hardships. The Americans that Mr. Polk sympathises with so much, are, no doubt, people of pretty much the same class, though he would make them appear as innocent as Arcadian shepherds. We well know "the real nater of the genewine kreeter;" and as it may be taken as a matter beyond the slightest doubt that they are fellows who will not stick at trifles, why, therefore, should we be scrupulous about employing the means in our power to protect the property which they would deprive us of? Depend upon it, if it was not worth having, they never would have thought of taking it: and if it is good for them, it is equally so for us. It is also most certain that there is no advantage, however mean, that they will not take against us; and if we wish to prosper in this business, we must not be particular as to the means we may employ. (To be continued.)

THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.

MAJOR MACREADY IN REPLY TO CAPTAIN SIBORNE.

HAVING read Captain Siborne's reply to my remarks on that part of his History of the Waterloo Campaign which relates to the brigade in which I served, I beg to offer my thanks to that officer for his expressed intention to have sought an interview with me, and to say that had he originally conveyed to me the remotest hint as to any such intention, he would most assuredly have saved our readers and ourselves the trouble of perusing the present correspondence.

Captain Siborne has most fully admitted his error on the first point submitted to his consideration, and on the second point, viz., "Captain Siborne represents that at Waterloo the attacks of both the columns of the French Imperial Guard in the evening were made exclusively on the ground held by General Maitland's brigade of Guards, whereas I affirm that a portion of one of those attacks (the first) was directed against, and defeated by, the 30th and 73rd Regiments," I have the satisfaction to observe that Captain Siborne now avows the corrected opinion that the "column advanced in mass of battalions toward that part of the line occupied by Maitland's and Halkett's brigades," and acknowledging the fact of our co-operation in its defeat, is only undecided as to the "mode in which this co-operation should be described," he being himself under the strong impression that both brigades were employed simultaneously against "one and the same column," or rather mass of columns. As my impression is decidedly the reverse of this, I take leave (with much reluctance) to trespass so far on your valuable space as to state my reasons for being unable to concur in opinion with Captain Siborne on this point.

And first to state my own individual impressions from what I saw. I think the column of the Imperial Guard which we of the 30th saw directly in our front was one of 1000 men, or thereabouts,—that it advanced, so long as it did advance, directly on our front, and that, if it had moved in that direction till doomsday, it would never have struck the line of Maitland's brigade,-that this column had no skirmishers in front of it, and that it passed over our ridge pretty close to where Lloyd's guns were posted, that our regiment and 73rd fired a single volley at it, and

no more,—that the guns on our right opened immediately after we had fired, and not before, that the Frenchmen went away over our ridge with their mass of backs towards us, and that no charging line of our Guards followed them,-that I subsequently saw another body of the Imperial Guard and the 69th and 33rd Regiments firing at each other, and that these bodies altogether shut out the brigade of our Guards for a short time from our sight. Thinking thus, I can scarcely imagine that any one, comparing these impressions with the following description of the struggle between our Guards and their Imperial antagonists (abbreviated from Captain Siborne's book), can believe that they and we were acting against "one and the same column."-" The line of skirmishers which preceded it now pushed rapidly and boldly forward, up to the very summit of the Duke's position, for the purpose both of concealing by their veil of smoke the precise direction of the advance of the columns, and also of driving away the artillerymen from the guns, by the fire of which the Guard was suffering so severely.

The bearskin caps of the leading divisions of the column of the Imperial Guard appeared just above the summit of the hill. * * In

*

the next moment the swarm of skirmishers were scattered and driven back upon the main body by a sudden shower of canister, grape, and schrapnel shells, poured forth from Napier's guns, which now kept up a terrific fire upon the column, within a distance of forty or fifty yards. Nevertheless the French Guards continued to advance. They had now topped the summit. Wellington gave the talismanic call, 'Up Guards; make ready,' and ordered Maitland to attack. * * A tremendous volley. * * The French officers by encouraging words and gestures commenced a deployment, in order to acquire a more extended front. But the head of the column being continually shattered and driven back upon the mass by the well-sustained and rapidly-destructive fire by which it was assailed, this attempt altogether failed. * The confusion into which the French Guards had now been thrown became manifest. The Duke ordered Maitland to charge. * The brigade sprang forward with a loud cheer to the charge. * * * The British Guards continued their charge some distance down the slope of the hill, when Maitland perceived the second attacking column of the Imperial Guard advancing on his right."

*

*

*

I have no reason to doubt that this is all historically true, but assuredly it is in almost all particulars the very converse of what I believe to bave occurred in front of the 30th and 73rd Regiments. I would add that my strong impression (grounded on having been closely engaged with these troops for I suppose ten minutes) is, that Donzelot's columns were not nearer to Halkett's brigade than the ground in front of Kruse's Nassauers, and it seems unlikely that the French, in their attack, would have left the space from that to the front of our Guards without some solid body.

