viz., that the enemy were in force. This day, February 3rd, was most oppressively hot, and it requires the English resident to be removed to South Africa, before he can imagine the sufferings the men and horses underwent from the effects of heat and thirst*. In this part of the Fish river range, the forests are extensive, the enemy was found to be in force, and the day was spent in sharp skirmishing. The troops returned to bivouac at dark, having captured a number of cattle, and inflicted some loss upon the enemy, among whom was their principal Hottentot deserter, Barber, shot by Lieut. Granet, 98th Regt. On the night of the 4th, Colonel England, having directed the infantry to move the next day at daylight to Trompeter's Drift, advanced again into the line of kloofs extending, from the southward of Commatuy's Drift, away in an easterly direction towards the Clusic river. The Fish river at this place was deep, and running rapidly, and a scene of indescribable confusion took place among the irregular horse, at which it was impossible not to laugh, although you knew not how soon you might be an actor in a similar scene. Kicking and plunging generally terminated in horse and rider being carried down the stream, and a dissolution of partnership arising therefrom; whilst the biped was making for the opposite bank, the more sensible quadruped generally returned to the bivouac.

When the force was collected on the other side of the river the march was resumed. The path selected this night was through low but thick underwood, which afforded an active enemy every advantage for attack, as it scarcely allowed passage for more than one horse at a time; so the military reader may imagine the difficulty of conducting a body of 150 cavalry by such a route, with much regularity, nay, the almost utter impossibility when they all (with the exception of ten men) consisted of irregular troops. The ignorance or obstinacy of many in persisting in urging their horses kept the rear-guard in at constant gallop; while the necessity there existed for preserving silence, the narrowness of the path, "added to the darkness of the night, called forth deep, if not loud execrations from the officers in command of it.

Having arrived at the place of destination, about 12 o'clock P.M., the troops halted and lay down, every man holding his horse ready to mount on emergency. At 3 o'clock A.M. the march was resumed, and about sunrise the advance found itself in the midst of a Kaffir location, huts built in the bush, cattle regularly kraaled, and a quantity of goats, manifesting certain indications that the enemy had considered that they had conquered the colony, and that they had been for some time residing here. The attack on the first huts was a signal for the inhabitants of the others to seek refuge in the adjoining bush, which they did with hardly any loss; and the purpose of this march being merely a reconnoissance, to ascertain correctly the force and situation of the enemy, the troops pushed on, destroying the huts as they passed, and driving the cattle. The country at this part became very intricate; some of the kloofs were so thick and precipitous, and the enemy, having collected, advanced so rapidly, that it became absolutely necessary to

The goats (taken from the enemy) suffered so severely, that we saw them lying in heaps in the bush with their tongues hanging out black and shrivelled.

abandon the cattle (600 head), as, owing to the almost insurmountable difficulties of the ground, it was next to impossible to drive them. However, at the next halt, about mid-day, we found ourselves in possession of from 400 to 500 head of fine colonial cattle, which had been taken during the latter part of the march, after some slight skirmishing, and the loss of only one man on our side. The enemy were now numerous, and in truth you may say that the hills were red with Kaffirs. The path through which it was necessary to march to arrive at the river was by an old elephant track, nearly overgrown with bush; it wound along the side of a precipitous kloof, commanded by a lofty rock, from which the enemy was enabled to observe all our movements, and here, with more ability than might have been expected from them, they did their utmost to annoy us, not confining themselves to shot for shot, but keeping up a constant tiraillade-fortunately, however, with no other effect than slightly hitting some of the cattle.

It may seem strange to the inexperienced reader, that so little loss should have been sustained under such heavy fire, especially when at this time many Hottentots (known good shots) were serving with the enemy; but he must recollect, that at any time a man is no easy mark, and when in the bush the slightest twig may turn a bullet. But to proceed. We had safely reached the flats, within a few miles of Trompeter's Drift, where we were to join the infantry, when our attention was attracted to one of the enemy shouting to us in Dutch. The cattle and greater part of the force had moved forward, and Lieut.-Colonel England, with the rear-guard, was watching the movements of the enemy, and endeavouring to hear what they were saying, when some shots from the bush, within a few yards of the road, (one wounding a private of the Cape Mounted Rifles through his bridle-arm,) gave us a gentle hint, that if we remained much longer we stood some danger of being surrounded, as the enemy had already completely outflanked us. This part of the country was more favourable for the Kaffir mode of warfare, the bush not being so dense as that in the kloofs, thereby enabling the savage to use his assagais, and to move with greater rapidity; and their daring this day was such, that they even followed us within musket shot of the infantry, who were drawn up on the opposite bank of the river.

At 5 o'clock P.M., the whole force was collected in bivouac at Trompeter's Drift, and thus ended our second day's operations, which, although not attended with great results, had, however, afforded us the first certain information of the strength and confidence of the enemy; and, what was more important, had proved to them that this their favourite bush, hitherto deemed impenetrable, presented no insurmountable obstacle to Englishmen.

The Cape.

