approach it can be made without imminent danger. That she has declared districts in a state of blockade which all her united forces would be unable to blockade, such as entire coasts and the whole of an empire.

5. That this monstrous abuse of the right of blockade has no other aim than to prevent communication among the nations and to raise the commerce and the industry of England upon the ruins of that of the continent.

6. That, since this is the obvious aim of England, whoever deals of the continent in English goods, thereby favours and renders himself an accomplice of her designs.

7. That this policy of England, worthy of the earliest stages of barbarism, has profited that power to the detriment of every other nation.

8. That it is a natural right to oppose such arms against an enemy as he makes use of, and to combat in the same way as he combats. Since England has disregarded all ideas of justice and every high sentiment, due to the civilisation among mankind, we have resolved to apply to her the usages which she has ratified in her maritime legislation.

The provisions of the present decree shall continue to be looked upon as embodying the fundamental principles of the Empire until England shall recognise that the law of war is one and the same on land and sea, and that the rights of war cannot be extended so as to include private property of any kind or the persons of individuals unconnected with the profession of arms and that the right of blockade shall be restricted to fortified places actually invested by sufficient forces.

We have consequently decreed and do decree that which follows:

ARTICLE I.-The British Isles are declared to be in a state of blockade.

ART. II. All commerce and all correspondence with the British Isles is forbidden. Consequently letters or packages directed to England or to an Englishman or written in the English language shall not pass through the mails and shall be seized.

ART. III.-Every individual who is an English subject, of whatever state or condition he may be, who shall be discovered in any country occupied by our troops or by those of our allies, shall be made a prisoner of war.

ART. IV. All warehouses, merchandise or property of whatever kind belonging to a subject of England shall be regarded as a lawful prize.

ART. V. Trade in English goods is prohibited, and all goods belonging to England or coming from her factories or her colonies are declared a lawful prize.

ART. VI. Half of the product resulting from the confiscation of the goods and possessions declared a lawful prize by the preceding articles shall be applied to indemnify the merchants for the losses they have experienced by the capture of merchant vessels taken by English cruisers.

ART. VII. No vessel coming directly from England or from the English colonies or which shall have visited these since the publication of the present decree shall be received in any port.

ART. VIII. Any vessel contravening the above provision by a false declaration shall be seized, and the vessel and cargo shall be confiscated as if it were English property.

ART. IX.-Our Court of Prizes at Paris shall pronounce final judgment in all cases arising in our Empire or in the countries occupied by the French Army relating to the execution of the present decree. Our Court of Prizes at Milan shall pronounce final judgment in the said cases which may arise within our Kingdom of Italy.

ART. X.-The present decree shall be communicated by our minister of foreign affairs to the King of Spain, of Naples, of Holland and of Etruria, and to our other allies whose subjects like ours are the victims of the unjust and barbarous maritime legislation of England.

ART. XI.-Our ministers of foreign affairs, of war, of the navy, of finance and of the police, and our Directors General of the port are charged with the execution of the present decree so far as it effects them.

Done by the Emperor,
HUGUE MARET,

(Signed)

NAPOLEON.

Ministerial Secretary of State.

111. THE PENINSULAR WAR (1808-13).

Napoleon's Spanish policy was beyond doubt a blunder, and British troops, after much mismanagement between 1793 and 1807, were at length given a chance to prove their metal in the Peninsular War. There they made Europe see that the French could be beaten, and in the person of Wellington they

developed a general of all but the highest class. The Peninsular War is a fine historical subject, and has been worthily treated by Sir William Napier, who fought in it with distinction. At the close of his work he offers some general considerations on the contest, and a quotation therefrom is reprinted because it brings out well the respective qualities of the troops engaged. Napier's comparison of Napoleon and Wellington is also a striking piece of composition, based on careful military observation. SOURCE.-History of the War in the Peninsula. Sir W. Napier (17851860). London, 1853. Vol. vi., p. 193.

Napoleon's system of war was admirably adapted to draw forth and augment the military excellence and to strengthen the weakness of the national character. His discipline, severe, but appealing to the feelings of hope and honour, wrought the quick temperament of the French soldiers to patience under hardships, and strong endurance under fire; he taught the generals to rely on their own talents, to look to the country wherein they made war for resources, and to dare everything even with the smallest numbers, that the impetuous valour of France might have full play: hence the violence of their attacks. But he also taught them to combine all arms together, and to keep strong reserves that sudden disorders might be repaired and the discouraged troops have time to rally and recover their pristine spirit; certain that they would then renew the battle with the same confidence as before. He thus made his troops, not invincible indeed, nature had put a bar to that in the character of the British soldier; yet so terrible and sure in war that the number and greatness of their exploits surpassed those of all other nations, the Romans not excepted if regard be had to the shortness of the period, nor the Macedonians if the quality of their opponents be considered.