* Captain Siborne, in speaking of the column of the Imperial Guard engaged with our Foot Guards, and saying at page 573, "for I cannot conceive the possibility of their not having seen it," reminds me of a German physician who used to say, in reply to my complaint of a pain in my back, "I cannot conceive that pain in your back." But, nevertheless, there it was, though he could not conceive it; and had Captain Siborne been present at Waterloo with our portion of Halkett's brigade, he would have been able to conceive a good deal occurring in front of Maitland's brigade, which would have been at times utterly invisible to him.

My own supposition, and that of other officers of our brigade, is, that the first column, or mass, reached our position near to Lloyd's guns, and then (when under cover of the ridge) moved to their own left, deploying into a line of two, three, or more columns as they did so, each column advancing in succession on the part of our line in its front. This supposition is supported by French testimony, and by the description of Craan, the Belgian Engineer, who says, "it was half-past seven when the Middle Guard advanced with an imposing coolness, with shouldered arms, deploying regularly as they approached." But Captain Siborne "cannot concede that Craan is worthy to be considered as an authority in this matter, and is surprised that I should have brought him forward as such,"-continuing that, unless I can give some account of the doings of six battalions of a certain Belgian brigade, I should "have hesitated to bring him forward as one of the concurring testimonies." I am very willing to be taught what I should do in a matter in which I have so little practice; but, supposing Mr. Craan, from his situation, to have been a gentleman, and knowing that he wrote at Brussels when that city was full of the wounded officers of the French and English armies, and finding that in this particular his account coincided with that of the French historians, and with the little I and my brother officers saw of the proceeding in question, I did not hesitate to accept his testimony on this point, because he had made six battalions of his countrymen advance where they did not at Waterloo, any more than I should hesitate to accept Captain Siborne's testimony, where it concurs with that of others, because he has made three battalions of his countrymen retire where they did not at Quatre Bras. Writers, especially military writers, are not to be absolutely rejected as authority because they are not in all particulars absolutely correct, and the error into which Mr. Craan's patriotic predilections have led him, is one, I believe, common (with some great or singular exceptions) to the writers of all countries*. I know nothing of Ditmer's Belgians, but I considered the French column which we opposed to have been more like a strong battalion than a mass of 4000 or 5000 men, and therefore I believed that mass to have separated into two or more bodies before it crossed our ridge. I also believe that the column we fired at was not the column I saw engaged with the 33rd and 69th Regiments, unless, indeed, it came up a second time on our plateau, which does not seem altogether out of the question, as the French account says, "Le Capitaine Minal essaya de ramener encore son bataillon sur le plateau, mais il fut repoussé par les troupes qui accoururent de tous côtés;" and here, let me observe, is a distinct battalion distinctly mentioned as acting separately. Respecting this French account, I would not willingly characterize it as Captain Siborne does; but if it must be called "a tissue of blunders and absur

*A 30th man may be excused for endeavouring to substantiate Mr. Craan's respectability on account of the honourable mention which he (though a foreigner) makes of the regiment. His words are, "The 3rd division of General Count Alten, being much exposed by its position, had to repulse innumerable charges. Let it suffice to cite, for example, that the square a little advanced of the 30th and 73rd English regiments, was charged eleven times without the least success by the Lancers of the Guard and Cuirassiers." As we find this statement repeated in the German account published at Weimar in 1817, we are in hopes it will be considered an established fact, at least on the Continent.

U. S. MAG., No. 199, JUNE, 1845.

S

dities," I do not the less avow that, setting aside the portion of it adopted by Captain Siborne, and the palpable errors I have myself pointed out, I still consider its general representation, that the Imperial Guard, after passing some of our abandoned guns, came in collision with several portions of our Army, as more like what happened than Captain Siborne's original description, restricting its operation to the ground in front of, and that held by, our Guards; but it is scarcely just to describe me as "having adopted" a version in which I point out manifest errors, because in comparing it with another version, which also seems to me erroneous, I declare that in such and such particulars I think it the more correct of the two*. When I read in Alison's History that "the Imperial Guard came up to within forty paces of the English Foot Guards, and the 73rd and 30th Regiments," and in Captain Siborne's, that the Imperial Guard came against our Guards alone, I think in this particular Mr. Alison's History "more like what happened" than Captain Siborne's; but I do not, therefore, adopt Mr. Alison's version of the whole transaction. Captain Siborne had declared that the attack in question came solely against our Guards. I felt convinced that it came also against Halkett's brigade, and in reasoning against Captain Siborne's assumption I naturally quoted the French, and alluded to the Belgian and General Alava's+ descriptions, which asserted even more than I battled for, or cared to establish; but having now established so much of my case as the heretofore overlooked co-operation of Halkett's brigade, I willingly leave Brunswickers and Belgians to their legitimate defenders.

