Consciousness and QualiaThis is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc. Consciousness is analyzed as the "having" of "qualia." Phenomenal properties or "qualia" are problematical because they lack appropriate bearers. The relation of "having" is problematical because none of the typical candidates for this relation introspection, inner monitoring, higher level thoughts is capable of explaining what it looks like to have a quale . The "qualia problem" is solved by introducing a bundle theory of phenomenal objects. Phenomenal objects are bundles of qualia. Thus there is no need for independent qualia bearers. The "having problem" is solved by introducing a bundle theory of the self. To have a quale is for it to be in the bundle one is. Thus no further relations are needed to explain how qualia are had. This study strives for phenomenological adequacy. Thus the first-person point of view dominates throughout. (Series A) |
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account of consciousness act/object adverbialism adverbialist answer appeal to phenomenology appears argue argument from illusion Armstrong assumption belief thesis blindsighted brain bundle theory celluloid qualia Chapter Chisholm claim cognitive color colored-brain concrete secondary quality Dennett DIRE realism discussion Dretske eliminativism epistemic exemplify existence explain explanandum Feigl first-person perspective having-problem heterophenomenology homogeneous identity theory illusion of concrete illusory instantiated intentional objects intrinsic introspection introspectionism look Lycan matter mental paint Mentalese metaphysical mind monism monistic Nagel nature nature-problem neutral neutral monism nonveridical experience notion one's Oscar panpsychism perception phenomenal properties phenomenal qualities phenomenal red phenomenology philosophical philosophy of mind pink Pollock possible worlds present problem problematic qualia-bearers qualitative beliefs qualitative consciousness qualophile question rational architecture red quale relocated qualia relocationist representation representationalism Rosenthal Russell sciousness Section seems sensation sense sense-data silver-screen qualia simple sort theory of consciousness theory of experience things tion tomato