ANCIENT.

*The Kaffirs smear their bodies with red clay and grease, both for warmth and as a protection from insects.

VINDICATION OF THE CONNAUGHT RANGERS FROM THE CHARGE PREFERRED AGAINST THEM IN THE LIFE OF SIR T. PICTON.

Mr. EDITOR,-In the May Number of the United Service Journal, I read a reply from the compiler of the Life of the late Sir Thomas Picton, to a Correspondent of your Journal, who signs the initial "M," to some remarks he had thought proper to make on certain portions of the work written by Mr. Robinson. I was curious, never having read the Memoir, to see what your Correspondent "M" had written, and I accordingly obtained the April Number of your periodical, and there I found the remarks of your Correspondent. Since then I have read an extract from the 'Memoir,' which was sent to me, and I am at a loss to guess at the exact drift of the attack made on my old corps the 88th, or the different regiments, in general, that composed the third division. Whether it be meant to show that General Sir Thomas Picton was a man of such superior abilities that he did as much, or more, with the worst description of troops in the army, than any other General; or that, by some fortuitous circumstance, he was placed in command over such a set of men, I cannot pretend to say; but it is most true that the regiments which composed the third division were as well organized, and in as high a state of discipline, as any other division in the army. But the remarks on the 88th Regiment are so void of foundation, that I think it only right to inform Mr. Robinson, through the medium of your Journal, that he has been greatly led astray by his "informant." All this is, however, unimportant, and I think your Correspondent "M," who I take for granted read Mr. Robinson's work before he wrote his letter, has devoted more time and paper, to say nothing of pens and ink, in his reply, than the subject merits. Whether General Picton called the 88th Regiment "ragged rascals," or "Connaught robbers," is of little import to the regiment, or the army in general. Neither is it of much consequence whether General Picton commanded the right, left, or centre, of his division, on the day of Busaco. We are to give the General credit for doing the best he could,' and if he happened to be away from the principal point of contest, it was no fault of his; or, did he claim any merit to himself, for the charge made by the five companies of the 45th and the 88th Regiments, it only goes to prove what I have said in my Reminiscences,' that "regiments can perform this work as well when led on by their own commanding Officers, as if Generals placed themselves at their head."

I never heard that General Picton called the 88th Regiment his "ragged rascals," but as Mr. Robinson so denominates them, so shall they remain for the present. But, Mr. Editor, if I have said that the points, to which your Correspondent "M" has alluded, were of little import to the 88th Regiment, or the army in general, it does not follow that what I am now going to speak about is not of importance to both. It is a point that strikes hard at the honour-the very vitals-of a corps. It is the charge made by Mr. Robinson, in his work, against the 88th Regiment, on the score of their ammunition.

The 88th Regiment, according to Mr. Robinson's "informant," was found frequently, upon going into action, deficient, by the half, of their cartridges, and the men, it would seem, substituted in place of them pieces of wood "cut and coloured," to resemble ball. Now, in what action did this occur? Was it at Busaco, where they with a few companies of their brave companions, the 45th, overthrew the 2nd, 4th, 36th, and the Irish brigade belonging to Regnier's corps? Those four French regiments were at least six times the number of the 45th and the "ragged rascals." Was it at,Fuentes d'Onore, where the 9th French light infantry, and some hundreds of the Imperial Guard, were driven from the chapel

heights, through the town into the river, and across the river, by five companies of the 88th, and a few men of the 71st, and 79th regiments? Those French troops were about five times the number of the 71st, 79th, and the ragged rascals!" Was it at the breach of Rodrigo, where General Picton told the Rangers of Connaught, (not the "ragged rascals,") "that it was not his intention to expend any powder that evening, that the business should be done with the could iron ?" At this same breach the senior Lieutenant of the 88th volunteered, and led the forlorn hope of Picton's division, a Major of the 74th followed, with the storming party, this forlorn hope. Both officers escaped without even a wound. The Major of the 74th was promoted, but the senior Lieutenant of the 88th was not promoted-not even noticed! Was this "unqualified praise,"was it justice? Perhaps Mr. Robinson's "informant was at Rodrigo, and can tell him something about this! I have myself no doubt but that he was there, and that hearing Picton make his splendid, though short appeal to the 88th, perhaps caught hold only of that part of it which said, that no powder was to be expended, and took it for granted that there was none to expend! Fie! what a shame for any man, much less an officer, to mislead an author to such an extent, and now after so long a lapse of time to lend his aid in endeavouring to crush a regiment that has already suffered such degradation and injustice at the hands of General Picton, as the ill-fated 88th has endured! Did the 88th want ammunition at Badajoz, where Lieutenant Whitelaw, of that regiment, led the advance with the ladders, against the castle, and died unnoticed? Did the men' that carried the fort of La Picurina want ammunition? At the storming of this fort, one of the most desperate affairs, for the numbers engaged, that occurred during the Peninsular War, a force of five hundred men from Picton's division was taken out of the trenches, this force was divided into three parts, and each attacked the point marked out for it. The three Officers that commanded were wounded before the fort was carried. The command then devolved upon Captain Oates of the 88th. This Officer was a Captain of some nine or ten years standing,-a splendid soldier in the fullest acceptation of the word. He found himself in a dangerous situation, as to success; for his ladders were too short to reach the embrasures. He called out to the men, who, by the way, were all 88th, to run the ladders up the counterscarp, and throw them across the fosse. The men did so, and thus a sort of bridge was formed. Oates put himself at their head, carried the fort, and fell wounded so desperately that it took one year to enable him to recover and join his regiment. At the time he was thus wounded, he was in command of the entire-he, in fact, was commanding officer. It may be asked, what was his recompense for this service? Just the same as the leader of the forlorn hope at Rodrigo; he was neither promoted nor noticed by his General! Did the 88th want ammunition at Salamanca, where the 45th, 74th, and 88th regiments, not counting, altogether, more than 1500 men, and led on by the gallant and chivalrous Colonel Alexander Wallace, of the 88th, overthrew, and knocked the heart's-blood out of the French 7th division? This French division was four times the number of the 45th, 74th, and the "ragged rascals." They struck the first blow, and struck it well, on the memorable 22nd of July, 1812; and having said so much so far, may I ask, where, and on what occasion was it, that the "ragged rascals" were found deficient?