*Captain Siborne remarks, at page 573, "The Major has an undoubted right to adopt whatever version he pleases, French or British (i. e., Captain Siborne's), of that critical part of the battle, but I think he will find very few of his countrymen to agree with him as to the former,- certainly not those who have given much of their attention to the subject." Now this "certainly" implies so much confidence on the part of Captain Siborne, that I should perhaps feel disposed to bow to his decision, did he deliver it in any other character than that of my antagonist. But as we stand pitted against each other, I confess his assurance does not satisfy me, and I hope it is something sounder than mere self-sufficiency that inclines me to say, with Master Dumbledon, "I like not the security."

† Capt. Siborne says, "Upon a closer examination of General Alava's dispatch, I think Major Macready will find that the falling back of the Brunswickers was somewhat antecedent to, and was not coincident with, the attack of the Imperial Guard." I have therefore referred to the dispatch, and find its words to be, "At last, about seven in the evening, Bonaparte made a last effort, and putting himself at the head of his Guards, attacked the above point of the English position with such vigour, that he drove back the Brunswickers who occupied a part of it."

In addition to the testimony already adduced by me on this point I some days since received a letter from Mr. T. Tytton Monypenny, of Holt House, Rolvendean, who was a Lieutenant in the 30th at Waterloo, but of whose existence (he having left the Army) I was not aware when I last wrote. He says, "I am glad Capt. Siborne admits that he is wrong in stating that we fell back into any wood whatever at Quatre Bras. With regard to our being attacked by the Imperial Guard, I know not how many columns they came up in, but I most unhesitatingly say, that we were attacked by them. I can even now fancy I see their bearskin caps and feathers directly in front of us, and remember the beautiful order in which they mounted the crest of the hill, their step measured, as if on parade, to the tap of the drum, and I think I ought to know to whom I am indebted for the rap I got in my leg. I certainly have hitherto given the Imperial Guard the credit of it.' I have also had forwarded to me a letter written by an officer of the 30th to his father, dated July 7th, 1815, in which he says, "The enemy then sent a

With respect to what Captain Siborne says of what "has been disproved, and of all that has not been proved," in my view of this movement of our enemies, I ask what proof can I, thirty years after an event, in which I was a young Ensign in a regiment well behind the ridge of our position, be expected to produce of what,—if done at all,—— was done by the enemy in a very few minutes, under cover of that ridge, and could be seen by very few indeed of the army that was behind it? I can only state my impression that the column which crossed the ridge to us was one of about the strength of a strong battalion, that I saw a distinct body engaged with the 33rd and 69th Regiments, and that I could only suppose such bodies to have come where I saw them, as the sequel of the deployment which Frenchmen state to have taken place. And what evidence does Captain Siborne, whose information is so general, produce to controvert this opinion? Simply the declaration of an Officer of another brigade, that "no French column advanced on the proper right of the first column of French Guards, at least, between it and La Haye Sainte," which in no way seems to me to prove or disprove, or in any way to touch, the question, as to whether, when it reached our position, the column did or did not deploy under cover of the ridge. Captain Siborne describes the above Officer as one whose name "would be a sure guarantee to the whole Army for the truth of his testimony, so justly appreciated is his character for strict integrity," which makes it a nervous affair to have to remark on any portion of his evidence. But as my natural disinclination to accept the "ignotum pro magnifico" has been a good deal strengthened by one result of this correspondence, and, as the point at issue involves a matter of eyesight and protracted observation in a smoky neighbourhood, rather than of integrity, I take leave to say that if the Officer means exactly what is put down, viz., that "no French column" advanced on the proper right of the first column of French Guards, at least, not between it and La Haye Sainte, I beg most respectfully to say that a very few minutes after the advance of the first column of French Guards, I was myself, with another Subaltern of the 30th, engaged in firing (through their skirmishers) on the front and left flank of a very heavy French column between the ground on which the column of the Guard advanced and La Haye Sainte. But if the words "no French column" are meant to imply no column of the Imperial Guard, I then beg to urge that the question now at issue between Capt. Siborne and myself, is not, whether any column advanced on the right of the one column, but whether the one column, when it came under our ridge, did or did not throw off portions of its mass by deployment to its right or left, previous to, or on its advance upon our troops. Of course, mounted

column of the Grenadiers of the Guard to drive us, but when they came within forty yards, we gave them a volley and a huzza, and prepared for a charge; but they spared us the trouble, as seeing our bayonets levelled, away they went." He continues, "We expect our General in a few days-a finer fellow never stepped. He made an elegant speech to us in the middle of the action," &c. I have not the honour of any acquaintance with Sir C. Halkett, but I happen to have seen his sentiments respecting our brigade in his own handwriting, which makes me earnestly hope that he may, even at this eleventh hour, be inclined to tell us, and those whose “established facts" may be affected by our testimony, what the brigade did or did not do with the portion of the Imperial Guard that came against it.