are the " apanage of genius." The latter formed the peculiar character of the Great Frederick's wars; for the Seven Years' War, though conducted on the defensive, bore almost always the impress of the opposite type. Under this point of view, if allowance be made for the difference of times and the state of military science, many of his campaigns will be found to bear a striking resemblance to those of Napoleon.

In perusing with care the wars of the greatest Captains, we can at once understand the kind of troops they commanded by their mode of employing them, the nature of the difficulties they had to overcome, nay, even their own individual characters; for those who excelled in warfare of a peculiar nature possessed a special genius for it; for that instinct which we receive from nature, if it is not our first guide, powerfully contributes to the development and improvement of all our intellectual qualities.

In every age, and in every country, great Generals have given to their operations their own peculiar character; and with a little reflection we easily discover the difference which exists between those who have been made the objects of comparison. The campaigns of Turenne and the Great Condé bear no resemblance to each other. Prince Eugene of Savoy and Marlborough had each their own peculiar mode of operation. The same observation equally applies to the great Generals of antiquity-to Alexander and Cæsar, to Fabius, Hannibal, and Scipio.

On taking the field, a skilful General ought to master in detail every circumstance under which he may be placed, arising from the composi tion and character of his troops, their numerical strength, the object he has to attain, the means placed at his disposal, and regulate (even in opposition to his own taste) the best mode of employing them.

END OF THIRD PART.

REMINISCENCES OF THE LATE WAR OF SUCCESSION IN POR. TUGAL; AND OF OPORTO, DURING THE SIEGE OF

1832 AND 1833.

BY CAPTAIN A. J. HIPPISLEY.

(Continued from No. 197, page 559.)

THE various field-fights and affairs of outposts which had taken place since the 29th of September, quite filled the hospitals; added to which, small-pox, dysentery, cholera, and typhus fever, broke out to a frightful extent among the inhabitants and soldiery. Winter, in all its horrors, was fast approaching, at which period the bar would be closed against succour by sea. Affairs had reached this awful crisis, when General Count Barbacena assumed the command of the troops surrounding Oporto. This officer, of well known repute*, commenced his operations by a rapid succession of most vigorous assaults. Immediately after his arrival at Villa Nova, he bombarded the city for thirty hours without ceasing, and his storming parties fearlessly came up to the very muzzles of the guns of the besieged. The Count also strengthened his own lines by the construction of additional batteries and redoubts; day after day fresh works were unmasked, and the brass moutht and iron teeth of the enemy appeared more eagerly to gape for the besieged. Nothing daunted, however, by the sombre aspect and conflicting events of this critical and perilous period, His Imperial Majesty paid his respects to his renowned antagonist, on the morning of the 14th November, at the head of a mission of two thousand five hundred chosen troops. The attacking columns were gallantly commanded by Brigadier-General Schwalback; the spirited and elated band passed over to Villa Nova, just in the vicinity of the Pontoon Bridge§; in this boldly executed sortie, the enemy's picquets were surprised, some few of their guns spiked, several of their newly constructed works demolished, and many officers of rank taken prisoners. Brigadier-General Torres also ably co-operated in this attack, by marching out all his disposable force from the Serra Convent; whilst at the same eventful moment, Captain Morgell, of the Portuguese Navy, landed his ship's crew, and attacked the batteries at the mouth of the river, but here the enemy was on the alert, fought most desperately, and Captain Morgell fell without having effected his object.

This day's trip to the opposite bank of the Douro, cost the Queen's troops a loss of upwards of one hundred killed and wounded, a great

*Count Barbacena had served and distinguished himself on the respective staffs of Lords Wellington and Beresford.

+ Several of the new batteries mounted from seven to nine brass mortars of the largest calibre, and from six to twelve thirty-two pounders.

This officer rose from the ranks of the 60th, or German Rifles, during the Peninsular War, and exchanged into and has since been retained in the Portuguese service.

§ This bridge was broken up during the siege, but was replaced after the enemy had quitted Villa Nova,