It was utterly impossible that such a practice, as that of substituting "coloured wood" for cartridges could have taken place in the 88th, without detection; and I never knew an instance of the regiment wanting ammunition in battle. The ammunition of the corps, in common, believe, with the others that composed the army, was inspected daily, and a certificate of such inspection signed by the company's Officer, who made the inspection, on the back of the morning report of the state and strength of his company. The 88th was too well commanded to allow

any relaxation on this essential point. Colonel Wallace, as well as his Officers, knew, that not only the honour of the regiment, but the honour of the British army, and the honour of the British nation, was at stake, in the contest we were engaged in. But, independent of this, supposing the Officers to be so degraded a set of scoundrels, as to be totally dead to any such feeling, as I think did exist, on so vital a point, amongst us all, the lives of the men, as well as the Officers themselves, might be forfeited by our thus disarming ourselves, and any Colonel, or any set of Officers who could allow so high a crime to pass unpunished, would deserve to be, not only cashiered, but sent to the galleys for life.

If such atrocious conduct, on the part of the Officers of the 88th Regiment be true, why did not General Picton immediately report it, and demand a Court Martial upon them? That would have been but his duty. This would have been doing real justice to the 88th; for by so acting he could have got a Colonel and a set of Officers over the men that were trustworthy; and a set of Officers amongst whom, during the four years of his command, he might have found one, at least, worthy of promotion or notice. Now, General Picton never having done as I say he should, he must have either connived at the infamous conduct of the regiment, Officers as well as soldiers, or the entire story is a mere fabrication. If the Officers connived at, or could be duped by such conduct on the part of their men, they should have been dismissed the service for infamy or incapacity. And if the General of the division connived at such infamy or incapacity on the part of the Officers of any regiment under his command, he was equally culpable as they, and should be likewise dismissed the service. It then comes to this, that Colonel Wallace, and the Officers of the 88th, as likewise General Picton, should have been turned out of the service; or, that all have been most foully calumniated. There can be no distinction between them. An Officer who does not know the merits or demerits of his men is unfit to command them. A General who is similarly circumstanced is equally unfit. The story of the "coloured wood," in point of argument, whether true or false, is the same. If true, the General, the Colonel, and all the Officers, so implicated, should have been, not only turned out of the service, but degraded, and their names held up to public scorn. If false, both General and Officers, as likewise the soldiers, have been libelled, foully libelled.

No knot, no matter how closely tied, can be more binding than the charge made by Mr. Robinson against the 88th Regiment and General Picton. And both the General and the Officers of the 88th Regiment must stand or fall together! They are both placed in the same predicament. The fate of the third division; the fate of a battle; the fate of a campaign; the fate of the Peninsula! might be decided by the inefficiency of a regiment only half-armed when called upon at the moment of necessity. Thus then, the General who could allow such a practice to be carried on under his own eye, was not fit to hold a command, Both the General and the Officers of the regiment, for both must be linked together, so incapacitated, were unfit to remain in the Peninsula. But where is the man who will say, that Picton was not a fit person to command his invincible old third division; that was never defeated; or, that the ill-fated 88th Regiment did not stand by him, and add a stone, I do not say the coin-stone, that has raised the monument of his fame to the pinnacle upon which it now stands? Oh! shame! The biographer of General Picton, instead of adding to the fame of his friend, in his endeavour to brand the 88th Regiment with infamy, has committed an historical suicide. He has, in fact, murdered the man whose life he attempted!

Now, Mr. Editor, to you, who know so well the habits of the British soldier, it would be but taking up your time unnecessarily to say, that the men of the 88th Regiment would, and did, in common with all the regiments in the army, exchange their ammunition for wine, where oppor