Look at their amazing toils in the Peninsular war alone, which though so great and important was but an episode in their military history. "In Spain large armies will starve and small armies will be beaten," was the saying of Henry IV. of France, and it was not the light phrase of an indolent king, but the profound conclusion of a sagacious general. Yet Napoleon's enormous armies were so wonderfully organized that they existed and fought in Spain for six years, and without cessation; for to them winters and summers were alike; they endured incredible toils and privations, yet were not starved out, nor

And for

were their small armies beaten by the Spaniards. their daring and resource a single fact recorded by Wellington will suffice. They captured more than one strong place in Spain without any provision of bullets save those fired at them by their enemies, having trusted to that chance when they formed the siege! Before the British troops they fell; but how terrible was the struggle, how many defeats they recovered from, how many brave men they slew; what changes and interpositions of fortune occurred before they could be rolled back upon their own frontiers! And this is the glory of England, that her soldiers and hers only were capable of overthrowing them in equal battle. I seek not to defraud the Portuguese of his well-earned fame, nor to deny the Spaniard the merit of his constancy; but what battle except Baylen did the Peninsulars win? What fortress did they take by siege? What place defend? Sir Arthur Wellesley twice delivered Portugal.` Sir John Moore's march to Sahagun saved Andalusia and Lisbon from invasion at a critical moment. Sir Arthur's march to Talavera delivered Gallicia. Graham saved Cadiz. Smith saved Tariffa. Wellington recaptured Ciudad and Badajos, rescued Andalusia from Soult, and Valencia from Suchet; the Anglo-Sicilian army preserved Alicant, and finally recovered Taragona and Barcelona under the influence of the northern operations, which at the same time reduced Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. England indeed could not alone have triumphed in the struggle, but for her share let this brief summary speak.

She expended more than one hundred millions sterling on her own operations, she subsidised both Spain and Portugal, and with her supplies of clothing, arms, and ammunition maintained the armies of each even to the guerillas. From thirty up to seventy thousand British troops were employed by her; and while her naval squadrons harassed the French with descents upon the coasts, and supplied the Spaniards with arms and stores and money after every defeat, her land forces fought and won nineteen pitched battles and innumerable combats, made or sustained ten sieges, took four great fortresses, twice expelled the French from Portugal, preserved Alicant, Carthagena, Tarifa, Cadiz, Lisbon; they killed, wounded and took two hundred thousand enemies, and the bones of forty thousand British soldiers lie scattered on the plains and mountains of the Peninsula. For Portugal she re-organised a native army and supplied officers who led it to victory; and to the whole Peninsula she gave a general whose like has seldom gone forth

And all this and more was necessary to redeem

to conquer.
that land from France!

Wellington's campaigns furnish lessons for generals of all nations, but they must always be especial models for British commanders in future continental wars; because he modified and reconciled the great principles of art with the peculiar difficulties which attend generals controlled by politicians who prefer parliamentary intrigue to national interests. An English commander must not trust his fortune. He dare not risk much, however conscious he may be of personal resources, when one disaster will be his ruin at home; his measures must be subordinate to this primary consideration. Wellington's caution, springing from that source, has led friends and foes alike into wrong conclusions as to his system of war; the French call it want of enterprise, timidity; the English have denominated it the Fabian system. These are mere phrases. His system was the same as that of all great generals. He held his army in hand, keeping it with unmitigated labour always in a fit state to march or to fight, and acted indifferently as occasion offered on the offensive or defensive, displaying in both a complete mastery of his art. Sometimes he was indebted to fortune, sometimes to his natural genius, always to his untiring industry, for he was emphatically a painstaking man.

That he was less vast in his designs, less daring in execution, neither so rapid nor so original a commander as Napoleon, must be admitted; and being later in the field of glory it is to be presumed he learned something of the art from that greatest of all masters. Yet something besides the difference of genius must be allowed for the difference of situation; Napoleon was never, even in his first campaign of Italy, so harassed by the French as Wellington was by the English, Spanish and Portuguese governments: their systems of war were however alike in principle, their operations being only modified by their different political positions. Great bodily exertion, unceasing watchfulness, exact combinations to protect their flanks and communications without scattering their forces; these were common to both; in defence firm, cool, enduring, in attack fierce and obstinate; daring when daring was politic, yet always operating by the flanks in preference to the front; in these things they were alike; in following up a victory the English general fell short of the French emperor. The battle of Wellington was the stroke of a batteringram, down went the wall in ruins; the battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a mighty wave before which the barrier yielded and the roaring flood poured onwards covering all.