Page images
PDF
EPUB

THE

UNITED SERVICE JOURNAL.

THE BATTLE OF JENA.*

JOURNAL OF THE MOST REMARKABLE EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED AT THE HEAD

QUARTERS OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA, IN THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1806.

BY GENTZ.

Ar nine at night I repaired to the Marquis Lucchesini. As every body went to bed early at Erfurth, he gave me a general invitation to pass every evening with him, tête à tête. I availed myself of this permission with the utmost alacrity. I knew Count Haugwitz, and was aware what the character of his conversation was in general. He had more than one interested motive for presenting and describing the history of the past and the actual state of things in a brilliant aud favourable light. The narrative with which he opened, far from satisfying me, only rendered me more eager for an éclaircissement and a right understanding. I was not ignorant that the accounts of M. Lucchesini would be also very far from gospel. But between two false versions there was more chance of arriving at the truth, and knowing, besides, that the latter minister was never at the bottom of his heart a friend to M. Haugwitz. I formerly knew him well, and I was enabled to question him at my ease; and with regard to the point that most interested me (i. e. a perfect understanding of the motives which had given rise to a sudden commencement of hostilities on the part of Prussia), I was sure that in the course of conversation I should arrive at a perfect knowledge of the subject. These are the reasons for which I look upon the soirées of M. Lucchesini as a source of most precious information.

This first conversation was entirely devoted to the history of what happened at Paris, to occasion the rupture with Prussia. M. Lucchesini confirmed altogether the conception that Count Haugwitz had enabled me to form as to the origin of the treaties of Vienna and Paris. (It was later, as will be seen hereafter, that he afforded me a more circumstantial detail.) He assured me that he himself had for a long time deemed a war with France inevitable. He knew beyond doubt that from the first commencement of negociations with England the restitution of

• Continued from No. 93, page 446.

U.S. JOURN. No. 94, SEPT. 1836.

B

Hanover had been distinctly submitted to the English Government. At Berlin they would not credit it. This step, taken at the precise moment of M. Laforet's receiving orders to press the Cabinet of Berlin to complete and enforce the measures, for which he was accredited to the country, appeared in so perfidious and black a light that even those best acquainted with the French Government could hardly credit it. M. Oubril's negociations threw a new light upon the designs and secret intentions of this Government. The treaty signed on the 20th of July contained two secret acticles, of which one decided the notorious compensation to the King of Naples of the Balearic Isles, and the other, in addition to article 8, the patent of the treaty, declared that France and Russia should jointly engage the King of Prussia to make peace with the King of Sweden, without exacting of this sovereign the sacrifice of Swedish Pomerania.

Nothing, from what I could gather, ever irritated the King of Prussia more than this impudent clause, which appeared to attribute to him a project against which he had ever protested, and which he had rejected whenever France had proposed it. What rendered this article still more piquant was, that Napoleon, in speaking of his future designs, had exclaimed on several occasions, "This King of Sweden is an honest man. I shall not be satisfied with only saving his country; I shall endeavour to aggrandise it." During the conferences with Oubril, the French negociators had always proclaimed that if the Emperor of Russia desired to extend his territories in Poland, they would consent, and without any difficulty. According to M. Lucchesini, it had not been exacted of the Cabinet of the Tuileries that a formal article should be added, especially for this purpose, to the secret terms of the treaty. In short, a new declaration of the facility with which France would lend herself to the restoration of the Electorate was made to the English Government before Lord Lauderdale's departure for Paris. Napoleon flattered himself at this juncture that, in concert with the Emperor of Russia, he should engage the King of Prussia to abandon Hanover. The restoration of his ceded provinces was not even thought of. "Some trifling recompense, some Bernberg Cloten, &c. &c.," said the Marquis, that's all that they have ever intended for him ;" and each day more sufficiently developed the project of directly sacrificing him, and preparing the fall of his monarchy. Such was the substance of the information which he had afforded for some months past at his court; but it was principally from the two reports which he made on the 22nd and 29th of July, joined to the propositions made to the Elector of Hesse, and the hostile measures against the Prince of Orange, that the King decided for war.

66

More than once during this recital I was tempted to broach the important question as to whether all those were sufficient motives even for the resolution of suddenly breaking with France; but it appeared to me more prudent to delay it. I might have said to the Marquis things which would have embarrassed him, or perhaps even cooled him towards me; and I wished to be completely informed before he came to discussion. He then recounted to me the history of his recall. The French Government had intercepted one of his despatches (and to judge from several circumstances, I do not believe that I am deceived in suspecting

that this incident was designed). He demanded the recall of M. Lucchesini. Lafôret had an order to declare that he answered for nothing, if this request was not forthwith acceded to. The Court of Berlin, as M. de Haugwitz had already told me, was secretly enchanted with this uproar. Nothing seemed to him more favourable to the disguise of his projects; and M. de Knobelsdorff, ever famous for being one of the most zealous partizans of Napoleon and of the pacific system, was expressly chosen to delude them.

But the most curious feature of this last measure (it was one of M. de Haugwitz's stratagems) was the fact of M. Knobelsdorff being himself completely the dupe of his omission. He imagined, in good earnest, that they despatched him to Paris to re-establish a good intelligence by means of his personal credit. He arrived there, suspecting nothing, and under the impression that he should overcome every difficulty in a few days. He had the folly to believe that his instructions were unknown to M. Lucchesini, in whom he saw but a disgraced minister. He concealed them from him carefully; and when the latter, assuming complete ignorance, told him that it was supposed his instructions were to demand the retreat of the French troops, the other assented, adding that he viewed it as an easy measure to obtain the Emperor's consent to this step. At the first audience, Napoleon addressed himself to M. Knobelsdorff in these words: "I am very glad to see you here: I like plain, straightforward men like you; but I am much dissatisfied with your Court! What means this shuffling about the Northern Confederates, and the continuance of my troops in Germany?"

The other wished to make it understood that the King was far from proposing any measure that would in the least disoblige the Emperor; but yet that it appeared to him that the stay of the French troops should have some limit. Upon which Napoleon, putting himself in a great passion, exclaimed, "What! you are ignorant, then, that I have need of Cattaro, and that I will have Cattaro. Not a man shall pass the Rhine before this shall be accomplished. As for that paltry 7000 or 8000 men which are posted on the side of Westphalia, I shall find some means of disposing of them; but first of all it is necessary that your King should disarm, and completely disarm, and all your troops retire into peace quarters." Knobelsdorff was a little disgusted by this ebullition; but when he received the next morning a present of four horses and a carriage, a circumstance which never before happened to any one but the Turkish Ambassador, he considered himself again at the summit of favour. He wrote to his wife, desiring her to be perfectly easy, that war was not thought of; and when there was a question of Napoleon's setting off for the army, he demanded roundly of his Court whether he should not accompany him on his journey.

M. de Lucchesini, on quitting Paris, had a very long audience to take leave, and all passed off calmly. Buonaparte spoke incessantly to him of the views he had in contemplation for humanity's sake, likewise adding that they had only to leave it to him, and Europe would soon find herself in the position most to be desired. Touching negociations with England, he observed, "I know perfectly well Lord Lauderdale is nothing but one of my Paris spies. I should have sent him away about his business long ago, but ministers would not consent to it." M. Luc

[ocr errors]
« PreviousContinue »